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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Adjudication: Process of settling disputes in court before a judge or magistrate, in accordance 
with the formalities and procedures required by law (ILO, 2013). 
Award (determination): Written decision of an arbitration hearing (ILO, 2013). 
Conciliation: Process where an independent and impartial third party assists the disputing parties 
to reach a mutually acceptable agreement to resolve their dispute (ILO, 2013). 
Dispute: Disagreement and conflict between two or more parties concerning a matter of mutual 
interest (ILO, 2013). 
Dispute resolution: A situation where a dispute ends and an agreement is reached as a result of 
consensus-based behaviour of the disputing parties with or without the assistance of a third-party 
conciliator (ILO, 2013). 
Employers’ organization: this is an organization whose membership consists of individual 
employers, other associations of employers or both with a purpose of protecting and promoting 
the collective interests of members, to present a united front in dealing with organizations and/or 
representatives of workers, as well as to negotiate for and provide services to members on labour-
related matters (ILO, 2013). 
Labour administration: These are public administration activities in the field of national labour 
policy (ILO, 2013). 
Labour officer: An employee of the labour administration system who may be engaged in labour 
inspection, industrial relations or employment service functions (ILO, 2013). In the case of Uganda 
it means the commissioner for labour, the district labour officer and the assistant labour officer. 
Trade union: An organization of workers/employees that associate together to achieve their 
common goals particularly related to the protection and improvement of the terms and conditions 
of employment (ILO, 2013). 
Ugandan: a citizen of Uganda.     
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study is to compare the dispute resolution systems of Uganda and South 
Africa. The historical developments of both systems were discussed so as to understand the 
factors that contributed to their growth or demise. From the study, it is clear to see that the 
Ugandan system’s development has been greatly affected with every regime change, between 
1894 to the present. The developments that were tackled are closely related to various historical 
and political phases through which Uganda has passed and these significant periods are 1894-
1962 (pre-independence), 1962-1971 (Obote 1), 1971-1979 (Amin), 1980-1985 (Obote II), 1986-
2006 (NRM) and 2006 to the present Multi-party system. The South African system on the other 
hand is divided into four eras with the first one beginning from 1870 to 1948, the second era from 
1948 to 1979, the third from 1979-1994 and the last era from 1994 to the present date. The South 
African system has been greatly influenced by the past government’s move to create a dual 
system of labour relations that was eventually removed.   
The two systems were compared using a framework created basing on literature by ILO (2013), 
Brand, Lotter, Mischke, & Steadman (1997) and Thompson (2010). The framework for 
comparison outlines the elements of a dispute resolution which include the nature of the dispute, 
coverage, processes, avenues and human resources. It further presents the criteria and possible 
indicators to evaluate the performance of the system which are legitimacy, efficiency, informality, 
affordability, accessibility, a full range of services, accountability and resources. The comparison 
highlighted the various differences between both countries. The study established differences in 
the nature of disputes as the Ugandan system does not differentiate between the different types 
of dispute unlike the South African system which differentiates them and has different avenues 
for their settlement, the fact that the South African system has a number of avenues to cater to 
the different types of disputes unlike the Ugandan system which only has one route beginning 
with the Labour officers and the Industrial court if unresolved. An evaluation of the performance 
of both systems brought to light the number of changes the Ugandan system has to undergo so 
as to meet the expectations of the International Labour Organisation and have an effective 
system. The South African system proves to be more legitimate, efficient, informal, affordable, 
and accessible than the Ugandan system. Further still the South African system provides a full 
range of services is more accountable and has enough resources when compared with the 
Ugandan system. 
Recommendations have been proposed at the end of the study, mainly for the Ugandan system 
as the South African system appears to be more advanced and more effective in dispute 
resolution by international standards. The recommendations suggested are creating an 
independent dispute resolution system, mass sensitisation on labour rights, accreditation of 
private agencies, create a separate dispute resolution system for the informal sector, proper 
routing of disputes, creation of an independent body to monitor the national system, encouraging 
the creation of more democratic workplaces, re-establish the industrial court and finally, employing 
and training more labour officers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. THE THEORY OF LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Dispute resolution is an important part of labour relations and the ability to settle disputes 
guarantees labour peace in any setting. Most countries have labour legislation which provides 
frameworks for the effective and expeditious resolution of labour disputes (Smith, 2008). 
Labour disputes and conflicts are part of our lives and part of any labour relations system and 
therefore cannot be eradicated, no matter how good the processes and techniques of dispute 
resolution are. Rather, conflict should be managed well without resorting to the use of power. 
Once conflict is handled, it ensures economic prosperity, labour peace and a mutually beneficial 
and enduring relationship for all concerned parties (Brand, Lotter, Mischke, & Steadman, 2008). 
Labour dispute resolution systems are at different levels. They cover different parties and 
distinguish between the different types of disputes. The different types of disputes are disputes of 
interest and disputes of rights. However, the distinction between the two is not always an easy 
one. A dispute of right pertains to a right that is provided for by the legislation, collective agreement 
and contract while an interest dispute arises because of the differences over the determination of 
future rights and obligations due to the failed attempt at collective bargaining. Interest disputes 
are not provided for, for example wage increase. There’s a further distinction made between 
individual and collective disputes. Individual disputes are those involving a single worker whereas 
collective disputes involve groups of workers usually represented by a trade union (Smith, 2008). 
The responsibility for resolving collective industrial disputes usually lies with the parties involved 
in the dispute itself and that’s why the parties to a dispute need to exhaust all the dispute 
resolution procedures availed to them. For example, the procedures provided by the collective 
agreement, if it is a collective dispute and when it is an individual dispute, there are procedures 
in many organisations which can be used before opting for external dispute resolution. When the 
internal processes have failed, a dispute can be referred to alternative dispute resolution 
processes which include conciliation, mediation, arbitration, facilitation and adjudication (Brand et 
al., 1997). 
According to the ILO (2013), for any dispute resolution system to be effective, it must have a set 
of goals it wishes to achieve. These goals should work hand in hand with each other to achieve 
success. These goals can also be used as criteria for evaluating whether a system is actually 
performing as expected. The set of goals for a labour dispute resolution system would include 
legitimacy, efficiency, informality, affordability, accessibility, a full range of services, accountability 
and resources.  
Labour Dispute Resolution would not be effective if it did not have the backing of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO has several conventions and recommendations which deal 
with dispute resolution. These provide guidance to member states through setting international 
labour standards and jurisprudence to help them establish and strengthen labour courts, industrial 
tribunals and dispute resolution mechanisms so that labour disputes are dealt with effectively. 
 
2. LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN UGANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
The Ugandan dispute resolution system has been shaped by the political history of the country. 
Uganda has had quite a number of regimes and they all came with different ideologies on how to 
manage labour and disputes within the country. This in turn deemed the country’s system very 
unstable resulting in an unreliable system to-date. The historical development is discussed in six 
phases, that is, 1894-1962 (pre-independence), 1962-1971 (Obote 1), 1971-1979 (Amin), 1980-
1985 (Obote II), 1986-2006 (NRM) and 2006- to-date (Multi-party system). Currently, the Ministry 
of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) is responsible for labour in the country. It 
is divided into a number of Directorates, including the Directorate of Labour. The Directorate of 
Labour, in turn, has three departments which are the Employment Services, Occupational Safety 
and Health and Labour, Industrial Relations and Productivity. The Employment Services 
Department is in charge of the Labour officers who in-turn are called upon to facilitate the 
settlement of employment disputes and are empowered to institute criminal or civil proceedings 
in the Industrial Court. All different types of disputes, that is, private sector and public sector 
disputes, collective and individual disputes, Unionised and nonunionised disputes, disputes of 
rights and interests and disputes from the essential services are all covered under the Labour 
Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006.  
The evolution of the South African labour dispute resolution movement can be divided into two 
eras. The first era is the pre-apartheid era which was from 1870 to 1994 and the second is the 
post-apartheid era which was from 1994 to today. The South African labour relations system is 
currently governed by the Labour Relations Act of 1995 which covers both interests and rights 
disputes as well as covering both private and public sector employees. Dispute resolution is 
provided by institutions such as the CCMA which happens to be a government funded but 
independent body which provides conciliation and arbitration. Certain disputes must be referred 
to the Labour Court for adjudication if attempts at conciliation fail. Decisions from the labour court 
can be appealed at the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The South African dispute resolution system was established in 1995 after the fall of apartheid 
with the enactment of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. The system was developed through 
dialogue with the government and social partners. At the time the designers had the opportunity 
to build on the strengths of the past, benchmark against countries where the labour dispute 
resolution systems were effective, and draft in accordance to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) conventions. The subsequent governance of the system is executed by the 
social partners who are also very active in the day-to-day operations. 
The Ugandan dispute resolution system, like South Africa with roots in the British legal system, 
was significantly overhauled in 2006 with a suite of new labour legislation. Pressure for the 
reforms came from the United States government. Prior to 2006, Uganda’s labour legislation 
embodied significant dispute resolution machinery, however, it also sought to contain and weaken 
the trade union movement, thus compromising the effectiveness of the labour dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The 2006 legislation has enacted a labour dispute resolution system implemented 
through the Directorate of Labour. A report developed by the International Labour Organisation in 
2004 recommended that a system like the South African dispute resolution system was too 
complicated for implementation in Uganda with one of the reasons given was that the trade union 
movement in Uganda was comparatively weak. The implementation of the 2006 dispute resolution 
system is however, only partial. 
Using a framework outlining the elements and the performance of an effective dispute resolution 
system developed based on the International Labour Organisation’s criteria and discussed in 
chapter one, this study aims to evaluate the dispute resolution systems of Uganda and South 
Africa against these criteria. Further, to compare the two systems in order to identify whether 
lessons from the South African system may be applied to the Ugandan system and lastly, to make 
recommendations for the strengthening of the Ugandan system. 
4. SCHEME OF THE PAPER 
The paper is divided into five chapters with each focusing on a specific theme. The first chapter 
will focus on the theory of labour dispute resolution and offer a framework for the comparison of 
the two systems. The second chapter will look at Uganda’s historical development of the trade 
dispute legislation, the trade union movement between the pre-independence period, 1894, to 
today and lastly a performance review of the dispute resolution system of the country. Chapter 
three will focus on the evolution of the South African labour dispute resolution movement and it 
will be divided into four eras which are from 1870 to 1948, the second era from 1948 to 1979, the 
third from 1979-1994 and the last era from 1994 to the present date. Lastly a review of the 
performance of the system will be discussed. Chapter four will be a comparison of the two systems 
and the last chapter will present conclusions and recommendations. 
Chapter two and chapter three primarily utilise secondary data from the existing literature. 
However unlike the South African system where there is an extensive body of literature that has 
described and critiqued the system, there has been relatively little written reviewing the current 
Ugandan system. Therefore, this researcher undertook a small sample of interviews to ascertain 
the current perceptions and use of the system. The interviewees were purposively selected by 
the researcher from persons in a range of different businesses. The findings from the interviews 
are incorporated in Chapter two as case studies. The list of interviewees is shown in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: List of respondents  
Number Name Job title Date interviewed 
1 Respondent 1 Liquor factory owner 05/11/2013 
2 Ms Birungi R Human Resources 
Manager 
15/09/2013 
3 Mr Agaba B Employee 20/09/2013 
4 Mr Niwamanya T Employee 10/10/2013 
5 Respondent 2 Entrepreneur/ retired 
lawyer 
20/10/2013 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORY OF LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Conflict is part of our lives and thus, it cannot be eradicated, no matter how good our processes 
and techniques of dispute resolution. Instead, conflict has to be managed as best as we can, and 
dispute resolution plays an important role in the management of conflict (Brand, Lotter, Mischke, 
& Steadman, 1997). 
Conflict resolution is a very important part of any well-functioning labour market. Where there are 
employment relationships, one finds disputes and there is a need to resolve them efficiently, 
effectively and equitably for the benefit of all the parties involved and consequently the economy 
at large. Thus, the dispute resolution machinery that is put in place to deal with such disputes is 
a crucial component of any country’s employment relations system. The dispute resolution options 
available to the social partners and to governments are numerous and range from informal 
negotiations all the way to formal litigation and may even include government intervention to 
resolve certain labour disputes in the public interest (ILO, 2007). 
This chapter will discuss conflict in the workplace by firstly establishing the difference between 
complaints, grievances and disputes and identifying different types of disputes namely disputes 
of interest or disputes of rights, and collective or individual disputes. Secondly, the chapter will 
further look at the goals of the labour dispute resolution system, different dispute resolution 
processes such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and the institutions dealing with dispute 
resolution. The chapter will lastly propose a framework for analysing the elements of the dispute 
resolution system and criteria to evaluate the performance of the system. 
 
      2. CONFLICT AT WORK 
2.1 Complaints, grievances and disputes 
According to Salamon (2000), all organisations require a process which allows employees to 
express, and seek to resolve dissatisfaction about their work situation, whether it is related to their 
terms and conditions of employment, working arrangement or managerial decisions. Although 
management may have an obvious interest in ensuring that employees are not dissatisfied, the 
grievance and dispute resolution process is primarily an employee mechanism. 
Conflict, grievances and disputes are indicators of a single process and should therefore be 
interconnected, not isolated from each other (Brand et al., 1997). However, a distinction among 
the three needs to be established. According to Salamon (2000), a complaint is where 
dissatisfaction is being expressed but not in a procedural way; a grievance is a partly formalised 
expression of individual or collective conflict, usually dissatisfaction in respect of workplace 
related matters and it may relate to a number of factors, for example the terms or interpretation 
of a collective agreement, managerial policies, actions of the employer or other employees, 
customs or practices in the workplace. A dispute on the other hand can be described as a highly 
formalised manifestation of conflict in relation to workplace related matters which may include the 
failure to address a grievance, or may be the outcome of negotiation or disciplinary processes. 
However, the variety of issues, their importance to both employees and management and how 
they are presented make it difficult to get a universalistic and precise definition of grievances, 
disputes and complaints. Furthermore, the issue of matters of rights and matters of interests, 
individual and collective disputes make the definition much more complex (Salamon, 2000).The 
essential difference between grievance and dispute lies in the way they are initiated and in the 
degree of proposed change in status quo.  Salamon (2000) suggests  that it is useful to regard 
complaints, grievances and disputes as overlapping segments of a continuum based 
predominantly on the manner and formality of presentation of employee dissatisfaction. Whether 
a specific situation is likely to be regarded as a dispute rather than a grievance depends on the 
degree of formality of its presentation, the organisational level at which it is initially raised and the 
extent to which both parties regard the outcome as establishing new terms and conditions of 
employment. This relationship as outlined by Salamon (2000) is shown in figure 1 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Degree of effect on  
 Status quo 
 
Formality and level 
 Matter of interest Of representation 
 
 
 
 
 Matter of right 
 
 Individual  Group         All employees 
 Extent of employees likely to be affected 
Figure 1:Typology of employee dissatisfaction (adapted from Salamon, 2000 p.554) 
Conflict and disputes can be reduced, but the nature of employee-employer interactions in a 
market economy points to the inevitability of conflict. Labour  relations in a market economy 
accepts and recognizes that employees and management have different interests and thus 
conflict has to arise but has to be managed (ILO, 2013). Having different interests, however, does 
not have to mean constant disputes. Employees and employers can work together to resolve their 
differences and reach a common understanding without disagreements escalating into formal 
disputes. 
 
2.2 Categories of disputes  
2.2.1 Collective and individual disputes 
Employment disputes are divided into two categories: individual and collective disputes. Individual 
disputes are those involving a single worker whereas collective disputes involve groups of workers 
usually represented by a trade union (ILO, 2007). 
Latent 
Dissatisfaction 
Dispute 
Grievance 
Complaint 
An individual dispute while usually  a disagreement between a single worker and his or her 
employer,  can also include situations in which a number of workers disagree with their employer 
over the same issue, but where each worker acts as an individual (ILO, 2013). 
A collective dispute on the other hand, is a disagreement between groups of workers usually, but 
not necessarily, represented by a trade union, and an employer or group of employers (ILO, 
2013).  
Individual disputes are usually seen as rights disputes whereas collective disputes can further be 
divided into two sub-categories: rights disputes and interests’ disputes (ILO, 2007). The difference 
between rights and disputes is explained below.   
2.2.2 Disputes of interests and disputes of rights 
Disputes of rights arise  from breaches of existing rights brought about by the  failure to implement 
or comply with rights granted by legislation, collective agreements or individual contracts of 
service. If no such source exists, its safe to assume that the dispute is one of interest (Anstey, 
Grogan, & Ngcukaitobi, 2011; Basson et al., 2005; Lotter & Mosime, 1993; ILO, 2007).  
According to Anstey et al., (2011), disputes of interest  should  be resolved by negotiations and 
in the absence of agreements, dispute resolution processes and industrial action. Disputes of 
interest are, therefore, those arising from the effort to secure a right, for example when parties 
attempt  to conclude, renew, alter or revise an existing agreement fails. One very common 
example of interest disputes are  disputes over core economic issues such as wage disputes 
(Lotter & Mosime, 1993; ILO, 2007). 
Conventionnal wisdom has it that disputes of right are amenable to adjudication and disputes of 
interest are best resolved by the respective power of the parties (Lotter & Mosime, 1993). 
 
3. THE GOALS OF A LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
According to Brand et al.,(1997), for any dispute resolution system to be effective, it must have a 
set of goals it wishes to achieve. These goals should work hand in hand with each other to achieve 
success.  
Besides the contribution to labour peace and economic prosperity, the function of a labour dispute 
resolution system should allow for disputes to be resolved without resorting to the use of power 
and further, once the dispute is resolved, the parties should feel able to continue to enjoy a 
mutually beneficial and enduring relationship (Brand et al, 2008). 
According to Brand et al. (2008), the overall goal of a labour dispute resolution sysytem differs 
perhaps from the outcome expectations of a normal civil dispute system because  the parties may 
have to continue a relationship beyond the resolution of the dispute. Thus, the set of goals for a 
labour dispute resolution system would include legitimacy , efficiency, informality, affordability, 
accessibility, a full range of services,  acountability and resources. These goals are further 
discussed below. 
3.1 Legitimacy  
For any labour dispute resolution system to be effective, it must be a product of the consent of 
the parties whose interests are at stake. Further, the substantive standards to be applied should 
satisfy public interest norms and standards. There are many actors and many viewpoints in any 
given society and the system should take them into consideration plus understand the historical, 
cultural, and social contexts so as to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of 
the entire community, and how this can be achieved (ILO, 2013;Thompson, 2010). 
Independence is also a very important element in establishing legitimacy. That is, a legitimate 
system should not belong to or be controlled by any political parties, business interests, 
employers, or trade unions and it should operate without interference from Government. This is 
to avoid any conflict of interest in relation to the parties or subject-matter and to ensure that the 
laws are enforced impartially. However, independence often does not mean financial 
independence from the Government, as dispute management systems operating as statutory 
bodies will be dependent on State funding (ILO,2013;Thompson, 2010). 
The protection of human rights, particularly those of minors, should also be the ultimate goal of a 
legitimate system, This can only be achieved by an independent judiciary, and transparent, 
impartial and incorruptible enforcement agencies (ILO, 2013)..  
The principle of voluntarism is also important in establishing legitimacy. The disputing parties 
should be free to decide whether to use the services (ILO, 2013). 
Lastly, the dispute resolution system, whether public or private, must be aligned or compatible 
with the wider system of workplace regulation and agreement. It should ultimately compliment 
and not undermine (Thompson, 2010). 
3.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency is the most important goal of a dispute resolution system according to Brand et al 
(1997). Efficiency as desired by the parties to labour disputes, is the requirement that disputes be 
speedily resolved. That is, disputes should be addressed quickly with the least procedural 
technicalities as there is a need for the disputing parties to have the dispute resolved quickly and 
not drag on indefinitely.  
The subject of time is also emphasised by the ILO (2013) with regards to the issue of 
responsiveness. That is, for efficiency to be achieved, the system needs to serve all stakeholders 
within a reasonable time frame. Besides, the requirement for speed of resolution, efficiency can 
also be achieved by decision makers being innovative; that is, being sufficiently flexible to respond 
to new situations and the needs of new stake holders. 
However, efficiency becomes a problem if it is the main consideration and aim of the system. That 
is, when efficiency becomes an end in itself, the system may find that it is in danger of losing sight 
of its function (Brand et al., 1997). 
3.3 Informality 
Informality means that parties involved should be able to approach the system virtually unaided. 
Procedures and operations should be clear, uncomplicated, and informal. The ideal of informality 
is based on the negative experience of legal proceedings being formal and technical in the 
extreme; in a perfect labour dispute resolution system, for example, a dismissed employee should 
be able to approach an institution unaided and where appropriate, obtain relief after having 
presented their case, in simple terms and using non-technical procedures. Thus, since the 
concept of informality includes the issue of legal representation, thought must be given to at which 
point in the process is legal representation desirable and allowed (Brand et al., 1997; ILO, 2013). 
3.4 Affordability 
An ideal labour dispute resolution system should be free or at the very least inexpensive. That is, 
the least privileged or the poor should be able to access the system. The Voluntary Conciliation 
and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), article 3(1) states that voluntary conciliation 
procedures should be free of charge (ILO, 2013). 
However, providing a free dispute resolution system is not easy and it comes at a heavy cost 
usually to the State. Commonly the system is paid for by the state as a service to its citizens, paid 
for by means of revenue obtained from the citizens themselves (Brand et al., 1997).  
3.5 Accessibility 
A dispute resolution system should ensure that all parties, including the most vulnerable, have 
easy access. That is, they should know where to go, who to approach and how to involve the 
dispute resolution institutions in their dispute. Furthermore, the concepts of informality and speed 
are closed linked to accessibility as there should be minimum formalities in obtaining assistance 
of the dispute resolution mechanisms and the parties must be able to call upon and get a response 
in a short space of time (Brand et al., 1997).  
The Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), article 3(2) provides 
that services should be made available at the request of any party to a dispute, and also be 
capable of being triggered at the initiative of the public institution with responsibility for overseeing 
labour relations (ILO, 2013). This is important because a state’s legitimacy  is derived from  
ensuring that all its citizens, especially the most vulnerable, feel that they have a stake in it and 
do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society.  
3.6 Range of services 
An effective dispute resolution system should aim at providing a range of services related to the 
prevention and resolution of disputes for both private and public sector clients. Services may 
cover the full range of disputes including individual and collective disputes and disputes of rights 
and interests. Examples of disputes could be about organizational rights, recognition for 
bargaining, interpretation of collective agreements, discrimination, unfair labour practices, 
retrenchments, dismissals and disputes over wage bargaining.  
The services should include the provision of information, advice, training, facilitation, 
investigations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication as well as conciliation-arbitration, 
and arbitration-conciliation sequences where appropriate. Very importantly, the availability of 
services such as advisory information and training assists employers and employees to prevent 
disputes from arising in the first place (ILO, 2013; Thompson, 2010). 
 
 
3.7 Accountability 
Accountability is an important goal of any institution and is not limited to only governmental 
institutions but also the private sector and civil society organizations. They must be held 
accountable to the public and those institutional stakeholders who will be affected by their 
decisions or actions (ILO, 2013). 
 
3.8 Resources 
In order to achieve the above goals, one of the crucial goals of any dispute resolution system is 
to have sufficient financial resources to meet the capital and operating expenditure associated 
with providing services to its clients. Expenses will include sufficient professional and support 
staff, adequate space and equipment, including computer and telecommunication systems. The 
personnel of the dispute resolution institutions are the most important resources as they play a 
decisive role in determining how efficiently the whole system works. They must therefore, be well 
qualified, have sound knowledge of the legal framework within which they are functioning and be 
able to provide support and training to the other parties within the system for example, the 
employers and the organisations and the employees and their organisations (Brand et al., 1997). 
The level of professionalism of the institutional personnel is extremely important as the users of 
the system need to know that the institution operates under an ethically sound governance 
structure (ILO, 2013). 
 
4. NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
This section deals with the various ILO conventions, recommendations and supervisory 
machinery relating to labour dispute resolution. These provide guidance to member states through 
setting international labour standards and jurisprudence to help them establish and strengthen 
labour courts, industrial tribunals and dispute resolution mechanisms so that labour disputes are 
dealt with effectively. 
4.1 ILO conventions, recommendations and supervisory machinery 
There are several ILO conventions dealing with dispute resolution and settlement. One of the first 
is the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
which emphasises the rights of both employers and workers to join organisations of their own 
choosing. Another convention is the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
1949 (No. 98) which deals with the establishment of specific principles for arbitration in the context 
of collective bargaining. That is, that arbitration should be freely chosen and that the parties should 
be bound by the final decision. Compulsory arbitration which is imposed by the authorities is 
generally contrary to the principle of voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and thus the 
autonomy of bargaining partners. There is an exception, however, in cases involving essential 
services, the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole 
or part of the population (ILO, 2007). Both of the above conventions are among the eight   
conventions advocated as fundamental by the ILO.   
Another important recommendation is the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92). It mentions that voluntary conciliation “should be made 
available to assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between employers and 
workers.” It emphasises that such procedures, which should be free and voluntary, should include 
equal representation of employers and workers. Parties should refrain from strikes or lockouts 
while conciliation or arbitration procedures are in progress, without limiting the right to strike (ILO, 
2007). 
Another instrument is the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154) which insists that the 
bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour disputes should be designed to contribute to 
the promotion of collective bargaining (Article 5(2)(e)). Although this convention focuses on 
collective bargaining, it does not rule out the use of conciliation and/or arbitration as part of the 
bargaining process provided  such processes are voluntary (Article 6). This is because one 
objective of dispute resolution is in fact to promote the mutual resolution of differences between 
workers and employers and, consequently, to promote collective bargaining and the practice of 
bipartite negotiation (ILO, 2007). 
Communications within the Undertaking Recommendation, 1967 (No. 129) is concerned with 
communications between management and workers within an undertaking. It underlines the 
importance of both workers and management creating a positive environment within the 
enterprise. This can only be achieved through the rapid dissemination and exchange of 
information, showing mutual respect, recognizing workers as stakeholders, consultation between 
both parties, addressing misunderstandings and building trust (ILO, 2013). 
The Examination of Grievances Recommendation, 1967 (No. 130) addresses dispute resolution 
at the enterprise level, including rights disputes over alleged violations of collective agreements. 
It sets out a number of recommendations on the development and implementation of workplace 
dispute mechanisms. It further recommends that where efforts to resolve the dispute have failed, 
there should be a possibility for final settlement either through the procedures set out by collective 
agreement, through conciliation or arbitration by the competent public authorities, through 
recourse to a labour court or other judicial authority, or through any other procedure which may 
be appropriate under national conditions (Paragraph 17) (ILO, 2007). 
When it comes to the public sector, the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 
151) renders that the settlement of disputes over the terms and conditions of employment is to be 
sought “through independent and impartial machinery, such as mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration, established in such a manner as to ensure the confidence of the parties involved” 
(Article 8) (ILO, 2007). 
Other ILO instruments refer to the role of the labour administration in resolving disputes. For 
example, the Labour Administration Recommendation, 1978 (No. 158) provides that the 
“competent bodies within the system of labour administration should be in a position to provide, 
in agreement with the employers' and workers' organisations concerned, conciliation and 
mediation facilities, appropriate to national conditions, in case of collective disputes” (Paragraph 
10) (ILO, 2007). 
A full list of relevant international labour standards pertaining to dispute resolution and taken from 
the ILO (2013) is attached as Appendix 2.  
 
5. ELEMENTS OF A DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The design of a labour dispute resolution system begins with the classification of the nature of the 
dispute. As discussed in Section 2 above, conflict can be informal or when formal, classified as 
disputes, which can be deemed to be collective or individual and concerned with rights or 
interests. The other elements that need to be considered in a system are considered below.  
5.1 Coverage of the system 
Labour dispute resolution systems are at different levels (for example, national, industry, 
enterprise or plant) to cover different parties (for example, private or public sector, industry or 
enterprise, particular bargaining unit) and different types of disputes (for example collective or 
individual, rights or interest)  
The responsibility for resolving collective industrial disputes usually lies with the parties involved 
in the dispute itself, reflecting the principles of autonomy and voluntarism, which are important 
features of genuine collective bargaining and freedom of association. The social partners usually 
enjoy a great deal of latitude in settling their own disputes and in deciding upon the strategies for 
doing so, either through direct negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration, or even through 
the use of industrial action (ILO, 2007).  
However, it is common to encounter rules requiring compulsory conciliation, mediation or 
arbitration in certain circumstances, resulting in enforceable awards and agreements. Under 
Finnish law for example, mediation is compulsory although there is no obligation to reach an 
agreement. In some situations, dispute resolution may only be mandatory where the dispute 
arises in a particular sector such as the public sector or in cases where the dispute affects the 
delivery of “essential” public services (ILO, 2007). 
In some situations, recourse to compulsory arbitration in cases where parties do not reach 
agreement through collective bargaining is permissible only in the context of essential services in 
the strict sense of the term that is, services the interruption of which would endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population (ILO, 2007). 
5.2 The dispute resolution process 
5.2.1 Internal processes 
Complaints, grievances and disputes often arise within a workplace. Resolving conflict within the 
workplace requires both dispute prevention and dispute resolution processes. Dispute prevention 
is particularly relevant in the case of individual disputes and requires that there are policies and 
procedures to deal with grievances and discipline (ILO, 2013, p 180). The internal dispute 
resolution process requires some form of dialogue between employees and management. 
Management’s response will be determined by their perception of the employee’s dissatisfaction 
and their assessment of the likely implications of any solution for the maintenance of policies and 
strategies (Salamon, 2000).  
Where there is an established relationship between employers or managers and employee 
representatives, and where negotiations take place, there will be a dispute settlement procedures 
agreed upon by both the employers and their employees taking into consideration whether the 
dispute is a dispute of interest and dispute of rights and whether it concerns just a single employee 
or a group. This procedure usually covers details of how the dispute will be declared, time limits 
for the other party to reply, a number of conciliation meetings, the possibility of mediation or 
arbitration and finally details of what should happen if the dispute is unresolved. Normally, the 
dispute will go to arbitration, statutory machinery or strike or lockout if the parties have the right 
to do either. In disputes of rights, particularly those dealing with individual employees, details of 
support and representation would also be dealt with in the procedures (Salamon, 2000).   
Best practice would also contend that even in the absence of  employee organisations and 
representatives, organisations should have established clear grievance and disciplinary 
procedures to deal with individual and collectives grievances and disputes that may arise (Bendix, 
2010; Salamon, 2000, ILO, 2013).  
5.2.2 Consensus-based processes 
Many laws place great emphasis on consensus seeking as a first step in dispute resolution. Most 
disputes are required to be dealt with in a consensus-seeking process before they become subject 
of industrial action or are decided either by an arbitrator or a judge. For example, some of the 
primary consensus-seeking processes contemplated in the South African Labour Relations Act 
1995 are conciliation and facilitation (Brand et al., 1997). 
a) Mediation 
Mediation is a form of third party intervention into disputes which aims at assisting parties in a 
dispute to find a mutually acceptable settlement. Mediators don’t have authority to make decisions 
but can facilitate settlement searches through the negotiation process. Mediation can be used in 
community conflicts, hostage crises, domestic and divorce situations, environmental conflicts, 
labour management relations etc. (Anstey et al., 2011). 
In many instances mediation and conciliation are used interchangeably (ILO, 2013) however, 
Anstey et al (2011) draw a distinction.  
The difference between mediation and conciliation is mediation refers to the intervention of a third 
party to resolve industrial disputes amicably while conciliation refers to working with two opposing 
parties, with the intention of reaching a mutual settlement to a dispute (Anstey et al,. 2011). 
Conciliation is discussed further below. 
b) Conciliation  
Conciliation is the preferred first stage in any dispute resolution process. Although in some 
instances, parties go straight to third party decision-making processes like adjudication or 
arbitration, it has been common for parties to initially conciliate rather that arbitrate disputes of 
interest (Brand et al., 1997). 
Conciliation is very helpful for a number of reasons, for example when relationships, speed, 
confidentiality and communication are vital. It is also important when parties want to control the 
outcome but cannot find the solution themselves (Brand et al., 1997). 
In private conciliation, as opposed to statutory systems, the choice of the conciliator is the most 
important issue on which parties need to agree.  The factors which influence the choice of the 
conciliator include that the conciliator be independent of the parties and have no interest in the 
issues in dispute; the conciliator should be appropriately trained and have some knowledge of 
and experience in the labour relations field (Brand et al., 1997). They are chosen voluntarily by 
the parties and have the duties and powers that are assigned to them by agreement between the 
parties (Brand et al., 1997). 
Conciliators are usually trained to follow a systematic problem-solving approach in conciliation. 
They do this both in joint-meetings with the parties and in side meetings with one party. 
Throughout the conciliation, the conciliator considers when to separate the parties into side 
parties. This is done if it is considered that a joint meeting is not conducive to consensus-building 
and the process may be better managed by having a side meeting. The conciliator can bring the 
parties together after the side meetings when a joint-meeting will be helpful to the process. The 
usual indications of a need to separate are high levels of anger, emotion or abuse, or a need for 
confidential discussions between the conciliator and a party. These side meetings can also be 
used to explore options, develop proposals, explore the potential for movements and to challenge 
the parties (Brand et al., 1997). 
c) Facilitation 
Facilitation is similar to conciliation as it also involves the use of an independent third party with 
the purpose of helping both parties reach an agreement and deal with the conflicts and disputes. 
Facilitation aims at “getting both parties to the table” as the facilitator frequently finds 
himself/herself helping parties identify which other parties should join the facilitation. At times 
facilitations usually involve large numbers of participants and therefore require the use of more 
than one facilitator. The issues dealt with in facilitation usually concern structures and 
relationships and a more cooperative approach is adopted. The issues may not arise from a 
disputes but may be seen as more preventative  (Brand et al., 1997). The ILO (2013) view 
facilitation as a pre-conciliation process where the conciliator encourages the parties to interact 
with each other in order to obtain a better appreciation of the issues.  
5.2.3 Referral-based processes 
a) Arbitration 
Arbitration is a process whereby parties to a dispute agree to refer the issue to an independent 
and impartial third party (the arbitrator) to decide the matter and make an award which they accept 
as final and binding upon them. It is a form of adjudication and should therefore be distinguished 
from mediation and conciliation even though in both processes the two parties agree to refer a 
dispute to a third party (Lotter & Mosime, 1993; ILO, 2007). 
This quasi-judicial process, in which a neutral party renders a decision, is generally considered to 
be an option of last resort in cases where the social partners cannot otherwise resolve their 
differences. More specifically, arbitration typically follows after attempts at mediation and/or 
conciliation between the parties have proven unsuccessful (ILO, 2007). 
The arbitration process involves the three different actors, that is the representatives of the two 
opposing parties and the arbitrator getting together in what is referred to as a hearing. At the 
hearing, the representatives present all the relevant factual information to the arbitrator and also 
make submissions as to what conclusions the arbitrator should reach and having regard to the 
applicable legal principles, what the ultimate outcome should be. The arbitrator then proceeds to 
examine all the facts introduced through evidence and the submissions made by the different 
representatives. He considers the provisions of any collective agreement and any prior decisions 
by other arbitrators (or judicial system) that deal with similar problems and then makes an award 
(Lotter & Mosime, 1993). 
b) Adjudication   
According to Smith (2008), adjudication is a process where a judge reviews evidence and 
argumentation including legal reasoning set forth by opposing parties to come to a judgement 
which determines the rights between parties involved. Thus adjudication is part of the court and 
judicial system and subject to the formalities of the legal system (ILO, 2013).  
5.3 Avenues of a dispute resolution system 
5.3.1 Legislation 
According to ILO (2007), every country has some legislative rules for dispute resolution covering 
all manner of individual and collective disputes. In certain cases, the framework is part of a 
country’s general labour law or code or in other cases, the rules regarding dispute resolution are 
found scattered across a host of different statutes, regulations or decrees governing labour 
relations. Still other countries adopt singular pieces of legislation that deal primarily with labour 
dispute resolution; for example South Africa currently has the Labour Relations Act of 1995.  
No matter what form they take, laws on dispute resolution commonly addresses a range of similar 
issues covering, for instance, the status of the parties involved in a dispute, their corresponding 
rights and obligations during the course of a dispute (for example cooling off periods in relation to 
industrial action) and detailing the different mechanisms and processes for resolving the dispute 
(ILO, 2007). 
Though some countries have extensive legal rules and other countries have no specific provisions 
pertaining to dispute resolution, we must note that more rules do not automatically lead to a more 
effective dispute resolution machinery. This is because a system with many rules could tend to 
be very complex and bureaucratic (ILO, 2007). 
5.3.2. Dispute resolution agencies 
Dispute resolution agencies vary from country to country. As noted in Article 1 of the ILO’s 
Recommendation No. 92 concerning Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration, dispute management 
systems must be appropriate to national conditions. This is essential to ensuring the system is 
effective and in engendering the confidence and trust of its users (ILO, 2013). In general, however, 
dispute management systems fall into three main categories, as follows. 
a) Ministries or Departments of Labour 
National and state labour administrators are responsible for labour dispute prevention and 
resolution as part of a public service. The processes of conciliation and arbitration are firmly in 
the hands of labour department officials though circumstances may allow for some limited 
involvement of private agencies in the dispute resolution process. This is evident in many African, 
Asian, European, Arab and American countries (ILO, 2013). 
b) Independent statutory bodies 
Labour dispute prevention and resolution is the responsibility of these state founded bodies. 
These bodies however, operate with a degree of autonomy and independence from political 
parties, businesses, and trade unions and are not part of the central labour administration but 
rather part of the wider labour administration system They fall under the responsibility of an 
independent commission, authority, or similar body operating under its own legislation, and with 
its own governing council or board. These bodies are regarded as modern independent as they 
support the involvement of private agencies in the dispute resolution process for example the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) in the United States, the Advisory Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service (ACAS) in the United Kingdom, the Commission for Conciliation Mediation 
and Arbitration (CCMA) in South Africa, Tanzania’s Commission for Mediation and Arbitration 
(CMA). As independent statutory bodies, such commissions are not part of the central labour 
administration but are part of the wider labour administration system (ILO, 2013). 
c) Shared arrangements 
Labour dispute prevention and resolution is partly the responsibility of the labour administration 
and partly the responsibility of an independent body. Other types of shared arrangements can be 
the involvement of employers’ organisations, trade unions or social partners (ILO, 2013). 
d) Private dispute Resolution agencies 
Most countries give provisions in their labour related acts for parties to resolve their dispute 
through private processes which is commonly referred to as private dispute resolution. Parties to 
a labour dispute may at any time agree on their own dispute settlement mechanism for example 
mediation or arbitration maybe undertaken in private agencies and both parties will also determine 
their own terms of reference and powers (Smith, 2008). However private dispute resolution 
agencies have not been favoured by many. In the South African context for example, it is argued 
that they should be avoided because their continued use would undermine the legitimacy of the 
statutory system established by consensus. However the Labour Relations Act of 1995 tries to 
establish a relation between the statutory and private systems of dispute resolution whereby the 
statutory body may accredit private systems of dispute resolution (Anstey et al., 2011). 
 
 
5.4 Human Resources 
The individuals or groups involved with  a labour dispute resolution system and processes are 
legal personnel for example lawyers and judges; para-legal personnel for example case workers, 
commissioners for conciliation and arbitration, and consultants; and finally the users of the 
system, for example representatives of employee collectives and employers represented by 
management.  
The following section deals with how individuals operating within dispute resolution structures 
may be selected and what should be their general competencies. 
5.4.1 Human Resources attached to dispute resolution institutions  
For personnel within the system to be accepted and to have credibility, they are typically appointed 
through a bipartite or tripartite consultative process involving the State, employer organizations 
and trade unions (Thompson, 2010). For example, the Commission for Conciliation and Mediation 
and Arbitration (CCMA) in South Africa is required by statute to be independent of the State, any 
political party, trade union, employer, employers’ organization, federation of trade unions or 
federation of employers’ organizations. The governing body of the Commission is constituted on 
a tripartite basis. This body is charged with selecting the panels of professional managers and 
commissioners charged with carrying out the Commission‘s work. The management and 
commissioners selected must be independent and competent and representative in respect of 
race and gender. They are also required to operate under an exacting code of conduct. 
Dispute resolvers have to have the right qualifications and knowledge of the legal framework 
within which they are functioning. The dispute resolution systems should also clearly and 
unequivocally formulate policy on certain issues to guide the resolvers within the framework. 
Consistency in approach to dispute resolution is proof of such a system (Brand et al., 1997).  
One important skill that resolvers need to possess is the ability to negotiate. Negotiation requires 
insight, structure and a great deal of practice if it is to be undertaken to good effect. If bargaining 
is to be productive, then it is important that the resolvers undergo prior training in negotiation skills 
and also education in underlying bargaining perspectives. Only with knowledge of the choices 
available can the negotiators make informed and, better still, wise decisions on the best 
bargaining approaches to adopt (Thompson, 2010). 
Dispute resolvers should also be sensitive to the nature, extent and consequence of the dispute. 
They should also never lose focus of the fact that their role is to attempt to resolve disputes in an 
appropriate manner with consideration to the both parties’ relationships, their needs and interest 
regardless of the power they wield. Other personal characteristics include being fair, unbiased 
and independent.  The way the resolvers handle the process and go about their work determines 
the trust the parties have in the system itself (Brand et al., 1997). 
Although many of the statutory bodies involved in dispute resolution have a responsibility of 
information sharing and education e.g. South Africa’s CCMA, awareness-raising and information-
giving on dispute prevention and resolution matters is not the responsibility of the concerned 
government department or statutory authority alone. Trade unions and employers’ organizations 
also have a vital role to play. Through their networks and direct contact with their members they 
should keep their members informed of new policies and laws, as well as operational procedures 
should a member become involved in a labour dispute (ILO, 2013). 
5.4.2 Trade Unions and their role in dispute prevention and resolution  
Trade unions are organizations of workers who come together to achieve common goals such as 
protecting the integrity of its trade, achieving higher pay, increasing the number of employees an 
employer hires, and better working conditions. However their most important role is to maintain 
or improve the conditions of their members’ employment. The trade union, through its leadership, 
bargains with the employer on behalf of union members and negotiates labour contracts with 
employers. They are highly structured organisations, aware of their strength and clear as to their 
position in relation to other social partners, employers and government (Bendix, 2010). 
Trade unions and employers sign agreements which are legally binding after bargaining and these 
agreements, which are referred to as collective agreements, establish the rights and obligations 
of both parties. These agreements provide the essential reference point for any disputes that arise 
and how to prevent these disputes from escalating. They also include specific provisions for 
preventing disputes (ILO, 2013). 
Shop stewards on the other hand are employees within organisations who have been elected to 
represent the collective interests of unionised employees. The shop steward represents the union 
in the organisation and in this capacity will hold meetings with employees and act as liaison 
between unions and employees As employees, shop stewards may have a specific jobs in the 
organisation which they will be expected to perform, but, as a shop steward, will also be required 
to meet with management and raise employee concerns, or to engage in negotiations on certain 
issues. The shop steward has a very important role to play in dispute resolution at the level of the 
organisation as they may be requested to represent individual employees or groups of employees, 
who have lodged complaints against management or are being disciplined by the employer or the 
manager. As part of negotiations and collective bargaining, shop stewards may also be involved 
in collective disputes requiring resolution (Bendix, 2010). 
 
6. EVALUATION 
This section deals with the evaluation of a dispute resolution system. As discussed previously, to 
be effective, the dispute resolution system must have clearly stated goals which are measurable 
and attainable (ILO, 2013). The goals for an effective system were identified in section as 
legitimacy, efficiency, informality, affordability, accessibility, an appropriate range of services, 
accountability and adequate resource support. 
However, the sign of an effective labour dispute system is one whose services are valued by its 
users and eventually earns their confidence and trust because it delivers services fairly and 
without discrimination to all who fall within its jurisdiction. A system which is shunned by its 
supposed users and is always being criticised needs to re-evaluate and revise its intended goals 
and make changes accordingly. The measures that could be taken to determine the extent to 
which the users of the service were satisfied could be through the means of regular client 
satisfaction surveys.  Further indicators of support for the system would be to measure the level 
of support for the system from trade unions and employers and employers’ organisations (ILO, 
2013).   
6.1 Legitimacy  
The key facets of legitimacy as discussed in section 3.1 dealt with the need for consensus, 
independence, the protection of human rights, the need for the use to be voluntary and aligned 
not only societal norms but workplace agreements and regulations (ILO, 2013; Thompson, 2010). 
The dimensions of legitimacy could be evaluated by examining the following; (Questions sourced 
from the ILO (2013)). 
Consensus: Were employers’ and employees’ representatives consulted in setting up the 
system? Who else was consulted? 
Independence: Is the system independent of the State for example the Ministry or Department of 
Labour (or the Ministry responsible for labour matters)? Is the judiciary independent of the state?  
• Is the system transparent? Are rules and procedures generally well known? 
• Is information concerning the application of rules and procedures available and accessible 
to those likely to be affected?  
• Are regular reports on the system’s operations made available to clients of the system? 
Human rights: Are the human rights of all interested parties protected, particularly those of 
vulnerable groups? 
Is the use of the system voluntary or mandatory? 
Is there alignment in the system? Do the legislation and the workplace practices reinforce each 
other? Is the labour practice aligned with broader societal norms and standards?  
Are services provided for atypical employees (e.g., home workers, seasonal workers, contract 
workers)? 
6.2 Efficiency 
The key aspects discussed in section 3.2 under efficiency were the requirement for speed, 
flexibility and innovation. These could be evaluated by asking the following questions:  
Does the system make every effort to respond to the interests of all stakeholders? 
What is the average time taken to resolve disputes?   
Is the system able to adapt to meet changing circumstances? 
Do officers receive training on ‘new’ approaches to dispute prevention and resolution? 
Does the system make use of computer and information technology? 
6.3 Informality 
Informality is an important contributing factor to both legitimacy, in ensuring that even the most 
vulnerable groups can use the system and also to efficiency in that the more formal the system 
the more time consuming it is and also to cost as the formal the system the more cost implications 
there are. The specific aspects of informality that were highlighted in section 3.3 dealt with notion 
that individuals should be able to use the system, it should easy to understand and use and there 
should be no need for costly legal representation. Possible questions to evaluate informality could 
be:  
What are the processes involved in lodging a dispute?  
How easy are these processes to understand? 
What level of assistance is available? 
At what point in the dispute resolution process is it allowed to have legal representation?  
6.4 Affordability 
An ideal labour dispute resolution system should be free or at the very least be inexpensive. That 
is, the least privileged or the poor should be able to access this system (Brand et al., 1997; ILO, 
2013). This could be determined by asking the following questions:  
Does the system provide conciliation services free of charge to the disputing parties? 
Does the system provide arbitration services free of charge? 
Does the system provide advisory, training, and information services free of charge? 
6.5 Accessibility 
An accessible dispute resolution system should ensure that all parties, especially the most 
vulnerable, have easy means to make contact. Further, potential users should know who to 
approach with minimum legal and procedural formalities and how the system works. Services 
should also be available on short notice (Brand et al., 1997; ILO, 2013). Possible questions that 
could determine the levels of accessibility would be:  
Who may use the system?  
• Is the system available to all employer-employee situations, including disputes that arise 
in the informal economy? 
• Does the system serve both the private and public sectors (including public corporations 
and statutory bodies)? 
 Contacting the service? 
• Where are the services physically located? How is the system decentralized to enable 
access by persons outside the main centres?  
• Are mobile services provided? 
• What are the waiting periods for dispute resolution? Does the system differentiate in order 
to prioritise certain disputes? 
Information of the service 
• How is information disseminated to the potential users? 
• How widely is the service understood among potential users? 
 
6.6 Range of services 
For a dispute resolution system to be effective, it must be able to provide a range of services 
related to the needs of all stake holders. The system should also put emphasis on preventative 
measures to ensure that resources are available to assist employers and employees to prevent 
disputes from arising (ILO, 2013; Thompson, 2010). 
Does the system provide the following services? 
• Information 
• Advisory 
• Training 
• Investigation 
Does the system cater to all types of disputes as follows? 
Individual and collective disputes  
• Existing rights 
• Future interests 
• Unfair dismissal 
6.7 Accountability 
As mentioned earlier, transparency is one important aspect of an effective system and 
transparency in this sense comes in the form of the system being able to accountable to the public 
and to their institutional stakeholders (ILO, 2013). The level of accountability can be determined 
by asking the following questions: 
How does the system account to its stakeholders and the public at large? 
Is the system accountable for the use of the resources made available to it? 
Is the system accountable not only for its decisions but also for the processes by which decisions 
are made? 
6.8 Resources 
As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of an effective labour dispute resolution system is to have 
sufficient resources to meet the capital and recurrent expenditures associated with providing 
services to its clients, including sufficient professional,  and support staff who have sound 
knowledge of the legal framework, adequate space and equipment, including computer and 
telecommunication systems (Brand et al., 1997; ILO, 2013). The issue of human resources 
however, goes beyond the staff of the dispute resolution institutions and also embraces the trade 
union movement and employers and employer organisations. The understanding and 
professionalism of these groupings is also required for the effective running of the system. The 
resources can be evaluated by asking the following questions: 
Does the system receive sufficient funds to achieve its purpose and objectives to an acceptable 
level? 
Are all the professional staff of the dispute resolution institutions at the required level of 
competency? 
Are all the support staff of the dispute resolution institutions at the required level of competency? 
Are there adequate physical facilities available to manage the proceedings?  
Are the trade union representatives involved in dispute resolution competent? 
Are the representatives of the employers and employers’ organisations competent? 
 
 
 
7. FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON 
The framework for comparison outlines the elements of a dispute resolution which include the 
nature of the dispute, coverage, processes, avenues and human resources. It further presents 
the criteria to evaluate the performance of the system which are legitimacy, efficiency, informality, 
affordability, accessibility, a full range of services, accountability and resources. This framework 
will be used to structure chapters two, three and four. 
Table 2: Framework for comparison, elements and performance criteria 
Elements of the system 
 Examples of questions to be asked regarding each element  
The nature of the 
dispute 
Does the system differentiate between disputes of rights and 
disputes of interest? Do the disputes follow different dispute 
resolution pathways? 
Does the system have pathways for both individual and collective 
disputes? What are the pathways?  
Individual and collective, rights and interest 
Coverage  Are all workers covered by the same labour legislation? 
If not what legislation covers private and what covers public? 
What dispute resolution system operates for private and what for 
the public sector? 
Are there special dispute resolution pathways for certain groups 
of employees e.g.  essential workers  
Are any workers excluded from coverage by labour legislation 
and therefore from labour dispute resolution pathways?  
Public, private, workers excluded 
Processes  What provision is made in legislation for internal dispute 
resolution processes of grievance and disciplinary procedures? 
Which consensus based processes are used and where and 
when? 
Which referral based processes are used, when and where?  
Internal processes, consensus based processes, referral-based 
processes,  
Avenues of dispute 
resolution 
Legislation, dispute resolution agencies 
Which are the dispute resolution agencies? 
Which type of dispute, for which employees and using what 
processes does each handle  
Human Resources Personnel within the system 
Trade union representatives  
 
Performance of the system 
Key criteria  Possible indicators 
Legitimacy Stakeholders to the design of the system 
Independence of the institutions 
Respect of Human rights of all interested parties 
Voluntary or mandatory use of the system 
Services for atypical employees 
Efficiency Speed of dispute resolution within the system 
Flexibility of the system 
Innovativeness of the system 
Informality Is the procedure of dispute resolution understood by all 
parties 
Processes for lodging a dispute 
A minimum of legal and procedural formalities 
Affordability Free or inexpensive for the users 
Accessibility Availability of services on short notice 
Awareness and understanding of the system by employers, 
employees, and the general public 
Dispute resolution Offices within reasonable travelling 
distance 
Availability to all employer-employee situations 
Full range of services  Catering for the needs of all stakeholders 
Catering for all types of disputes 
Accountability Accountability to the public and institutional stakeholders 
Resources Availability of funding for the system 
Competency for all the professional staff 
Adequate physical facilities to manage the proceedings 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, dispute resolution is an essential part of any well-functioning labour market and 
industrial relations system. However, more importantly, it has been established that there is need 
to resolve disputes efficiently, effectively and equitably for the benefit of all the parties involved 
and the economy at large. Chapter one has covered the theory of labour dispute resolution. 
Conflict at work has been covered by firstly establishing the difference between complaints, 
grievances and disputes and also and identifying different types of disputes namely disputes of 
interest or disputes of rights, and collective or individual disputes. As the term implies, individual 
disputes are those involving a single worker whereas collective disputes involve groups of workers 
usually represented by a trade union. Collective disputes can further be divided into two sub-
categories: rights disputes and interests’ disputes. With respect to resolving these different types 
of disputes, there are options such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration. All of these 
alternatives involve the intervention of a third party and it is rather the degree of intervention that 
differentiates one from the other.   
For any dispute resolution system to be effective, it must have a set of goals it wishes to achieve 
and these goals need to work hand in hand together to be a success and they include legitimacy 
, efficiency, informality, affordability, accessibility, a full range of services,  acountability and 
resources. The various ILO conventions, recommendations and supervisory machinery relating 
to labour dispute resolution were also discussed as they provide guidance to member states 
through setting international labour standards and jurisprudence to help them establish and 
strengthen labour courts, industrial tribunals and dispute resolution mechanisms so that labour 
disputes are dealt with effectively. Other elements of the system were also covered and these 
include who the system covers, the avenues of the system, human resources and the processes. 
Lastly, the specific benchmarks for an effective dispute management system were also covered 
and these will be used to evaluate the performance of a dispute resolution system. Chapter two 
is going to look at the evolution of the Ugandan Labour Dispute Resolution system, the history of 
trade unionism in Uganda and a review of the performance of the system.  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE UGANDAN LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
This chapter is going to deal with a description of Uganda, that is, its physical, political and 
economic aspects. In addition, it will  describe the historical development of the trade dispute 
legislation, the trade union movement of Uganda between the pre-independence period from 
1894 to the present; lastly a performance review of the dispute resolution system of the country. 
 
1. THE UGANDAN ENVIRONMENT 
1.1 Physical 
Uganda is landlocked and borders with South Sudan in the North, Kenya in the East, Rwanda 
and Democratic Republic of Congo in the West.  Lake Victoria forms a large part of the Southern 
border. Uganda’s total area is 241,038 square kilometres of which 43.942 square kilometres is 
open water comprised of lakes, swamps and the river Nile. Given that Uganda is situated at the 
equator its climate is equatorial. And has two distinct wet and dry seasons each year. The wet 
seasons are from, March to May and September to November (Saida, 2005).   
1.2 Economic 
According to the Ugandan 2011 population survey, it is estimated that the country has a 
population of about 37 million people. 
The agricultural sector which forms the cornerstone of the Ugandan economy accounts for about 
40 per cent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), over 70 per cent of total exports and 
about 80 per cent of employment. Eighty five per cent of Uganda’s population live in rural areas 
and depend mainly on agriculture for their livelihood (Fashoyin, Herbert, & Pinoargote, 2003). 
Although Uganda is not rich in minerals, oil was recently discovered in north western Uganda. In 
addition, gold was recently discovered in the very remote Karamoja district in North East Uganda 
(Cassibry, 2013). 
 Between 1960 and 1970, Uganda was considered to be one of the most prosperous countries in 
Africa. It enjoyed an average growth rate of 5.3 per capita and a GDP growth rate of 2.4 per 
annum. This was followed by a collapse of the commercial and industrial sector. This sector was 
formally controlled by the Asian population who were forcefully deported by the President Idi 
Amin. This led to the collapse of the economy and the country has been struggling ever since 
(Barya, 1990; Saida, 2005). 
1.3 Political 
Uganda gained political independence from Britain on 9 October 1962. From 1960 to 1970, it was 
considered one of the most prosperous countries in Africa. However, it has had a chaotic political 
history. Following independence, an undemocratic form of governance began. The first president 
was Kabaka Mutesa I who was later overthrown by Apollo Milton Obote (Obote) of the Uganda 
People’s Congress (UPC). UPC led Uganda until it was overthrown by a military coup d'état in 
1971 led by Idi Amin (Amin). The period under Amin has been termed by Barya (1990) as “the 
nine years of fascist military rule” and lasted until 1979. For a short period of time between 1979 
and 1980 the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) ruled Uganda until the 1980 general 
elections which brought Obote and his UPC back into power until he was overthrown by the Army 
again in 1985. This was followed by a short-lived military junta, under Lt-General Tito Okello 
Lutwa, which in turn was overthrown in 1986 by a guerrilla movement known as the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM). Its armed wing was the National Resistance Army (NRA) under 
the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (Museveni). The NRM still rules Uganda in a 
decentralized system of governance (Barya, 1990; Saida, 2005).  
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UGANDAN LABOUR DISPUTE SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
This section describes the historical development of the trade dispute legislation and the trade 
union movement of Uganda between the pre-independence period from 1894 to the present. 
Uganda’s labour movement history has had very dramatic turns of events. It is one of only a few 
countries where politics has played a significant role in its development, even after it gained its 
independence. The developments that will be discussed are closely related to various historical 
and political phases through which Uganda has passed; significant periods are 1894-1962 (pre-
independence), 1962-1971 (Obote 1), 1971-1979 (Amin), 1980-1985 (Obote II), 1986-2006 
(NRM) and 2006 to the present Multi-party system. 
Colonised by the British in 1894, Uganda integrated into the emergent world capitalist system. 
However, it was not until the 1920s that labour began to collectively organise itself due to the 
introduction of a monetary economy rather than the barter system of trade previously used. In 
addition, the commodification of labour which was then semi-proletarian and immigrant also 
contributed to the organisation of Ugandan labour.  
The British encountered opposition from Ugandan kingdoms when they tried to impose dominion. 
The Buganda kingdom cooperated with the British which resulted in the signing of The 1900 
Agreement between them. This agreement redistributed land between the Buganda Kingdom 
hierarchy, private landlords and the British. It also created a “voluntary” supply of labour for the 
government, Christian missions, private settlers and planters. The voluntary supply of labour was 
later abolished and replaced by a paid forced labour system called “kasanvu” and this too was 
later abolished in 1922, because of its social effects. The abolishment of “kasanvu” resulted in 
further shortage of labour for the Ugandan economy which led to the establishment of a Labour 
Department in 1925 and a private recruiting organisation, approved by government, to oversee 
and recruit immigrant workers respectively which led to most of the labour being migrant. 
The only employee-related Act was the Masters and Servants Ordinance, No.19 of 1913. Other 
legislations that were enacted were the Trade Unions Ordinance, No.18 of 1937, the Trade 
Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance, No.46 of 1941 and the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Ordinance, No.9 of 1943 but these did not have practical significance on Uganda as 
they were results of other Colonial struggles throughout the world. However, this changed with 
the enactment of the Employment Ordinance, No.13 of 1946 which repealed the Masters and 
Servants Ordinance, No.19 of 1913.  The 1945 general strike led to the enactment of the Trade 
Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance, No.19 of 1949 and the Trade Unions Ordinance, 
No.10 of 1952 (Barya, 1990). This period also reported the first trade unions as early as 1922 
(Scott, 1966).  
The post-independence era, 1962-1971 (Obote I), had an immediate and dramatic effect upon 
the relations between the trade union movement and the new government. The new government 
under Obote of the UPC wanted to redesign the industrial relations legal framework as set up 
under Colonialism by restricting its liberal, voluntary character and enhancing the state control 
aspects of the law; one way they could achieve this was through the legislations (Barya, 1990). 
The acts that were passed under this new government were the Public Service (Negotiating 
Machinery) Act, No.78 of 1963; the Trade Unions Act, No.11 of 1965 and the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No.20 of 1964. A standing Industrial Court was also established 
(Barya, 1990).  Obote also developed a “move to the left” strategy with the intent of creating  a 
socialist society with the 1970 Act but this was not successful as Amin overthrew the government 
in 1971 (Barya, 2010). 
The next significant period is from 1971 to 1979 under Idi Amin. The Obote I regime was 
overthrown by the army in a coup led by Idi Amin in January 1971. Initially, the Amin coup 
supported organisational autonomy of trade unions but later became repressive. The legislative 
changes were the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.29 of 1973; the Trades Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Act (Amendment) Decree of 1974 and the Trade Unions Decree , 
No. 20 of 1976 (Barya, 1990). The Uganda Labour Congress (ULC) was abolished and the Trade 
Unions Act established the National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) and all the unions had 
to affiliate to NOTU (Ananaba, 1979). 
The Obote II era was the next significant period from 1980 to 1985. The UPC/Obote group 
returned to power after an election that was widely accepted as having been rigged. Although the 
majority of workers and trade unionists were opposed to the Obote II regime, they were not 
politically organized and had to either be for the UPC/Obote II regime or remain autonomous. This 
led to the failed attempts by trade unions to form a Labour Party in 1980. The trade unionists' 
ability to engage in parliamentary politics was made possible due to a 1973 amendment allowing 
trade unionists to become Members of Parliament (MPs) (Barya, 1990). This period was 
characterised by repression and imprisonment of many workers and union leaders and repression 
of the industrial court (Barya, 2010). There were no legislative changes during the Obote II regime. 
The final leadership change was in 1986 under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government led by Museveni. When NRM came to power it found a faction-ridden and polarised 
trade union movement and initially encouraged freedom of association for unions. However, it 
gradually shifted and became one of the leading ideologists of market forces, liberalisation and 
privatisation yet the nature of neo-liberalism negated the existence and functioning of trade 
unions. In addition, new investors and employers casualised the labour force and refused to 
recognise them adding to the divisions and leadership wrangles within the trade unions. The 
government also allowed the industrial court to operate independently until 1995. Worker MPs did 
not help the cause of workers (Barya, 2010). 
In 2005, Uganda saw considerable political and legislative changes. The government held a 
referendum which decided that the country should move from a no-party to a multi-party system. 
Legislatively, the trade union movement, with support from the Federation of Uganda Employers 
(FUE), spearheaded the labour law reforms in 2006. There were demands for the reform and 
modernisation of labour laws so as to bring them in line with ratified ILO ratifications and 
conventions. Thus the Employment Act, No.6 of 2006, the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and 
Settlement) Act, No.8 of 2006, the Labour Unions Act, No.7 of 2006 and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, No.9 of 2006 were all passed (Barya, 2010).  
2.2 1894-1962 (Pre-independence) 
Uganda was incorporated into the emergent world capitalist system by British colonisation which 
formally began in 1894 but it was not until the mid-1920s that wage labour began to organize 
following the introduction of a monetary economy and the commodification of labour after World 
War II (Barya, 1990). From the time of colonisation up to about the end of World War II, Uganda's 
labour force was largely “semi-proletarian and immigrant” and thus there was no material basis 
for its collective organisation (Barya, 1990). 
When the British tried to impose their dominion on Uganda, some kingdoms opposed them apart 
from the Kabaka (king) of Buganda. In return for that co-operation the British excised a 
considerable portion of Bunyoro land known as the “last counties” and gave it to the Kabaka. The 
last counties later became an important political issue which was eventually settled after 
independence (1962) when the vast majority of the Banyoro voted in a referendum in favour of 
being merged with the kingdom of Bunyoro (Ananaba, 1979; Scott, 1966). 
The basis for the country's colonial exploitation only began with The 1900 Buganda Agreement. 
From 1900 to 1909 colonial policy created a "voluntary" supply of labour for government, Christian 
missions, private settlers and planters by the imposition of various taxes on the African population 
but this policy only had limited success in forcing Africans to work and thus labour shortage 
persisted. Therefore from 1909 to 1922, the colonial state introduced a paid forced labour system 
called “kasanvu” where every tax-payer was obliged to work "for the usual wages, for at least one 
month in each year - unless engaged in permanent employment'. But this system was abolished 
in 1922 because of its social effects (Barya, 1990). 
Wage labour mainly consisted of peasants who worked only part of the year essentially to fulfil 
“kasanvu” obligations prior to 1922. But the abolition of “kasanvu” aggravated the shortage of 
labour for the colonial state and economy. For this reason a Labour Department was established 
in 1925 and a private recruiting organisation was approved by government to oversee and recruit 
immigrant workers. Therefore most workers in Uganda came from Rwanda and Burundi inorder 
to fulfil the economic and state requirements in central Uganda namely Buganda. This situation 
would change after World War II. Apart from being immigrant, this labour was predominantly 
casual thus were not inclined to organize (Barya, 1990). 
Initially, organisations and resistance against the British was against the 1900 Agreement over 
distribution of land. However this changed in the 1930s as resistance had widened to include 
opposition to racial discrimination in trade and employment especially in the Civil Service. Labour 
Organisations began to form in the 1930s. With the signing of The 1900 Buganda Agreement, 
peasants (bakopi) and Clan Heads (Bataka) opposed the land settlement. The clan heads formed 
the “Bataka movement” but this movement was compromised with the passing of the Buganda 
Parliament (Lukiiko) in 1927 of the “Busuulu” and “Envujjo” Law which gave security of tenure to 
peasants by fixing rent (busuulu) and tribute (envujjo). And as long as the peasants met these 
obligations and kept the land cultivated to satisfy the metropolitan demands for cash crops 
especially cotton, they could not be evicted except by court order. This law compromised the 
Bataka Movement by limiting the landlords' access to social surplus needs. For this reason, the 
landlords in Bulunge Bua Buganda organised but because of their narrow base, the organisation 
was replaced by the Uganda African Welfare Association (UAWA) in 1934 (Barya, 1990). 
UAWA mainly wrote petitions and raised various complaints to the British. Although it advanced 
the grievances of peasants, traders and workers, UAWA was essentially a paper organisation 
that did not achieve much in 1938. The “Bana ba Kintu” (Descendants of Kintu) and the Uganda 
African Motor Drivers Association (UAMDA) were established in the 1930s. The Descendants of 
Kintu primarily voiced grievances of rich peasants and traders, and also general demands 
including those of wage-earners. The other organisation of wage earners was the Civil Servants' 
Association (CSA) but other groupings of wage earners in other sectors were developing (Barya, 
1990). 
But by 1938, the Inspectorate of Labour recognised only the Association of Civil Servants, the 
Uganda African Civil Servants Association, the Uganda Asiatic Civil Service Association and the 
European Civil Service Association. However, there were noted indigenous formations among 
Africans in the nature of guilds, craftsmen, artisans and bus drivers. The Uganda African Civil 
Servants Association (UACSA), originally called the British government Native Employees 
Association (BGNEA), when formed in 1922, championed the interests of African clerks and 
professionals trained at Makerere College such as medical, veterinary, agricultural and 
engineering assistants. The main driving force of the UACSA was dissatisfaction with racial 
discrimination in the civil service terms and conditions of work (Barya, 1990).  
However, many of the colonial civil servants were rising “petty bourgeoisie” and had little contact 
with unskilled labourers and many were eventually appointed as chiefs and ministers in the 
Buganda government. Many became successful farmers and traders because of their 
comparatively higher wages. UAMDA also happened to be a diffuse organization as its members 
were the young taxi drivers in Kampala and also taxi owners so, as it demanded higher wages, it 
would also demand high government subsidies for the owners (Barya, 1990). 
2.2.1 Legislation 
Legislatively, the only employee-related Act was the Masters and Servants Ordinance, No.19 of 
1913 which regulated the obligations of employees towards their employers and vice versa and 
placed certain restrictions on the recruiting of labour (University of Illinois, 2010). In 1937, the first 
trade union statute, the Trade Union Ordinance, No. 18 was enacted in Uganda. It was a simple 
Ordinance whose enactment had more to do with developments in British Colonies than with the 
organisation, at the time, of Ugandan workers. For example, there were strikes and disturbances 
in the Caribbean Territories in 1935 and 1937 thus the Colonial Office sent despatches to colonies 
urging them to improve labour conditions and set up or strengthen Labour Departments or 
Inspectorates. In April 1937 Indian artisans went on strike disrupting all construction work on new 
buildings in Nairobi, followed by several strikes by Kenyan workers in various companies and in 
different towns between April and May. Therefore, the Trade Union Ordinance, No. 18 was 
enacted to conform to similar enactments in Kenya and Tanganyika. It was not seriously opposed 
by employers nor was it applied because at the time labour was still largely unorganised (Barya, 
1990). 
The primary importance of the 1937 Ordinance is that for the first time in the history of wage 
labour in Uganda the right to form a trade union was granted. Following the United Kingdom 1871 
Trade Union Act, restraint of trade would not be deemed criminal conspiracy nor would it be 
unlawful "so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust". However these immunities 
would apply only to a registered trade union.  The use of this law depended upon the level of 
organization and consciousness of the Ugandan workers (Barya, 1990). 
In 1941, a model Trade Union Ordinance, based on British legislation and practice was sent to all 
colonies in a circular despatch by the Secretary of State. It was this despatch and the provisions 
of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 that led the colonial state to enact the 1941 
and 1943 amendments. The Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance, No.46 legalised peaceful 
picketing and granted trade unions immunity from “tortious action” committed by or on behalf of a 
union in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. This amendment followed the United 
Kingdom’s 1906 Trade Disputes Act (Barya, 1990).  
The 1943 Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance No. 9 replaced the 1937 Ordinance. 
However with these new acts, there was no recorded evidence that trade union law between 1937 
and 1943 had any practical importance, partly because it had been initiated by the colonial state 
and not by workers' demands or struggles as in Kenya (Barya, 1990). 
Another major development was the Employment Ordinance, No.13 of 1946 which replaced the 
1913 Masters and Servants Ordinance, No.19.  The Employment Ordinance, No.13 of 1946 was 
meant to enact provisions protective of labour, that is, the full application of the Convention No. 
65 of 1939 "in the progressive abolition of all penal sanctions for breaches of contracts of 
employment by indigenous workers", ensure that employers provided minimum housing, diet and 
medical care and also regulated the movement of recruited workers from places of employment, 
et cetera (Barya, 1990). 
In 1949, the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance, No.19 replaced the Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, No.9 of 1943. A statutory dispute settlement process was 
instituted for the first time with the new ordinance but the use of the dispute settlement process 
was voluntary for general dispute because both parties would have to consent to the appointment 
(ad hoc) of an arbitration tribunal by the Governor.  Compulsory arbitration was also instituted for 
essential services. No employer would declare a lockout or any worker a strike unless the 
specified arbitration procedure had been followed. The essential services were water, electricity, 
public health, hospital and sanitary services (Barya, 1990). 
In 1950, the 1949 Ordinance was amended and three innovations were made. The Trade 
Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) (Amendment) Ordinance, No.23 increased essential 
services to include those similar services offered by the private sector, the Governor now had the 
power to reduce or increase the scheduled essential services and lastly, it was an offence for any 
person, whether a trade union official or not, to counsel or procure strikes before complying with 
the statutory dispute settlement procedure and this was added following the United Kingdom’s 
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927 (Barya, 1990). 
An Act that was a direct result of Ugandan workers’ struggles was enacted and it was the Trade 
Unions Ordinance, No.10 of 1952. It was a product of a strike that took place in 1945. Its 
provisions were divided by Barya (1990) into three categories. Firstly, were those provisions which 
guaranteed the formation of trade unions with specific positive rights. Secondly, there were 
provisions meant to ensure state control and thereby pre-empt a left-wing politicised trade union 
movement. Thirdly, there were paternalistic aspects meant to nurture some form of democratic 
administration of union affairs. In general, the 1952 act aimed at generating basic trade union 
rights and freedom of association but only under state control and guidance. 
As mentioned, the 1952 Trade Union Ordinance, unlike the 1937-1943 legislation, were a result 
of the cumulative workers struggles in Uganda, Kenya, and other British Colonies. The first union 
to register under the 1952 Ordinance was the Kampala Local Government Staff Association. 
Although it claimed to be multi-racial, it was mainly composed of European and higher-paid Asians 
with only one African member although originally other Africans had joined (Scott, 1966). 
In the six years that followed, thirteen trade unions representing 7,370 workers were organised. 
By 1961, the number of registered trade unions had increased to thirty-four representing a total 
membership of 39,862. In 1955, the unions founded the Uganda Trade Union Congress (UTUC) 
which existed in relative peace and unity until 1960 when there were periodical divisions over 
leadership (Ananaba, 1979; Scott, 1966). 
Uganda’s trade unions developed under the tutelage of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). They were at the centre of 
the Cold War and as such developed under what elsewhere was called “Cold War unionism”. 
These organisations taught Ugandan unions to be apolitical from the end of the second world war 
to independence in 1962 (Barya, 2010). 
2.3 1962-1971 (Post-colonial Obote I) 
Uganda gained independence from the British in 1962. The first post-independence election, held 
in 1962, was won by the alliance between the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Kabaka 
Yekka (KY). These two formed the first post-independence government with Apollo Milton Obote 
as Executive Prime Minister and the Buganda Kabaka Edward Muteesa being the President. 
However in 1966, following a power struggle between the Obote-led party (UPC) and the Kabaka, 
the UPC-dominated parliament changed the constitution and removed the King without first calling 
an election. Obote was declared an executive president in 1967 (Barya, 1990). 
According to Barya (1990), Obote sought to redesign the colonial industrial relations legal 
framework by restricting its liberal voluntary character and enhancing the state-controlled aspects 
of the law. This was because the government intended to restrict the militant political trade 
unionism that prevailed from 1962 to 1964 which explained the postcolonial industrial relations 
legislation enacted from 1963 to1965. The second and long term aim of the government was to 
curb industrial disputes, enhance industrial peace and thereby attract foreign investment for 
economic development (Barya, 1990). This explains, as mentioned above, why Uganda was 
considered to be one of the most prosperous countries in Africa between 1960 and 1970 with an 
average growth rate of 5.3 per capita and a GDP growth rate of 2.4 per annum (Saida, 2005). 
In 1961, the Uganda Trade Union Congress (UTUC) split because the Jinja-based unions 
accused the Kampala-based unions of dominion and neglect. Additionally, ideological and 
leadership differences reinforced the split. At this time, J. Reich and his supporters from the Jinja 
unions launched an alternative union centre called the Uganda Federation of Labour (UFL). 
Although the Labour Commissioner at the time would have preferred only one centre, the 1952 
Trade Union Ordinance made no provision regulating national centres - thus there was nothing 
the Labour Commissioner could do about the development (Barya, 1990).  
UFL and UTUC represented two opposing ideological concepts of trade unionism. UFL, which 
was formed due to UTUC's neglect of Jinja unions, began to associate itself with UPC after it had 
won the April elections preceding Uganda's independence in October, 1962. By the end of 1961, 
J. Reich had resigned and become a Deputy Mayor and a Personnel Officer at Madhivani Sugar 
Factory in Jinja. Some unions returned to UTUC and UFL declined. UPC, prior to the 1962 
elections, did not have any commitment to either UTUC or UFL (Barya, 1990). 
UFL began to shape its ideological character and allied itself with the UPC-Youth League (UPC-
YL). In concert with UFL, UPC-YL encouraged political and militant unionism. It was this alliance 
of political and trade union organisation that fuelled the high expectations of workers from political 
independence - leading to numerous strikes and other industrial action (Barya, 1990). 
Politically, the UPC-YL and UFL demanded respect for the new African government by the British 
and Asian capitalists. For example, they wanted to enforce the display of the President’s and 
Prime Minister's portraits in business premises and removal of the Queen's portrait. The UPC-YL 
and UFL organised strikes and demonstrations against Asians who had previously clearly allied 
themselves with the colonial regime. In 1964 and 1965 the UPC-Youth League led demonstrations 
against western embassies, in Kampala, on several issues affecting Uganda's interests (Barya, 
1990). 
The Labour Consultative Council (LCC) and the Industrial Relations Charter were the main 
institutions of the tripartite industrial relations system preferred by government. The LCC was 
inaugurated in 1962 replacing the colonial Labour Advisory Board. Its terms of reference were to 
advise the Minister of Labour on all matters affecting labour policy and legislation, to keep under 
review the state of industrial relations and such problems relating to employment that may arise 
(Barya, 1990). 
Because of the endless feuds between the two unions, the Uganda Labour Council (ULC) was 
formed in 1962 in an endeavour to bring unity between both unions. However, this did not mean 
unity in the trade union movement as the UTUC virtually led the new ULC. ULC pledged to 
“strengthen the union movement by encouraging the formation of a few strong viable self-reliant 
national unions, to concentrate on workers' education, create Youth and Women's Wings and 
publicise the importance of trade unionism”. Further, the ULC declared its support for tripartite 
institutions and the desire to seek membership on Boards of Directors of public and parastatal 
bodies. Finally, in conformity with government policy of positive non-alignment and support for a 
Pan-African union federation, ULC pledged to "support any moves and initiatives aimed at 
achieving a truly Pan-African trade union centre" (Barya, 1990). 
However, the ULC did not achieve much in its one and half years' existence. Organisational and 
financial problems and ideological and leadership conflicts sparked off a crisis in April 1968 and 
thus the UPC government took advantage of the conflicts, suspended the ULC, closed its offices 
and took over its assets. On 1 May 1968 (Labour Day), Obote openly declared that, for the first 
time, the labour movement had entered a new era and therefore should be part and parcel of 
UPC. 
2.3.1 Legislation 
In 1963, the Public Service Act was introduced to handle dispute settlement processes especially 
disciplinary action, appointments and dismissals of public officers. It also established a Joint Staff 
Council (JSC) which would be appointed from nominees of the Permanent Secretary and the 
relevant trade unions. The objectives of the JSC were "to secure the greatest measure of co-
operation between the government, in its capacity as employer, and junior public officers, to 
provide machinery for dealing with grievances of junior public officers and to enable consultation 
to take place in matters affecting the well-being and efficiency of the public service". The functions 
of the JSC were: to negotiate terms and conditions of service of junior public officers and those 
below them, to advise government on any matter and "generally to assist in the furtherance of 
good relations between the government and junior public officers" (Barya, 1990). The act 
prohibited any junior public officer from taking part in a strike. 
The Industrial Charter of 1964, though originated from the Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE) 
at an LCC meeting in 1962, was derived from the Kenyan Charter of October 1962 and was 
encouraged by government. Discussions of the Industrial Charter arose because trade union 
leaders were looking for an alternative to restrictive labour legislation. Negotiations soon followed 
between FUE, UTUC and government, and the Industrial Relations Charter was signed on 1 June 
1964 between FUE and UTUC with government as a witness and not a party (Barya, 1990). 
According to Barya (1990), the Industrial Relations Charter set out three main principles.  
The first principle was the recognition of union and employer rights of organisation which meant 
that the management and unions would respect each other’s rights to freedom of association for 
example, management would recognise unions, accord reasonable facilities for normal union 
functioning while unions on their part acknowledged that management had the exclusive right and 
power to manage its undertaking and to engage, promote, transfer, demote or lay off employees 
and to discipline, suspend or discharge employees for just cause (Barya, 1990). 
The second principle was the acceptance of legal, constitutional and peaceful dispute settlement 
procedures. That is both sides, in accordance with democratic principles, would settle all future 
differences, disputes and grievances by mutual negotiation according to the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance of 1952, abide by the spirit of agreements mutually 
entered into, settle industrial disputes at appropriate levels and according to the laid down 
procedure, failing which disputes would be referred to the government-established machinery 
(Barya, 1990). 
The third principle was the acceptance of tripartite bodies. That is, labour and employers would 
participate constructively in tripartite bodies which may be formed by government in order to 
achieve a connection between them for the purposes of examining labour policy and legislation, 
fostering industrial co-operation, and raising industrial efficiency and productivity, so as to build 
up the economic prosperity of Uganda (Barya, 1990). 
The Charter was a voluntary agreement which was not legally enforceable but simply an agreed 
reference point. In the Charter, both FUE and UTUC stated their belief that consultation, co-
operation and mutual understanding were essential for the achievement of efficiency and 
productivity which would in turn be a foundation for good terms and conditions of employment 
(Barya, 1990). 
In 1964, the Minister of Housing and Labour, G. B. K. Magezi presented the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Bill confirming government's encouragement of voluntary industrial 
relations and that the state would only get involved when the disputants could not reach an 
agreement. The main developments of the new Act were that the settlement procedure had been 
prolonged, the Minister of Housing and Labour was the overall supervisor, institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict resolution and to restrict strike action mainly in the essential services (Barya, 
1990). 
This Bill also established the formation of a standing Industrial Court, for the first time, in order to 
avoid the ad hoc appointments of arbitration tribunals for dispute settlement. The industrial court 
consisted of a President appointed by the Minister of Housing and Labour, an independent 
member and one representative for employers and workers respectively selected by the President 
(Barya, 1990; ILO/SLAREA, 2004). 
Opposition to this Bill was widespread. Both UTUC and the opposition Democratic Party were 
concerned with the overwhelming powers of the Minister of Housing and Labour and the 
implications of the Bill for voluntary industrial relations. Even the media was not supportive of this 
Bill. Their reasoning for opposing the Bill was that the Industrial Relations Charter signed the 
previous month,  and witnessed by the Minister of Housing and Labour introducing the new law 
had not been given a chance to foster voluntary industrial relations processes. However, such 
opposition did not change government’s decision. 
Another legislative change under this new government was the replacement of the Trade Unions 
Ordinance, No.10 of 1952 by the Trade Unions Act, No.11 of 1965 which came into force on 2 
July 1965. Since independence in 1962, trade unions were governed by the Trade Union 
Ordinance, 1952. Firstly, the purpose of the Act was to amend and consolidate the law relating to 
the registration of trade unions. The Minister of Labour and the Registrar were given wide powers 
of control over unions to ensure that they were run in the interests of economic development. This 
was a consolidation of the “developmentalist philosophy” of the Trade Disputes Act and the Public 
Service Act. Secondly, government claimed it intended to foster the development of stable, viable 
and financially - sound unions which would be less dependent on foreign aid as ULC never 
became self-sufficient. Its affiliates contributed only 10 percent of their income and many of them 
were always in arrears. ULC, like its predecessors UTUC and FUTU, continued to rely on foreign 
funds. Finally government claimed it intended to ensure democracy and accountability of union 
leadership. To encourage "responsible unionism", militant non-Ugandans would be excluded from 
leadership while, to encourage strong unions, employers would be required to some extent to 
recognise unions and a "check-off" system would be provided for. Basically, the new Act had 
taken away the liberalism and wider freedom of association of the Colonial Trade Unions 
Ordinance 1952 (Ananaba, 1979; Barya, 1990). 
As mentioned above, the ULC was engaged in a phase of conflicts which eventually led to its 
collapse. There were quite a number of issues that caused splits within the Ugandan Trade Union 
movement. There was even a threatened trade union coup d'état. Issues on mismanagement of 
funds, bribery of union members by external sources, and failure to organise workers and co-
operate with government in developmental efforts were some reasons for the collapse of the 
Ugandan Trade Union movement. In 1970, the Uganda Parliament passed a new Trade Unions 
Act which repealed the Act of 1965 (Ananaba, 1979). 
After the publication of what was known as the Binaisa Commission Report on Trade Unions of 
1968, this arrangement was brought to an end by the Trade Unions Act, 1970 which came into 
force on the 31st December 1970. The purposes of the new Act were stated to be: - 
"to establish and regulate an integrated employees' trade union, to dissolve the former Uganda 
Labour Congress and all other trade unions registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1965, to 
provide for the formation of branch unions, and for other purposes connected therewith." 
To explain the above, the new law dissolved all existing trade unions registered under the 1965 
Act and reinstated the Uganda Labour Congress as a national trade union. Section 1 of the Act 
established a single trade union called Uganda Labour Congress which was to be the only trade 
union in Uganda. All the properties, rights, liabilities and obligations of the former Uganda Labour 
Congress and all other registered Unions were vested in the new Uganda Labour Congress by 
virtue of the Act. All the members of the abolished trade unions became automatic members of 
the Uganda Labour Congress and the new organisation was to have fourteen branches covering 
all categories of work in Uganda (Ananaba, 1979). The main aim of the 1970 Act was to destroy 
the organisational autonomy of the trade union movement. 
Branch and sub-branch elections were to be held in January 1971, and ten delegates from each 
branch were to attend a conference in February 1971 at which the new ULC was to be formally 
launched. All the branches of the Congress were required to be registered with the Registrar as 
long as they had at least 1000 employees. Section 18(1)(e) of the Act provided: 
"a registered branch union, members of which are his employees, shall be the negotiating body 
with which the employer shall be bound to deal in respect of all matters relating to the relations 
between him and those of his employees who fall within the scope of membership of the registered 
branch union, if at least ten per Centum of such employees are members of the branch union" 
Unfortunately that conference could not be held because of the military coup d'état which toppled 
President Obote’s government and brought Idi Amin to power (Ananaba, 1979). 
2.4 1971-1979 (Idi Amin Dada Dictatorship) 
1971 was meant to be the year for the implementation of the “Move to the Left” strategy where 
trade unions would be incorporated in the structure of the growing state bureaucracy under UPC 
dominion. However, the Idi Amin coup d'état halted the process and gave trade union leadership 
an opportunity to demand changes in the 1970 Act. Therefore, trade unionists were among the 
first elements of Ugandan society to welcome the Amin coup d'état, as they expected a guarantee 
of freedom of association. Ugandan trade unions went even further to disassociate themselves 
from the AATUF’s call on world trade unions not to recognize the Amin government (Barya, 1990). 
The importance of the Amin regime in the area of trade union and trade disputes legislation was 
its liberalisation while at the same time the practical utilization of this liberal law was denied. The 
period 1971 to 1974 saw a considerable liberalization of trade union and trade disputes legislation 
following the UPC-Obote I attempt to incorporate the unions into the economic structures of the 
“Move to the Left” and the erosion of many union rights (Barya, 1990). 
Specifically, the Amin regime restored the organizational autonomy of the trade unions and made 
legal provisions guaranteeing a voluntary industrial relations system that included enforcement of 
legal rights which employers could otherwise deny unions or workers. However the coming into 
being of the 1973 to 1974 legislation was a result of the struggles of workers and trade unions 
with the backing of a liberal civilian Minister of Labour and Housing. The desire of the Amin regime 
to “cultivate a social base” created a favourable political context for the demands of the workers 
and unions to be met for the most part and therefore provided space for trade unions to regain 
their organisational autonomy. This is why in 1973 and 1974, the legal amendments were not 
repressive (Barya, 1990). 
Rumour has it that someone persuaded the new military government of Idi Amin that the 1970 
Act had abolished freedom of employment and the right to form autonomous trade unions and 
that the name "Uganda Labour Congress" was not appropriate. So the new decree abolished the 
name and established the National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) and re-established the 
formation of trade unions whose minimum membership had to be at least 1000 members. All the 
unions had to affiliate to NOTU and to be registered by the Registrar. The decree provided that 
an employer would not be bound to recognise or negotiate with a union unless 51% of his 
employees were registered with the union. The decree conferred on NOTU more powers, beyond 
mere regulation of trade unions as had been the case (Ananaba, 1979). However, the role and 
importance of this new trade union came to depend upon the character of the state and the 
employers thus bringing to question its “liberality” (Barya, 1990). 
According to Barya (1990), “liberal” trade union and trades disputes legislation was not used 
during Amin's era especially in the period from 1973 to 1979 because of the “Economic War” 
when Asians were expelled and the subsequent diplomatic and economic embargo from the West 
when Uganda's industrial base almost collapsed. This ultimately led to the weakening of trade 
unions as they lost members and the repressive industrial relations regime that employers and 
the state maintained. Additionally, the government's lack of legitimacy led to the adoption of 
repressive practices to ensure that there was no political opposition to it amongst the workers 
generally and trade unions in particular. 
Although the Industrial Court always supported the rights of trade unions to exist and represent 
their membership, in practice the new employers, mafuta-mingi (both soldiers and civilians), who 
took over the Asians' seized properties generally ignored such awards, provisions of collective 
agreements and the law in general. This was expressed in the militarisation of industrial relations 
whereby managers and employers resorted to police and military force to resolve industrial 
conflict or simply to suppress any workers' opposition. To make matters worse, the President 
banned collective bargaining from 1974 to 1976 (Barya, 1990). This further undermined trade 
unionism and, in the end, working class gains of the 1960s were eroded in the 1970s and even 
the small labour aristocracy that existed was eradicated (Barya, 1990). 
From 1974, leading members of the Amin regime reiterated the government's anti-freedom of 
speech and anti-freedom of political organisation openly and “ad nauseam”. Due to the 
atmosphere of repression, the Industrial Court was not unable to enforce its awards nor could 
unionists and workers (Barya, 1990). 
Though the Minister of Labour continued to claim in public that the Amin regime was committed 
to voluntary industrial relations both in law and practice, that was not the case in reality. Industrial 
relations were militarised in the private and public sector, workers' protest at conditions of work 
brutally suppressed while union officials were constantly at risk of imprisonment, torture, dismissal 
and even death. These practices were not recorded and couldn’t be reported in the official and 
private press (Barya, 1990).  
One of the examples Barya (1990) was able to suffice was in one of the nationalised companies, 
the Manager transformed himself into transport officer, cashier, storekeeper, canteen supervisor 
and general supervisor. He did not follow the grievance procedures laid down but physically 
punished workers he considered at fault. In other cases, managers would use their employees as 
their home servants. 
2.4.1 Legislation 
The first legislative change under Amin’s regime was the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, 
No.10 of 1971. This change was brought about during a period when the desire of the Amin 
regime was to get along with workers and unions. Trade union leaders called upon the new 
government to reverse the dissolution of autonomous trade unions and the centralisation brought 
about by the 1970 Act and, in response a temporary measure was adopted. The temporary 
measure was the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.10 of 1971 and it provided that “all 
trade unions registered under the Trade Unions Act 1965 shall continue as separate trade unions 
until such time as the Minister, shall, by notice published in the Gazette, dissolve them”. The rest 
of the Act was active though (Barya, 1990). 
The second legislative change was the Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.29 in 1973. 
The 1973 Act was a true reflection of the government's intention to uphold principles of democracy 
in the trade union movement and to maintain the right of freedom of association of workers so as 
to enable them to negotiate with the employers on an equal basis. This Act was backed by the 
Ministry responsible for labour and the LCC but the cabinet was split over two different views 
regarding the very existence and rights of trade union, that is, the autocratic view and the liberal 
one pursued by the Ministry of Labour. Employers too objected to this act - however it was 
eventually enacted. This act was liberal as it reinstated the existence and autonomy of trade 
unions on a permanent basis and also enhanced trade unions' freedom of association. It also 
reinstated the principle of voluntary industrial relations based on collective bargaining between 
autonomous unions and employers, overseen by the state. As mentioned above, this act also 
established NOTU (Barya, 1990; ILO/SLAREA, 2004). 
The third major amendment during Amin’s regime was the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and 
Settlement) Act (Amendment) Decree, No.18 of 1974 which repealed the Trade Disputes 
(Arbitration and Settlement) Act of 1964. The new Act aimed at relatively speeding up the dispute 
settlement procedures and this was because one of the loopholes of the 1964 Act was that both 
parties should agree to refer a dispute to the Industrial Court during the resolution process. The 
minister was now empowered to refer a dispute to the Industrial Court without the consent of both 
parties to a dispute. The act also aimed at making an award enforceable on a headstrong 
employer which therefore made it an offence for any employer to fail or refuse to implement an 
award of an arbitration tribunal or Industrial Court within twenty-eight days from the date of its 
publication. Lastly, the act aimed at making the Industrial Court more independent of the Minister 
as it was now empowered to announce its awards and have them gazetted without ministerial 
approval. This act also established for the first time a Trade Unions Tribunal to determine 
especially on some disputes within a union or between unions (Barya, 1990). 
The 1974 amendment to the 1964 act was really a result of workers' struggles which had 
precipitated both trade union leaders and government to strive to improve the grievance handling 
machinery. This became possible due to the support of the liberal civilian Labour Minister’s and 
the government's desire, before 1974 at least, to retain workers' support (Barya, 1990). 
The final legislative change was in 1976, that is, the Trade Unions Decree, No.20. This decree 
was an amendment to the trade union’s act and was a result of a cumulative pattern of 
embezzlement of union funds by some officials, bribery of union members by external sources 
and failure to organize workers and co-operate with government in development efforts. This 
therefore prompted the Minister of Labour to wage a lone battle against the practise and to ensure 
that the 1976 Amendment was made. Section 14(1) of the 1976 Decree empowered the Registrar 
of Trade Unions to interdict or suspend any officer or his representative of a trade union if satisfied 
that such officer had misused, misappropriated or mismanaged the funds or affairs of the trade 
union.  This act was a positive attempt to protect trade unions from unscrupulous leaders (Barya, 
1990). 
 
2.5 1980-1985 (Obote II) 
The UPC/Obote group came back to power after an election widely accepted as having been 
rigged. Although the majority of workers and trade unionists were opposed to the Obote II regime, 
they were not politically organised and thus had to make choices, either become for the UPC-
Obote II regime or remain autonomous. This led to the failed attempts by trade unions to form a 
Labour Party in 1980. An attempt by the trade union movement to draw out a political programme 
and even form a Labour Party was aborted by a section of the trade union leadership and one of 
the reasons was because they were not politically organised and lacked sufficient support among 
the workers and trade unions, in a situation where armed political opposition to the government 
now existed. The trade unionists' ability to engage in parliamentary politics was made possible 
due to the 1973 amendment allowing trade unionists to become MPs (Barya, 1990). 
Because of the unsuccessful attempt to form a labour party, the trade union movement was open 
to political interference by government and the ruling Party, UPC. The ruling government 
continued to try and control the trade union movement for example to split and take over the union 
movement by sponsoring a rival trade union centre. This was unsuccessful as the trade union 
movement leadership was much more determined and resisted these ploys. The government 
therefore resorted to repression and illegal intervention in union affairs (Barya, 1990). 
However, though trade unions tried hard to stay strong despite the political interventions, they 
were still largely responsible for the negation of union democracy and the consequent weakening 
of the trade union movement. This leadership struggle was fuelled by factors both internal and 
external to the unions (Barya, 1990). 
In a move to further weaken the trade union movement, the government suppressed the Industrial 
Court. The government also feared that the Court personnel could be sympathetic to anti-
government political organisations and the anti-government official trade union movement. The 
economic crisis and the Obote 11 regime's distrust of trade unions and workers thus generally 
coincided to make the legal dispute settlement process redundant (Barya, 1990). 
Because the industrial court was inoperative, that meant that only conciliation and arbitration were 
formally available as remedies for trade disputes. But the finality of Industrial Court awards was 
not available because the terms of service, of most Panel members of the Court expired in 1980, 
and that of the President in 1981; thereafter no new Panels or President had been appointed. 
Workers were therefore given no choice but to accept any outcome of collective bargaining where 
unions were recognised or to go on strike illegally (Barya, 1990). 
In this period no changes in legislation took place and as such the legislation originating from the 
colonial era and the post-colonial period between 1974 to 1976 remained the framework of 
operation for the trade unions and workers in general (Barya, 1990). 
2.6 1986- 2005 (National RResistance Movement- Y.K Museveni) 
When the NRM government came to power, it found a faction-ridden and polarised trade union 
movement (Barya, 2010). Despite NRM being the most radical political organisation to come to 
power in Uganda since independence it had no clear programme or role for workers. The 
government’s basic policy document did not give them or trade unions any specific role. The 
reason for this was because the NRM organised itself as a guerrilla movement (1981-1986) 
mainly in the countryside and among the peasantry (Barya, 1990).the government  initially 
encouraged freedom of association for unions and Trade unions played a role from 1986 to 2006. 
They participated through Boards of Directors of parastatals. Unions participated in different 
tripartite institutions and in parliament (Barya, 2010). 
From 1997, workers through NOTU became part of the ruling movement structure; for example, 
they had a representative on the National Executive Committee (NEC) and five representatives 
at the National Conference but they failed to produce any policies, resolutions or programs for 
workers. The NRM also emphasised and supported womens’ emancipation and thus NOTU and 
its affiliates created women’s wings and ensured that women occupiedy top positions within 
NOTU (Barya, 2010). 
However, the government radical views  gradually shifted and became one of the leading forces 
for market forces, liberalisation and privatisation yet the nature of neo-liberalism negated the 
existence and functioning of trade unions. In addition, new investors and employers casualised 
the labour force and refused to recognise them adding to the divisions and leadership wrangles 
within the trade unions. The government also allowed the industrial court to operate independently 
until 1995. But because of the government’s increasing entanglement in liberalization and 
privatization, it opposed the inhibiting force of the processes, for example it resisted the fixing of 
a minimum wage and it intimidated the industrial court. Disputes had, at times, been heard within 
the Ministry of Labour instead of being referred to the industrial court, especially those disputes 
regarding non-recognition of unions by the so-called investors. Worker MPs did not help the cause 
of workers as they were members of the NRM and thus had to support NRM views (Barya, 2010). 
2.7 2006 – to the present (Multi-party politics) 
In 2005, Uganda saw considerable political and legislative changes. The Museveni-led 
government held a referendum which decided that the country should move from a no-party  
system to a multi-party system (Barya, 2010).  
Trade unions were further disempowered and their decision to take a political stand greatly 
undermined their ability to operate throughout Museveni’s leadership. They entered a client-
patron relationship with the government. Today, Trade union leadership has been thoroughly 
incorporated into the NRM regime structures, both in the party and in parliament. However, 
despite having worker MPs, NOTU and COFTU have no control over them and they do not seem 
to consider the plight of workers (Barya, 2010). 
The presence of worker MPs has presented a number of challenges to the trade unions. That is, 
these MPs are not organisationally - linked to the NOTU constituents and their electorate; they 
are not catered for within NOTU structures, and NOTU has no control over them and gives them 
no instructions. They are therefore not accountable to NOTU or the workers. COFTU has one MP 
in parliament but the situation is no different from NOTU. At times, MPs have taken positions 
contrary to NOTU or other union interests and they have also acted in opposition to each other. 
Rather than representing workers, they have in fact represented government in parliament which 
is in opposition to what workers need.They have also represented government’s positions and 
interests to workers rather than workers positions and interests to government. The MPs claim 
that they are unable to make an impact because their representation in government is so small 
(Barya, 2010). During the 2011 election, all five worker MPs contested on the NRM ticket. 
Therefore, due to their political affiliation workers’ MPs are under pressure to support government 
interests in Parliament rather than workers’ interests  (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). 
The trade union movement, with support from the Federation of Ugandan Employers (FUE),  
spearheaded the labour law reforms in 2006. There were demands for the reform and 
modernisation of labour laws in Uganda to bring them in line with ratified ILO ratifications and 
conventions. The new laws were to overhaul the old laws, giving them meaningful and 
unrestricted rights and freedoms of association to workers, better dispute settlement processes, 
new rights for workers in the employment relationship. But government was reluctant to pass 
these new laws as they regarded them as “anti-investor”. However, with added pressure from the 
United States of America (USA) and with threats of being banned from the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), the new laws were passed before March 2006. Thus the Employment 
Act, No.6 of 2006, the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No.8 of 2006, the Labour 
Unions Act, No.7 of 2006 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, No.9 of 2006 were all 
passed and they will be discussed below (Barya, 2010). 
 
3. CURRENT STATE OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS AND TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES 
3.1 Trade unions 
The current number of registered trade unions in Uganda is approximately fourty (40). Almost all 
of these trade unions are affiliated to one of the country’s two national federations of unions; the 
National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) and the Central Organization of Free Trade 
Unions (COFTU) (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011).  
NOTU was established in 1973, under the regime of Idi Amin, and at that time all unions were 
required to affiliate with it. Together with their Kenyan and Tanzanian trade union counterparts, 
Uganda Trade Unionists formed the East African Trade Union Consultative Council (EATUC) in 
1988. NOTU is itself affiliated to the international Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU) and 
the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Accra (Saida, 2005). 
COFTU was formed in 2003 by members who had split from NOTU as a result of differences of 
opinion on administrative and ideological issues (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). 
3.2 Employers’ organizations 
The main employers’ organization is the Federation of Uganda Employers (FUE). FUE was 
founded in 1958 and registered in July, 1960. It was formerly known as the Society of Ugandan 
Employers but gained its current name in 1961 after its merger with the Federation of Industry. 
The FUE is affiliated to the East African Business Council and the Pan-African Association, and 
its membership comprises public and private sector companies, corporate bodies, schools, 
hospitals, sectoral associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It represents 
employers in statutory bodies such as the Labour Advisory Board, the Board of the National Social 
Security Fund, the Minimum Wages Advisory Board and the Private Sector Business 
Development Supervisory Committee (Fashoyin et al., 2003; Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme, 2012). 
 FUE’s mission is “to offer the most valuable advisory, training and consultancy services on 
employment, human resource management and development issues and promote members’ 
competitiveness by improving productivity and quality of work life”. FUE provides representation 
on questions of economic and social policy, guidance on employment relations, training for human 
resource development, training on HIV/AIDS and assistance on small enterprise and 
entrepreneurship development to all its members (Fashoyin et al., 2003). 
3.3 Labour Advisory Board (LAB) 
The main structure of social dialogue is the Labour Advisory Board (LAB). It was established and 
appointed in April 2011 but inaugurated in October 2011. The Board was established to advise 
the Minister on employment and industrial relations matters, the International Labour 
Organization, implementation of Child Labour Policy, regulation of employment agencies and 
bureaus, and overseeing of the dispute resolution process et cetera (Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme, 2012).  
According to the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (2012), the Board is made up 
of:  
“an independent chairperson, representatives of the Ministries responsible for the Public Service, 
Finance, Education, Local Government, Trade and Industry, and Justice; representatives of 
employers’ organizations; representatives of trade union organizations; representative of persons 
with disabilities; and the government agency responsible for environmental protection. The 
Secretary of the Board is the Commissioner responsible for Labour.” 
3.4 Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils 
Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils Act, 1957 makes 
provision for the Minister to appoint a minimum wages board if he or she considers desirable to 
fix a minimum wage and determine other conditions of employment for any employees or group 
of employees in any occupation. Composition of the board is the “chairperson, two other persons, 
assessors appointed by the chairperson who shall be persons with expert knowledge of any of 
the matters with which the board’s inquiry is concerned, and an equal number of persons 
representing employers and workers directly connected with the occupation”. However, the 
system of minimum wage-‘setting has not been functioning since 1996 when the last attempt to 
review minimum wages was made but failed due to opposition from the President and Minister of 
Finance (Labour Administration and Inspection Programme, 2012). 
 
4.INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Uganda is also a signatory to a number of ILO Conventions which promote freedom of association 
and right to organize and collectively bargain: 
1) Convention No. 98 concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (1949). 
2) Convention No. 154 on Promotion of Collective Bargaining (1981). 
3) Convention No. 144 on Tripartite Consultation (1976). 
4) Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour 1930.  
5) Convention No.105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957. 
6) Convention No.138 on Minimum Wage, 1973. 
7) Convention No.182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999. 
8) Convention No.87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 
1948. 
9) Convention No.100 on Equal Remuneration, 1951  
10) Convention No.111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958. 
 
5. THE 1995 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA 
The supreme law of the country is the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. It contains 
provisions aimed at protecting workers’ rights. Article 40 of the Constitution makes provision for 
economic rights where Parliament is mandated to enact laws to provide for the rights of persons 
to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, to ensure equal payment for equal work 
without discrimination; and to ensure that every worker is accorded rest and reasonable working 
hours and periods of holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. Article 40 
further guarantees the right of every Ugandan to practise his or her profession and to carry on 
any lawful occupation, trade or business. The Constitution further provides for the right of every 
Ugandan to form or join a trade union of his or her choice for the promotion and protection of his 
or her economic and social interests; to collective bargaining and representation and to withdraw 
his or her labour according to law (The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
 
6. THE LEGISLATION OF 2006 
The following are the current laws that relate to employee relations. 
6.1 The Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act no. 8 of 2006 
This act was enacted to revise the law relating to industrial relations, to repeal and replace the 
Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 1964, as amended by Decree No. 18 of 1974 
(The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
The main purpose of this Act is to provide avenues of resolving disputes involving workers. The 
Act provides for the establishment of the Industrial Court, which is required to arbitrate on labour 
disputes referred to it under the Act and to adjudicate upon questions of law and fact arising from 
references to the Industrial Court by any other law. This court is however, not operational. The 
Act also provides for other dispute resolution mechanisms such as the labour officer or a board 
of inquiry (The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 of Uganda, a 
dispute, whether existing or apprehended, may be reported in writing to a labour officer. However, 
a labour dispute may only be reported to the Commissioner for Labour, or the Commissioner may 
on his/her own motion take responsibility for any labour dispute if it is, or is likely to become, a 
national disaster. The labour officer should react to a report of labour dispute within two weeks 
and deal with the report in more than one way. He could endeavour to conciliate and resolve the 
dispute between the parties, appoint a conciliator, refer the dispute back to the parties with 
proposals on how to settle the dispute, reject the report with reasons and inform the parties 
accordingly or inform the parties that the report has matters which cannot be dealt with under the 
Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
The Labour officer may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court if, four weeks after receipt of a 
labour dispute, the dispute wasnot resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the Commissioner 
does not see a  likelihood of reaching any agreement. Therefore, the labour officer shall refer the 
dispute, at the request of any party, to the industrial court. If there are any arrangements for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration between a trade union and an employer - regardless of 
number- the labour officer should not refer the matter to the industrial court but should ensure that 
parties follow the procedures for settling the dispute laid out in the conciliation or arbitration 
agreement. 
6.1.1 Coverage 
Unfortunately, the Act does not differentiate between the different types of disputes that it covers. 
Therefore, all different types of disputes, that is, private sector and public sector disputes, 
collective and Individual disputes, Unionised and nonunionised disputes, disputes of rights and 
interests and disputes from the essential services are all covered under the Labour Disputes 
(Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, an employee 
means anyone who enters into a contract of service or an apprenticeship contract including, 
without limitation, a person who is employed by or for the government of Uganda, a local 
government or a parastatal organisation, but does not include a member of the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force.  
6.2 Employment Act No. 6 of 2006 
Employment relations in Uganda are primarily governed by the Employment Act No. 6 of 2006. 
Section 6 (1) of the Employment Act provides that “it shall be the duty of all parties including the 
minister, labour officers and the Industrial Court to promote equality of opportunity with a view to 
eliminating any discrimination in employment”. In relating this provision to employment and the 
youth in Uganda, the law presupposes that the youth are entitled to access employment 
opportunities in the same manner as senior citizens in the country, because youth unemployment 
is a very big issue in Uganda.  
The Employment Act of 2006, also has broad application as it covers all employees employed by 
an employer under a contract of service apart from exceptions for an employer’s relatives, the 
military and possible ministerial exceptions. The Employment Act also established the Labour 
Advisory Board as per Section 22 (4) (The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 
2011). 
  
6.3 The Workers’ Compensation Act 225 
The Workers Compensation Act 225 entitles employees to automatic compensation for any 
personal injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, whether the 
injury was as a result of his own mistake or not and, if it is an injury that leads to death, the 
compensation should be equivalent to an employee’s monthly pay multiplied by 60 months (The 
Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
6.4 The Occupational Safety and Health Act No. 9 of 2006 
This Act applies health and safety measures to every public and private sector workplace or 
working environment as defined in Section 2 of the Act. It requires the employer to provide 
compensation for any injuries sustained, diseases contracted or death suffered in the course of 
and as a result of employment and it also provides for general health and welfare provisions, 
including the provision of sound construction sites, proper ventilation of working environment, 
cleanliness, proper lighting, water, toilet services and first aid facilities for the workers (The Young 
Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
6.5 The Labour Unions Act No. 7 of 2006 
Under the Labour Unions Act 2006, employees have the right to organize themselves into labour 
unions and participate in the management of the said unions, collectively bargain, engage in other 
lawful activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid practice and 
withdraw their labour and take industrial action without interference from employers, as violation 
of this legal position is an offence on the part of the employer according to Section 5 of the Act 
(The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011).  
However, even with the existence of this Act, many companies have refused to acknowledge the 
existence and function of trade unions besides eradicating any attempts to create them within the 
very companies. In addition, the existence of casual labourers have also proved to be a major 
challenge in formation of “sustainable trade unions” as their employment security isnot 
guaranteed. According to the Employment Act, a casual labourer is defined as a person who 
works on a daily and hourly basis where payment of wages is due at the completion of each day’s 
work (The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
  
6.6 The Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils Act Cap.164 
As mentioned on above, this Act provides for the establishment of Minimum Wages Advisory 
boards and wage councils, and for the regulation of the remuneration and conditions of 
employment of employees. The issue of the minimum wage remains a challenge in Uganda as 
the set minimum wages applying to various sectors of the economy are not reflective of the current 
economic state. The Mimmum Wages Advisory Board recommended that the economy could 
support a minimum wage of Shs. 75,000 per month for the unskilled labour uniformly applicable 
throughout Uganda; however the President and the Minister of Finance opposed this suggestion 
(The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
6.7 Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training (BTVET) Act 2008 
The BTVET Act exists to address the redundancy of the different institutions for vocational training 
in Uganda and unemployment which has been a result of the scholar-oriented education system 
that provided minimal or no practical skills for students. It has steered the equitable distribution of 
vocational and skills training centres in Uganda but faces a major obstacle of limited government 
funding, absence of sufficient training and practice facilities/equipment, very expensive equipment 
to facilitate the work (The Young Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
6.8 The Employment (Recruitment of Ugandan Migrant Workers Abroad) Regulations, No. 
62 of 2005 
This Act aims at promoting full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all and 
to uphold the dignity and rights of Ugandan migrant workers. It futher allows the deployment of 
Ugandans to countries which have existing labour and social laws or are signatories to 
international agreements protecting the rights of migrants and to protect every Ugandan desiring 
to work abroad by securing the best possible terms and conditions of employment (The Young 
Leaders Think Tank for Policy Alternatives, 2011). 
 
 
 
7. STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR  
At this stage, it is also necessary to provide a brief description of the bodies responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of the country’s labour laws. The ministry responsible for labour 
administration in the country is the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development 
(MGLSD) (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). The government underwent structural reform programs and 
with a view of improving its efficiency and effectiveness, wanted fewer Ministries with smaller 
and effective management teams which led to the formation of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs through mergers of several Ministries. However, with government’s decentralization 
policy and more structural reforms, more ministries were merged together to form the present 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) (Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme, 2012). 
According to the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (2012), the MGLSD is made 
up of: 
“A political head of the Ministry who is a Cabinet Minister who is assisted by four Ministers of 
State responsible for Gender and Culture, Disability and Elderly Affairs, Youth and Children 
Affairs, and Labour, Employment and Occupational Safety, respectively. At the administrative 
level, there is a Permanent Secretary who is the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the 
Ministry who is also supported by three Directors and ten Heads of Department. The Ministry 
has administrative and policy units to support the technical Directorates and other related 
agencies and bodies which fall under its political mandate.” 
The Ministry has three Directorates, namely, the Directorate of Labour, Employment and 
Occupational Safety and Health; the Directorate of Gender and Community Development; and 
the Directorate of Social Protection. The Directorate of Labour, Employment, Occupational 
Safety and Health is the main focus of this study as it relates to labour administration. This 
Directorate is responsible for the implementation of labour laws and policies and some of its 
functions include the formulation, implementation and enforcement of labour policies and laws, 
development and dissemination of national guidelines on labour and employment and 
inspection of workplaces to ensure compliance with labour laws, regulations and standards; 
participation in negotiations concerning national, regional and international treaties on labour 
and employment as well as overseeing their implementation; liaise with international and 
national organizations on matters of common concern et cetera (Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme, 2012). 
The Directorate of Labour, in turn, has three departments (Labour Administration and Inspection 
Programme, 2012): 
1) Employment Services: this department is responsible for promoting employment and 
labour productivity and some of its functions include the formulation and review of 
guidelines, programmes and policies relating to employment; registration and placement 
of job seekers; regulation and monitoring of private employment agencies. 
2) Occupational Safety and Health: to ensure a safe and healthy environment at the 
workplace for example through the formulation and review of guidelines, programmes, 
policies and laws on occupational health and safety. 
3) Labour, Industrial Relations and Productivity: This department is responsible for labour 
relations function such as handling of individual labour complaints; labour inspections; 
child labour; dispute resolution; registration of trade unions et cetera. 
Labour officers 
Labour officers are responsible for conducting workplace inspections and ensuring compliance 
with the employment standards set out in the Employment Act. They are also called upon to 
facilitate the settlement of employment disputes and are empowered to institute criminal or civil 
proceedings in the Industrial Court in respect of any violation of the Employment Act. They 
operate under the Employment Services Department but are appointed and administered by the 
individual districts as part of the country’s shift towards decentralization. Responsibility for 
labour inspectors, however, has not been delegated to the districts and their appointment and 
facilitation remains with the Directorate of Labour (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, a Labour officer 
means the Commissioner for labour, the district labour officer and the assistant labour officer. 
 
8. INDUSTRIAL COURT 
The Industrial Court is the top organization for resolving labour-specific disputes. It was 
established by law under Section 7 of the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, 
2006 (No. 8) with the mandate to arbitrate on labour disputes referred to it; and to adjudicate all 
trade disputes referred to it. As mentioned above, if a dispute arises between an employee and 
his or her employer, it should first be referred to a labour officer and if the labour officer is 
unable to resolve it, then the matter should be referred to the Industrial Court (Ananaba, 1979). 
The Industrial Court is supposed to consist of the Chief Judge, a Judge, an independent 
member, a representative of employers and a representative of workers. They are all appointed 
by the Minister of Labour, but the employers’ organisations and trade unions each nominate five 
persons from whom the minister must choose (Labour Administration and Inspection 
Programme, 2012).  
The Court is set up in a manner intended to be more accessible and expedient than when one 
proceeds through the civil court system. Its procedures are simplified and legal representation is 
optional. The industrial court is however not operational as no Judge has been appointed. 
According to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), the tenure of the judges and independent panelists 
expired and replacements were not appointed in 2006. When the Minister of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development, Hon. Gabriel Opio, was appointed, he was tasked to re-establish the 
court and therefore he appointed an interim judge and also secured funding for the interim 
judge’s training. However, he was advised by the JSC that any case heard under the interim 
judge was at risk of being appealed, since the appointment did not follow the statutory 
procedure for judicial appointments to the Court. The minister then submitted a request to the 
JSC to make the required recommendation to the President and up to now, no 
recommendations have been submitted and the court has not been operational. In the Industrial 
Courts absence, labour matters have been taken to the High Court (Labour Administration and 
Inspection Programme, 2012). 
Additionally a majority of these cases are often referred to the in-operational Industrial Court or 
the Ministry responsible for labour, and consequently remain unheard which is quite distressing. 
There have been calls for the removal of the Industrial Court because of its inability to operate is 
prejudicing labour issues that are being raised by people (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). 
 
9. ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
The following services are regarded as essential services according to the Labour Disputes 
(Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
a) Water services 
b) Electricity services 
c) Health, sanitary and hospital services 
d) Fire services 
e) Prisons services of the administrations of districts 
f) Air traffic control services 
g) Civil aviation telecommunications services 
h) Meteorological services 
i) Transport services necessary to the operation of any of the services set out in the 
Schedule 
j) Supply and distribution of fuel, petrol and oil services 
k) Teaching services 
l) Public transport services 
m) Services relating to rail, road and inland waterways transport and inland waterways ports 
n) Services relating to civil aviation 
 
10. CASE STUDIES 
Case study one: (5th November, 2013) 
“A liquor manufacturing company in Uganda had a case of a male employee beating up a female 
employee. When the matter was taken to management, the female employee was accused of 
being the provocateur of the beating as she had been taunting the male employee for quite some 
time. Management decided to take the matter to the local police in the area who advised that the 
female employee be dismissed and the male employee be suspended. When the researcher 
inquired as to whether the management was aware of the formal dispute process, they claimed 
the police were more responsive and effective to the matter, and worse still, they were not aware 
of the existence of labour officers in the area” 
This case study is a very clear example of how the public is not aware of an existing dispute 
resolution system and would rather involve the police in settling dispute issues as they are quicker 
and effective. 
Case study two  
The researcher talked to the HR manager of multinational company, Mott MacDonald in Uganda 
who provided the dispute resolution procedure for the company.  
“Employees are encouraged to first resolve the grievances on an informal basis by raising it with 
the appropriate line manager. If the grievance involves another employee, the matter should be 
raised directly with that person. However, if an employee does not feel able to speak directly to 
the person concerned, or if the grievance is of a serious nature, the employee should instigate 
the formal procedure. However, it is intended that the majority of concerns will be resolved at the 
informal stage. The formal process is the employee should report the dispute in writing to his/her 
immediate manager or appropriate divisional/departmental manager describing the issue within 
three months. Once the company has received a formal written grievance letter, the complainant 
will be asked to attend the meeting with a relevant senior manager which take place within ten 
working days of receipt of grievance letter. A colleague may accompany the employee to this 
meeting.  Following the meeting, the employee will be advised within 10 working days of the senior 
manager’s determination which is confirmed in writing. If the matter is not resolved to the 
employee’s satisfaction, there’s a right to a written appeal to the senior manager nominated by 
the company who in-turn invites the employee to a meeting to discuss the matter. The director or 
authorised deputy will give a decision confirmed in writing within 10 working days of this grievance 
meeting. This decision is final.” 
The HR manager shared that she was aware of the national dispute resolution system but could 
not use it because of its unreliability. However, the Mott Macdonald system is well known to the 
staff of the company and there is training so as to ensure that every individual has access to fair 
justice in case of disputes arising.  
Case study three (Stanbic bank, Uganda) 
According to an employee of Stanbic bank, Uganda, Mr Bruno Agaba, the company makes an 
effort to respond to the disputes of all employees and the average time taken to resolve disputes 
is, Critical - 4 hours, High -16 hours and Medium -72hours. The company has an issues tracker 
that is used to lodge and track the progress which is simple to use as all one needs is a summary 
and description of the dispute. The other items such as names, job titles et cetera are automated 
as long as you log in with your credentials. An employee is allowed to have legal representation 
when the dispute has a revenue impact to the institution and customer. Stanbic bank discourages 
unionisation of its employees 
Case study four (MTN Uganda) 
According to an employee of the telecommunication giant MTN, all disputes are handled by the 
HR department and one is entitled to bring legal representation as the company is represented 
by their own. The company uses its own dispute resolution procedure. If the case is not resolved, 
one can take it to the public courts. According to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), MTN is one company 
that does not allow unionisation of its members. 
Case study five (entrepreneur) 
The researcher interviewed an entrepreneur with a couple of businesses who insisted that he 
encourages his employees to report their matters to the labour officers in the area in case the HR 
manager was unable to resolve it. However, he said because of the labour officers’ reluctance to 
do follow ups on the cases lodged by his employees, the employees always lost out. He 
expressed disdain with the system as the industrial court was not operational thus forcing fellow 
entrepreneurs and employees to pursue expensive court cases which they would eventually give 
up on. He also stated that an employee earning about Ugandan Shs. 80, 000 (R 280) per month 
would be discouraged from pursuing a labour dispute in the courts of law as it would be too 
expensive. 
All in all, from the case studies discussed above, it is evident that though the new and updated 
labour system has brought Uganda in line with the ILO expectations, there still quite a number of 
significant obstacles which continue to impede the effectiveness of the Ugandan system.  
 
11. REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UGANDAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
11.1 Elements of the system 
The Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 does not differentiate between 
the different types of disputes that it covers. Therefore, all different types of disputes, that is, 
private sector and public sector disputes, collective and individual disputes, Unionised and 
nonunionised disputes, disputes of rights and interests and disputes from the essential services 
are all covered under the Act and they all follow the same path. 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, a dispute, whether 
existing or apprehended, may be reported in writing to a labour officer. However, a labour dispute 
may only be reported to the Commissioner for Labour, or the Commissioner may on his/her own 
motion take responsibility for any labour dispute if it is, or is likely to become, a national disaster. 
The labour officer should react to a report of labour dispute within two weeks and deal with the 
report in more than one way. He could endeavour to conciliate and resolve the dispute between 
the parties, appoint a conciliator, refer the dispute back to the parties with proposals on how to 
settle the dispute, reject the report with reasons and inform the parties accordingly or inform the 
parties that the report has matters which cannot be dealt with under the Labour Disputes 
(Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
The Labour officer may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court if, four weeks after receipt of a 
labour dispute, the dispute was not resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the Commissioner 
does not see a likelihood of reaching any agreement. Therefore, the labour officer shall refer the 
dispute, at the request of any party, to the industrial court. If there are any arrangements for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration between a trade union and an employer - regardless of 
number- the labour officer should not refer the matter to the industrial court but should ensure that 
parties follow the procedures for settling the dispute laid out in the conciliation or arbitration 
agreement. The Court is set up in a manner intended to be more accessible and expedient than 
when one proceeds through the civil court system. Its procedures are simplified and legal 
representation is optional. 
11.2 Possible indicators 
11.2.1 Legitimacy 
Uganda’s legislative system has been marred by controversy from the very beginning. With every 
political regime, all the changes to the dispute resolution system were made with very limited 
consultation. The need to change the legislative system was spear-headed by the Ugandan trade 
union movement and the Federation of Ugandan Employers (FUE) in 2006 (Barya, 2010). 
However, government only passed the laws when it was pressured by the United States of 
America (USA) and with threats of being banned from the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA). 
After many failed studies, a final study supported by the ILO, the United Nations Development 
Programme with the participation of two local consultants and tripartite partners (government, 
unions, and employers) was made which resulted in new proposals to overhaul the old laws. 
Some of the proposals were unrestricted rights and freedom of association to workers, better 
dispute settlement processes et cetera. However, the president and the Ministry of Finance were 
opposed to them and tried to undo them. This therefore puts to question the actual validity of the 
laws as the government was forced to pass laws it did not believe in thus jeopardizing their 
implementation and enforcement (Barya, 2010). 
Government has let market forces determine the employer-employee relationship in Uganda and 
has failed to enforce recognition of unions in the private sector, failed to recognise and bargain 
effectively in the public sector. Government has also failed to enforce laws on minimum wage 
which has left vulnerable groups unprotected from the forces of liberalisation. Many private 
employers have refused to recognise unions such as textile, accommodation and building 
industries, mobile phone companies et cetera. Casualization of labour has the most effect on the 
rights of employees as they have no written contracts, get no leave or termination pay, they don’t 
receive workers’ compensation and health and safety protection while at work and their social 
security contributions are not made. Worse still is the general lack of awareness on the part of 
labour officers on the content and application of the law which generally means that the general 
public will also be clueless about the application of the laws yet use of the system is mandatory 
(Labour Administration and Inspection Programme, 2012). 
According to Barya (2010), most labour institutions have been non-functional for many years. The 
Labour Advisory Council has not been dealing with issues under the Employment Act of 2006 or 
the Workers’ Compensation Act (Cap.225 Laws of Uganda). The Minimum Wages Advisory Board 
recommended a minimum monthly wage in 2005 which was rejected by the President and the 
Ministry of Finance despite the law and Uganda’s ratification of the ILO convention (No.26) on 
minimum wage fixing. The government has also been accused of intimidating the Industrial Court 
for example when the court awarded a 60% pay rise to bank workers in 1995, the President and 
government media attacked the court and its president. Though the court’s independence was 
defended, the official government onslaught continued. The court’s administrative attachment to 
the MGLSD has also limited its independence as it is subject to budget cuts. The decentralisation 
of labour officers also subjects them to government control as districts are run by government 
representatives, Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs). This is evidence of government control of 
the labour institutions in Uganda. 
11.2.2 Efficiency  
The Ugandan system has been designed to respond to disputes within the shortest time possible. 
That is, the labour officer should react to a report of labour dispute within two weeks and he/she 
may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court if, four weeks after receipt of a labour dispute, the 
dispute was not resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the Commissioner does not see a 
likelihood of reaching any agreement. 
However, according to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), the system is not efficient because of the “chronic” 
shortage of labour officers and the un-operation of the Industrial Court, which is the only avenue 
for appealing the decision of a labour officer 
According to the Employment Act No. 6 of 2006, every district should have at least labour officer 
appointed by the District Service Commission. They are responsible for conducting workplace 
inspections and ensuring compliance with employment standards. They are also called upon to 
facilitate the settlement of employment disputes and are empowered to institute criminal or civil 
proceedings in the Industrial Court in respect of any violation of the Employment Act. However, a 
number of districts lack adequate funding to hire, train and pay full-time labour officers and this 
has left many districts without this first line of recourse in the event of a labour dispute proving to 
be a disadvantage to the system. Some labour officers are not qualified and are clueless on what 
their position entails. According to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), there are over 120 districts in Uganda 
and only 35 labour officers. 
The Industrial Court on the other hand has not been operational as no Judge has been appointed. 
In the Industrial Courts absence, labour matters have been taken to the High Court (Labour 
Administration and Inspection Programme, 2012). However, according to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), 
a majority of these cases are often referred to the un-operational Industrial Court or the Ministry 
responsible for labour, and consequently remain unheard which is quite distressing. There have 
been calls for the removal of the Industrial Court because its inability to operate is prejudicing 
labour issues that are being raised by people. 
11.2.3 Informality 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, the process of 
lodging a dispute that arises between an employee and his or her employer is first referred to a 
labour officer. In the event that the labour officer cannot resolve it, the matter is referred to the 
Industrial Court. This process is quite easy however the system is not understood by all. According 
to the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (2012), majority of the labour officers are 
not qualified and are not sure on what their position entails. This is because they have not been 
properly trained in key labour administration activities such as labour inspection, employment 
services, dispute resolution and labour law. This therefore means that if the system is not 
understood by the labour officers, chances are high that there is limited assistance available for 
those who need to use the system which in the long run complicates the process for the users. 
 
11.2.4 Affordability 
The services offered by the labour officers and the Industrial Court are free of charge.  According 
to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), Labour officers are civil servants and are financed by the government 
thus disputants should not pay them. However, the fact that cases which are unresolved by the 
labour officers are being sent to the normal court which are quite costly because of the inactive 
industrial court means that the system is not affordable for majority of workers. In addition, due to 
budgetary limitations and differing political priorities at the district level many districts do not have 
labour officers in place. Therefore the MGLSD faces a difficult challenge in functioning as a central 
authority to guide labour inspection action throughout the country. 
11.2.5 Accessibility 
As mentioned above, disputes are initially referred to a labour officer who then refers them to the 
industrial court and according to the Employment Act of 2006, labour officers should be appointed 
in each of the country’s 111 districts. However due to budgetary limitations and differing political 
priorities at the district level many districts do not have labour officers in place. This therefore 
means that not all parties, especially the most vulnerable, have easy means to make contact and 
using the court system is quite complicated for a country with a high rate of illiteracy. Keep in mind 
the fact that the government is proposing 20 more new districts which will bring the number to 
131 (Lumu, 2012). 
According to the surveys carried out by the researcher, many of the respondents were not aware 
of the existence of labour officers and the industrial court which proves there’s not enough 
information out there about the system. 
 
 
11.2.6 Range of services 
As mentioned above, the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 caters for 
all the different types of disputes, that is, private sector and public sector disputes, collective and 
individual disputes, unionised and nonunionised disputes, disputes of rights and interests and 
disputes from the essential services. The Industrial Court is tasked with promoting equity, effective 
and expeditious settlement of labour disputes, industrial harmony and improved working 
conditions. Labour officers on the hand are responsible for labour inspection, dispute resolution 
and because the Industrial Court is not operational, they have been conducting hearings and 
delivering rulings on matters which would ordinarily be done by the specialized court. This 
contradicts the ILO duties of labour inspectors according to Convention No. 81 which are 
enforcement of legal provisions relating to conditions of work and protection of workers, supplying 
technical information and advice to employers and workers and their representative organizations 
on the most effective means of complying with legal provisions; and bringing to the notice of the 
competent authorities any legal deficits affecting workers. 
Because of limited funding from the government, high staff turnover of labour officers, untrained 
labour officers, the system is unable to provide all the required services expected of a dispute 
resolution system such as provision of information, advice, training, facilitation, investigations, 
conciliation, arbitration et cetera. 
11.2.7 Accountability 
According to the indicators discussed in the framework in chapter one of this study, transparency 
is one important aspect of an effective system and transparency in this sense comes in the form 
of the system being able to accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. 
However, history has proven that the Ugandan system is not transparent and does not feel 
accountable to the Ugandan public. Some examples of its lack of accountability are the refusal of 
government to set a minimum wage for the country without a credible explanation (their excuse 
is that they are trying to maintain foreign investors), refusal to reopen the industrial court even 
with the backlog of unresolved labour disputes. According to Mudoola (2013), there are over 300 
labour disputes that are pending in the courts of law.  
The Ugandan government has proved to only be accountable to the western world and 
international bodies which was portrayed when the government refused to implement the new 
acts with pressure from the public but only did so after the US government threatened to ban 
Uganda from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
11.2.8 Resources 
Funding has been a critical issue with the dispute resolution system of Uganda. Local district 
governments have been faced with budget and staffing constraints and are thus forced to make 
decisions based on priorities and available resources. Issues such as health and education 
consistently rank high on the list of policy priorities for district governments, often leaving labour 
and employment matters on the side-line. According to the Labour Administration and Inspection 
Programme (2012), the Chief Administrative Officers’ (CAOs) have been known not to allocate 
sufficient funding for the functions of labour officers in the districts which could be because of a 
lack of knowledge on labour and employment issues or the benefit provided by these services. 
Another issue was the limited knowledge among employers and workers in the district about the 
contents of the labour laws and the untrained labour officers who are not up to date with the 
current legislative system. 
 
Uganda’s Trade Union movement on the other hand is still struggling to get the recognition 
it is entitled to according to the labour laws. According to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), it is a common 
practice in both the private and public sectors for employers to simply refuse to recognize trade 
unions and/or engage in collective bargaining. For example, representatives from the National 
Union of Educational Institutions (NUEI) stated that private schools are often resistant to the 
unionization of their workforce. Ugandan labour laws are adequate to protect the rights of the 
workers, but the enforcement is not there. For example there is an avenue of complaint if 
employers refuse to deal with registered unions. However, unions have reported that their 
complaints are not followed up on. 
According to Barya (2010), the trade union leadership has been incorporated into the current 
regime structures, that is in parliament and in the NRM party and considering the autocratic nature 
of the government, it is unlikely the trade unions will take independent and pro-worker stands as 
they are now forced to conform to the government’s expectations. The presence of worker MPs 
was thought to be an good step to advancing the workers needs and the trade union power 
however they have proved to be more problematic. They are not organisationally-linked to the 
trade unions and are therefore not accountable to the trade unions. At times, MPs have taken 
positions contrary to NOTU or other union interests and they have also acted in opposition to 
each other. Rather than representing workers, they have in fact represented government in 
parliament which is in opposition to what workers need. They have also represented government’s 
positions and interests to workers rather than workers positions and interests to government. The 
MPs claim that they are unable to make an impact because their representation in government is 
so small (Barya, 2010). 
11.2.9 Summary of the evaluation  
The evaluation of the Ugandan labour dispute resolution system is an indication of the need for a 
strong dispute resolution system. Uganda has a modern system however, it has failed use it. The 
system is faced with a number of challenges such as budget and staffing constraints and is thus 
forced to make decisions based on priorities and available resources and it is thus not efficient in 
its processes. The system’s legitimacy has been questioned as the government has been 
branded as dictatorial and lacks accountability to the Ugandan public for example its refusal of 
government to set a minimum wage for the country without a credible explanation (their excuse 
is that they are trying to maintain foreign investors), refusal to reopen the industrial court even 
with the backlog of unresolved labour disputes. The failure of the Ugandan trade union movement 
to get the recognition it is entitled to according to the labour laws by the employers and 
government shows that Uganda has a long way to go in regards to realising its labour rights. 
 
12. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has dealt with a description of Uganda, that is, its physical, political and economic 
aspects. In addition, the historical development of the trade dispute legislation and the trade union 
movement of Uganda between the pre-independence period from 1894 to the present was 
discussed. It is evident that Uganda’s labour movement history has had very dramatic turns of 
events. It is one of only a few countries where politics has played a significant role in its 
development, even after it gained its independence. The developments that were discussed were 
closely related to various historical and political phases through which Uganda has passed; 
significant periods are 1894-1962 (pre-independence), 1962-1971 (Obote 1), 1971-1979 (Amin), 
1980-1985 (Obote II), 1986-2006 (NRM) and 2006 to the present Multi-party system. The current 
state of the social partners was also discussed, that is, the trade unions, employer organisation 
and tripartite bodies where labour related issues are tabled. The current laws that relate to 
employee relations were also covered and they included Employment Act, No.6 of 2006, the 
Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No.8 of 2006, the Labour Unions Act, No.7 of 
2006 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, No.9 of 2006. This was followed by a 
discussion of the bodies responsible for the administration and enforcement of the country’s 
labour laws. A discussion of the ministry responsible for labour administration in the country 
followed and it is the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) and is in 
charge of recruiting labour officers who are the first step in resolving disputes according to the 
dispute resolution act, the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No.8 of 2006. 
Five case studies were also covered and they were a result of unstructured interviews that the 
researcher carried out to understand what really goes on in the country as research proved that 
though there is a labour dispute resolution system with recently updated laws, it was not being 
utilised by the employers and the employees. Lastly, a review of the system was carried out 
basing on the goals for an effective system which were set in chapter one. These goals are 
legitimacy, efficiency, informality, affordability, accessibility, an appropriate range of services, 
accountability and adequate resource support 
The next chapter deals with the South African dispute resolution system  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is going to deal with firstly, the historic evolution of the South African dispute 
resolution system and the influence of the South African trade union movement, secondly the 
current dispute resolution system and lastly a review of the performance of the current dispute 
resolution system. 
 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
The evolution of the South African labour dispute resolution system can be divided into four eras. 
The first era is from 1870 to 1948, the second era from 1948 to 1979, the third from 1979-1994 
and the last era from 1994 to the present date. 
2.1 The period 1870-1948 
The discovery of diamonds and gold in 1870 and 1872 respectively was the beginning of 
industrialisation in South Africa. It created a need for engineering and mining skills to extract the 
minerals. Therefore, these new mining companies had to recruit the skilled personnel from Europe 
and Australia. Because of the scarcity of their skills, these new workers were highly paid. Africans 
on the other hand were still subsistence farmers and successful traders. Indian labour was also 
imported to work on the sugar plantations in 1859. However, some Africans went to look for work 
in the mines (Finnemore, 2009).  
According to Nel, Kirsten, Swanepoel, Erasmus, & Poisat (2012), South Africa did not evolve its 
own labour relations. One reason was because the skilled employees were all immigrants and 
they imported foreign employment relations systems. Secondly, was the cultural heterogeneity of 
the country’s population. This was further aggravated by the white skilled workforce unwillingness 
to join forces with the unskilled.  
By 1900, the mining sector had grown so much that it needed more skilled labour as the white 
labour wasn’t enough to provide the necessary skills. Therefore more black workers and 
immigrant workers from other countries like China were brought in and some were put in skilled 
positions but with unskilled wages (Nel et al., 2012). Due to pressure from workers, the Ordinance 
No.17 was promulgated in 1904 and it was a discriminatory legislative action against the non-
South Africans and the the non-white workers as it placed non-white employees in skilled jobs 
but at unskilled wages. 
However, the mines continued hiring black workers for semi-skilled positions as they did the same 
work but at cheaper rates. This infuriated many white workers and made them believe they 
needed protection from the competition of cheap black labour. This happened mainly with the 
mines because of the gold price crash in 1922 where mines sought large scale measures to cut 
costs. This led to the reduction of wages for white workers and large scale retrenchment of white 
workers for the employment of black workers (Bendix, 2009). 
White miners and artisans became more militant and began to participate in violent strike action. 
The government promulgated the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act No. 20 of 1909 to manage 
employer and worker relations but it was unsuccessful in achieving its objectives. More militant 
strike action was instigated by white workers in the period 1913/1914 such as the 1913 miners’ 
strike and the 1914 general strike. The government tried to manage these strikes and unrest by 
passing the Workmen’s Compensation Act No. 25 of 1914, and the Riotous Assemblies and 
Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 27 of 1914, which gave it wider powers to restrict public unrest 
caused by individuals and trade unions (Bendix, 2009; Nel et al., 2012). 
The Black Labour Regulations Act No.15 of 1911 was also promulgated to regulate black labour 
matters. This act afforded protection to black workers who worked in the mines but made no 
provision for collective bargaining and negotiation and redress of grievances. By 1919, black 
workers were now beginning to organise and were even holding strikes. 
The replacement of white workers by the black workers was the main reason for the infamous 
bloody Rand rebellion of 1922. This rebellion was the turning point of South African labour 
relations as it marked the beginning of statutory racial segregation  and also led to the conciliation 
system (Nel et al., 2012). It was the biggest and bloodiest industrial upheaval in South African 
labour history, which took on the features of a civil war on the Witwatersrand and was 
characterized by pitched battles between the armed forces of labour and the state (Bendix, 2009; 
Nel et al., 2012).  
 
Dispute settlement between 1920 and 1948 
After years of an inadequate statutory legislative framework, the 1922 Rand Revolt was the 
impetus that drove the South African government to highlight the need for a comprehensive piece 
of labour legislation (Bendix, 2009). Therefore in 1924, the government passed the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (ICA) No. 11 of 1924 which repealed the Industrial Disputes Act of 1909 (Nel et 
al., 2012). 
Private sector (white workers) under the ICA of 1924  
The Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924 benefited the white private workers the most. 
According to Nel et al., (2012), the Industrial Conciliation Act basically aimed at creating industrial 
peace between employers and white workers. Under this Act, employers’ organisations and trade 
unions could register but since the definition of employee excluded the pass-bearing African and 
indentured Indian workers they were excluded. The Act also established Industrial Councils by 
agreement between an employers’ organisation and a registered trade union and these councils 
promoted voluntary centralised bargaining. The Act also provided for the formation of an ad hoc 
Conciliation Board for bargaining and dispute resolution between trade unions or employees and 
employer organisations or employers if there was no Industrial Council. All agreements reached 
between parties at both bodies were legally binding and it was considered a criminal offence if 
they were not complied with and could be extended to other employees and employers within 
their jurisdiction. The main emphasis was on the settlement of collective-interest disputes rather 
than individual-rights disputes. The Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards were not limited 
to conciliation only, they could also arbitrate but to a limited extent. This act also limited the right 
to strike as strikes and lock-outs were illegal (Du Toit, Woolfrey, Murphy, Godfrey, Bosch, & 
Christie, 2000). 
According to Majinda (2007), a majority of employer representatives and a majority of employee 
representatives on an Industrial Council or Conciliation Board had voluntary arbitration of disputes 
of rights in non-essential services by agreeing to the appointment of one or more arbitrators to 
arbitrate disputes of right. On the other hand, compulsory arbitration of disputes of right and of 
interest was introduced only in essential services, where strikes were forbidden. Therefore, many 
disputes of right had to be referred to the ordinary courts to be adjudicated on the basis of the law 
of contract. 
 
Private sector (Black workers) under the ICA of 1924  
The most important ramification of the Act was the exclusion of black workers (pass bearing 
natives, individuals regulated by any black pass regulations and the Black Labour Regulations 
Act) from the definition of employee which laid the basis for a racially determined dual system of 
industrial relations in South Africa. Therefore, black male workers were excluded from the 
provisions of the Act and in turn excluded from registered trade unions and were not entitled to 
collective bargaining. They could also be employed on terms inferior to those set by the Industrial 
Council or conciliation board agreements. However, it provided freedom of association to all other 
employees who did not carry passes, that is, African women, Indians and coloureds (Nel et al., 
2012; Du Toit et al., 2000). 
Public sector workers  
The Industrial Conciliation Act provided for workers in the private sector, the public sector 
employees were covered by a different suite of regulations.  
According to Koorapetse (2011), the Public Service commission (PSC) was in charge of the 
employment relationship in the public sector from 1912. The Public Servants Association was 
also established for white public servants in 1920 after the Public Service act of 1920 provided 
for the recognition of staff associations which depended on majority representation of the 
permanent employees in the various divisions of the public service. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924 was largely embraced by white workers and their 
unions but protested against by black workers and their unions however, they were simply 
repressed by government (Finnemore, 2009). It was a major instrument of racial discrimination 
as it was designed for the protection of interests of white workers from cheaper and often better 
skilled black workers. It also marked the beginning of dual system of labour relations in South 
Africa. What resulted was the separate development of white and black unions in South Africa 
and the stance of “racial corporatism” held by the South African government (Bendix, 2009; 
Finnemore, 2009). 
In 1930 the Act was amended to specify minimum wage rates and maximum working hours for 
persons excluded from the definition of ‘employee’. The main aim of the amendment was to 
protect the highly paid white workers from being undercut by cheaper African labour. The 
functions of the Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards were widened with the Industrial 
Councils now being obliged to deal with all disputes within their jurisdiction and the removal of 
limitations on the jurisdiction of Conciliation Boards. Dispute resolution remained conciliation and 
not adjudication and strikes and lockouts were prohibited during the currency of an agreement 
made within an Industrial Council or Conciliation Board (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
The 1930 amendment was replaced by a new consolidated Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act 36 
of 1937. This Industrial Council Act did not solve the problems that resulted from the dual industrial 
relations system such as intense competition for unskilled jobs and huge pay gaps between the 
well-organised skilled workers and the semi-skilled/unskilled workers (Du Toit et al., 2000). It 
provided an extension of Industrial Council agreements to cover African employees though they 
were still not allowed to be represented in Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards 
(Koorapetse, 2011).  
However, in 1935 the government formed the Van Reenen Commission to review existing 
employment legislation and the commission encouraged the formation of industrial unions to 
represent all classes of employees and proposed two government officials to represent the 
interests of African workers.  Therefore the 1937 Act made a provision for an inspector of the 
Department of Labour to represent pass-bearing African workers at Industrial Council meetings 
(Du Toit et al., 2000).   
2.2 The period 1948-1979 
In 1948, the National Party (with its ideology of apartheid brought an even more rigorous and 
authoritarian approach than the segregationist policies of previous governments), won the general 
election (Bendix, 2009; Finnemore, 2009). The government therefore appointed the Botha 
Commission in 1951 to investigate the existing employment legislation so as to align the 
legislation with the ideology. It ignored most of the Botha commission recommendations, for 
example for the formation of a coordinating body to which Industrial Council agreements would 
be referred for scrutiny, taking into account interests of all parties concerned, prior to ratification 
and extension by the Minister. The National Party further entrenched the racial divide by 
prohibiting the registration of new mixed- race unions. The already existing mixed race unions 
had to create separate branches for their “coloured” members and only white members could hold 
executive office. Job reservations where certain work could be reserved for “persons of a specified 
race” were also introduced in the Act (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
 
 
Dispute settlement between 1948 and 1979 
Legislatively, as a result of the Botha commission, the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act 
No.48 of 1953 was promulgated to prevent and settle disputes affecting the natives. Later on 
came the Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956 which repealed the 1937 Act for white 
employees (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
Private sector (white, coloureds and Indians) 
Some of the changes brought about by the Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956, as mentioned 
above, were the job reservations and tighter controls on registering mixed trade unions. With 
regard to dispute resolution, the Minister could appoint a permanent industrial tribunal that would 
hear appeals against decisions of the Registrar in respect of a wide range of matters as the 
registrar had powers of investigation, intervention and dissolution relating to the registration of 
trade unions and employer organisation. The minister could also “undertake arbitrations 
requested by parties to Industrial Councils or conciliation boards as well as compulsory arbitration 
for essential services; determine demarcation disputes; and conduct investigations and make 
recommendations on the desirability of job reservation determinations” (Du Toit et al., 2000, p.9). 
Private (African workers) 
After the World War II, black trade unionism increased steadily and therefore the government 
decided to formalise the position of black worker representation by introducing the Industrial 
Conciliation Act for blacks in 1947. This act aimed at providing machinery for mediation and 
arbitration for blacks in certain areas and cases. However, the proposed bill did not become a law 
and was shelved by the National Party government when it came to power in 1948 (Bendix, 2009; 
Finnemore, 2009). 
The National Party government however passed the Native Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 so 
as to bring the labour legislation in line with their apartheid policy. The Act removed African women 
from the definition of “employee” which had previously been accorded to them by the Industrial 
Conciliation Act thereby closing the loophole which had previously been exploited. The Native 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 48 of 1953 was also passed to create a “separate 
dispensation for African workers with plant-based works committees, regional native labour 
committees and a Central Native Labour Board.” These government controlled bodies were 
confined to reporting and dispute resolution functions. African workers were still not allowed to 
form or join registered trade unions or strike. The 1953 Act applied to all blacks who were 
employed in every trade besides the domestic workers in private households, those employed in 
farming operations and those who were working for government (Nel et al., 2012; Du Toit et al., 
2000). The 1953 Act also allowed black workers to establish workers committees which would 
enable black workers to report their grievances. However, these committees were largely 
ineffective as only one worker committee with five members was allowed per plant thus limiting 
effective representation and blacks lacked expertise to represent themselves effectively (Bendix, 
2009). 
The 1953 Act stated that if a native labour officer believed there existed a dispute in his appointed 
area, he had to report that particular dispute to the regional committee concerned and to the 
inspector defined by the regulation. The native labour officer with the assistance of the regional 
committee and in collaboration with the inspector had to attempt to effect a settlement of the 
labour dispute failing which the matter would be referred to the Central Native Labour Board which 
in collaboration with such an officer and inspector had in effect to endeavour to effect a settlement 
to the dispute (Koorapetse, 2011). 
The Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956 created a racially segregated industrial relations 
system which also happened to coincide with a long period of global economic expansion. 
Therefore, the skilled workers, who were mainly white, had significant rewards; employers faced 
few challenges from labour, low wage bills and the country benefited from the world-wide 
economic boom. Because all this success was as a result of unjust and repressive political 
dispensation, the apartheid regime would in fact face opposition and challenges from the excluded 
majority of the working class. This was followed by a number of strikes like the Durban strike of 
1973 (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
Government’s response was the amended Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) No.70 in 1973 
(formerly known as Act Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 48 of 1953) which introduced 
liaison and works committee in an effort to improve communication between employers and 
employees. However this move also aimed at restricting African workers from organising in 
unions. The Act also gave black employees limited freedom to strike just like the 1965 Act. The 
process of dispute resolution was that the disputes arising from employers and black employees 
were first channelled to the Black labour officer responsible for that area and if the labour officer 
was unable to resolve the dispute, it went to the regional Labour Committee. If that avenue failed, 
the dispute would be sent to the Divisional inspector and then the Black Labour Board. Employees 
could engage in legal industrial action only after all these channels had been exhausted 
(Koorapetse, 2011).  
The committees were rejected by the African workers and they flocked to join new unregistered 
trade unions. These unions focused on building strong shop steward structures to negotiate plant-
level agreements at the workplace as they had been excluded from Industrial Councils. Despite 
opposition from employers and the state, these trade unions continued to grow and the racially 
segregated industrial relations system started to decline (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
The government made a last attempt to encourage the committee system as an alternative to 
unionism by promulgating the Black Labour Relations Regulations Amendment Act No.84 of 
1977. This Act made it possible for the blacks to be in a position to negotiate with employers also 
allowed them to occupy positions previously held by whites. This Act was however very ineffective 
(Nel et al., 2012). 
 
Public sector workers 
A Joint Public Service Advisory Council for the white public sector was established by the 
government in the late 1960s. It was representative of all categories of white public servants and 
its role was to advise the Minister of Public Service on human resource matters (Koorapetse, 
2011). 
2.3 The period 1979-1994 
The early 1970s have been described as the “strike wave” as they were characterised by major 
strikes which had a huge impact on the labour environment of South Africa (Bendix, 2009). The 
statutory procedures where regarded as ineffective, lengthy and full of technicalities. The Durban 
strike of 1973 followed by the Soweto uprisings of 1976 prompted the government to appoint a 
Commission of Enquiry. It is better known under the name of its chairperson, Professor Nicolaas 
Wiehahn. This was to investigate the status of black workers within the South African labour 
relations system (Finnemore, 2009; Basson et al. 2005). Wiehahn’s recommendations were 
translated into the legislation between 1979 and 1983 (Basson et al., 2005). 
 
 
Dispute settlement between 1979 and 1994 
This commission recommended a number of reforms which would change the dual system of 
labour legislation. The government accepted most of the recommendations with a hope of 
incorporating the militant new unions into the system so as to tame them. These changes were 
enacted in a series of amendments over a period of four years which eventually led to the name 
of the statute changing to Labour Relations Act (LRA) (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
Private sector employees 
Some of the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations were freedom of association to all 
employees, to amend the Industrial Conciliation Act to include black workers within the definition 
of the employee and hence include them in collective bargaining, and to create an Industrial Court 
for dealing with labour disputes. Black trade unions would also be allowed to register and all 
statutory provisions would include them as well as white unions. This also allowed for blacks to 
work with whites and to fill positions that were previously exclusive to whites. In other words all 
employees now were equal in terms of labour relations. However while these reforms gave black 
workers industrial citizenship it did not grant political or economic rights equal to their white 
counterparts (Finnemore, 2009; Bendix, 2009; Smith, 2008).  
The Industrial Court was introduced to replace the Industrial Tribunal which had been established 
by the Industrial Conciliation Act on 1 January 1957 (Smith, 2008). The Industrial Court gave an 
option instead of industrial action. Before when a dispute was not resolved, parties would resort 
to industrial action or let the matter rest. Now the industrial court provided a channel through which 
disputes could be referred as all disputes could now be referred to the Industrial Court (Bendix, 
2009). The functioning of the Industrial Court was now premised on a distinction between disputes 
of right and disputes of interest (Du Toit et al., 2000). 
Initially, the government thought that they could still co-opt and control the militant unions by 
accepting most of the recommendations. But the black trade unions were aware of this and 
registered after a lot of pressure but rejected the Industrial Council participation in favour of 
bargaining at enterprise or plant level thus maximising their power. Though statutory bargaining 
and dispute resolution were now opened to the black unions in 1979, they did not jump into 
seeking to join Industrial Councils or Conciliation Boards as anticipated but continued to organise, 
seek recognition and bargain at non-statutory plant level which they used under the committee 
system. Thus they were able to establish plant level collective bargaining and dispute resolution 
to supplement the Industrial Council system (Koorapetse, 2011).  
The Industrial Conciliation Act, which later came to be known as the Industrial Conciliation 
Amendment Act of 1979, introduced a new era in South African Labour Relations. Because it did 
not add all the recommendations made by the Wiehahn Commission, more amendments were 
made in 1980, 1981 and finally 1983 (Bendix, 2009). More importantly, this new Act repealed the 
Black Labour Relations Regulation Act No.48 of 1953. The new changes meant that all registered 
and unregistered trade unions had the same provisions; committees were given “new life” and 
were now referred to as works councils. They couldn’t be removed as they ensured proper 
communication at a workplace (Nel et al., 2012). 
In 1988, there were further amendments and the government passed the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act. Some reasons for the amendment were inconsistencies in dismissals and 
retrenchments, contradictory concepts on fairness. However, the new amendment was rejected 
by unionists because of the restrictions to strike and the definition of the term “unfair labour 
practice”. Unions saw this as a move towards limiting their power and rights by government 
(Finnemore, 2009). Therefore, COSATU mounted a strong well supported campaign against the 
act. The period of the late 1980s was characterised by strikes, high unemployment, high rate of 
crime and violence. In 1987 alone, 1148 strikes were recorded (Bendix, 2009). 
Public sector workers 
The 1979 reforms did not change the situation of the public servants despite the calls for a formal 
bargaining mechanism. The Wiehahn Commission proposed that public servants be extended 
freedom of association rights but this was rejected by the government. Associations that were 
formed in the public sector were formed along racial lines, for example the Institute of Public 
Servants (IPS) for African Employees, Public Service Union (PSU) for Indian workers and Public 
Service League (PSL) for coloured workers. They wrote submissions which were 
recommendations to the Joint Advisory Council but they were not helpful as the government (as 
the employer) was not obliged to respond or even consider them when making decisions around 
conditions of service. However in 1988, after years of consultations and pressure from trade 
unions, like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) through the international 
body, the International Labour Organisation, the government committed itself to collective 
bargaining in the public sector (Koorapetse, 2011). 
In the early 1990s, there were struggles for recognition of union organisations in the public sector. 
Additionally, there were also divisions among the public service especially the health and 
education sectors. This led to the passing of two pieces of legislation in 1993, the Public Service 
Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) and the Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA), to deal with the 
public service labour relations. The PSLRA extended rights such as the right to strike and to 
organise and also established the Public Service Bargaining Chamber (PSBC) while the ELRA 
established a sector specific bargaining council for  educators whose role was to prevent and 
resolve disputes and the regulation of settlement of matters of mutual interest through negotiation 
(Koorapetse, 2011). 
The 1990s heralded in a new era of transition. Nelson Mandela was released from life 
imprisonment by President De Klerk. This development marked the beginning of the 
“rearrangement of South Africa’s socio-economic and political sphere” (Nel et al., 2013, p.90). 
This definitely meant changes would be made to employment relations. This transition was 
marked by a lot of political transition, such as the unbanning of the ANC and other political parties, 
several proceedings (Groote Schuur, Laboria and Pretoria), CODESA (Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa). Finally an interim Constitution and the Bill of Rights were developed 6 
months before the first election in 1994 (Finnemore, 2009). 
One of the important minutes was the Laboria Minute which was signed in September, 1990. It 
was one of the policy documents addressed through the negotiated compromise between Labour 
and employers. It set the tone and practice of tri-partism giving labour an institutionalised voice 
enabling it to shape the broader transition agenda. Among the key issues discussed was the 
repealing of the controversial features introduced into the Labour Relations Act (LRA) by the 1988 
amendments and extending the legislation to the public service, agriculture and domestic workers 
sectors. The agreement also proposed the establishment of the National Economic Forum (NEF) 
which was the predecessor of National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). 
The NEF operated as a tripartite forum from 1992 to 1994. It had input into constitutional 
negotiations and economic and social policy issues (Bendix, 2009). 
In 1994, the Africa National Congress (ANC) came to power and started by undoing the apartheid 
laws to transform the legislative framework and bring it in line with the international standards set 
by the ILO. There was extensive consultation with all social partners and the public so as to 
implement laws that were fair for all (Nel et al., 2013). According to Nel et al., (2012), the ANC 
focused on all the apartheid laws and realigned the labour legislation by primarily drawing on 
Australian, New Zealand and Canadian and related labour laws. This is because all these 
countries are Commonwealth nations which inherited the British industrial relations system and 
South Africa’s history and labour relations structure is closely linked to the constitutional and 
socioeconomic developments of these countries.  
2.4 Dispute resolution 1995 to the present date  
The Labour Relations Act No.66 of 1995 was the first legislative item to be promulgated. It was 
fully negotiated between the state, labour and business at NEDLAC and came into force on 
November 11 1996 (Nel et al., 2012). This Act regulated individual and collective employment 
relations and brought all employees in South Africa under a single piece of legislation since as 
discussed above public sector employees in the past were under administrative law. The 
Industrial Councils were replaced by Bargaining Councils which would now be responsible for 
collective bargaining and dispute resolution when accredited. The new Act also created the 
institutions and processes for dispute resolution. These institutions include the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) and the Labour Courts (the Labour Court and 
the Labour Appeal Court) which replaced the Industrial Court (Bhorat, Pauw, & Mncube, 2009). 
Other acts that were enacted were the Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 of 1997, the 
Employment Equity Act No.55 of 1998 and the Skills Development Act No.97 of 1998. These 
applied to all workers irrespective of race or sector, these rights were the foundation of the unified 
system, sweeping away the legal basis of for the apartheid labour market (Donnelly & Dunn, 
2006). 
It is therefore safe to say that the Labour Relations Act No .66 of 1995 has given workers of all 
races and sectors and their representative unions’ equal rights, and free access to the statutory 
bargaining and dispute settlement machinery. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
South Africa is also a signatory to a number of ILO Conventions which promote freedom of 
association and right to organize and collectively bargain: 
a) Convention No. 98 concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (1949). 
b) Convention No. 154 on Promotion of Collective Bargaining (1981). 
c) Convention No. 144 on Tripartite Consultation (1976). 
d) Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour 1930.  
e) Convention No.105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957. 
f) Convention No.138 on Minimum Wage, 1973. 
g) Convention No.182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999. 
h) Convention No.87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 
1948. 
i) Convention No.100 on Equal Remuneration, 1951  
j) Convention No.111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958. 
 
4. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INSTITUTIONS 
The following section is going to discuss the various institutions for dispute resolution in South 
Africa. 
4.1 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
The LRA established the CCMA as a statutory but independent body, although it is funded by the 
state. It is governed by tripartite committee chaired by an independent person. It has jurisdiction 
all over South Africa and has offices in all nine provinces. According to Benjamin (2013, p.6), the 
CCMA’s functions include “dispute resolution, dispute management, and institution-building within 
the labour arena and the provision of education, training and information to employers and 
employees and their organizations”. However the primary function of the CCMA is to conciliate 
and arbitrate disputes referred to it in terms of the LRA and other labour statutes such as the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA), Employment Equity Act of 1998 (EEA), the 
Skills Development Act of 1998 and the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2001 (UIF) free of charge 
(Bhorat et al., 2009). 
According to Benjamin (2013), all disputes concerning unfair dismissals, trade union 
organizational rights, interpretation of collective agreements and certain individual unfair labour 
practices, interest disputes arising from collective bargaining, must be referred to conciliation. The 
commissioner should attempt to resolve the dispute within 30 days of the date the referral was 
received by the CCMA. However, the 30 day period can be extended through the consent of the 
disputing parties. At the end of the 30 days, a certificate must be issued indicating whether or not 
the dispute was resolved, a copy of the certificate should be served to each party to the dispute 
or his representative, the original of the certificate must be filed with the CCMA (Nel et al., 2012) 
However, if the dispute is unresolved, it may be referred either to arbitration or to adjudication by 
the Labour Court. Arbitration may be conducted with the backing of the CCMA, an accredited 
bargaining council or, by agreement, a private arbitrator appointed by collective or other 
agreement. CCMA arbitrations are conducted either by full-time Commissioners who are 
employees of the CCMA or by part-time commissioners (Benjamin, 2013). 
4.2 Bargaining Councils 
Bargaining Councils are joint employer and union bargaining institutions whose functions and 
powers are set out in the LRA. One of the LRA’s main objectives is to promote collective 
bargaining as a means of regulating relations between management and labour and as a means 
of settling disputes between them. A Bargaining Council has the responsibility to negotiate 
collective agreements that regulate terms and conditions of employment in the sectors in which 
they operate. Bargaining Council agreements deal with issues such as minimum wages, hours of 
work, overtime, leave pay, notice periods, and retrenchment pay. A bargaining council does not 
need to be accredited with the CCMA to perform dispute resolution services regarding parties to 
that council. If a bargaining council applies to the CCMA for accreditation, the CCMA may, as a 
term of accreditation, give council conciliators similar powers to CCMA conciliators. Their 
jurisdiction may be sectoral, regional or industry wide and hence they vary in size and quality of 
dispute resolution (Bhorat et al., 2009; Finnemore, 2009). 
4.3 Labour Courts 
The LRA established the Labour Court as a specialist court of law and equity. It has jurisdiction 
in all provinces with the same status as a division of the High Court of South Africa. NEDLAC 
plays a significant role in the appointment of Labour Court judges so as to enable the social 
partners to play an active role in determining the composition of the Court. The Labour Court can 
hear cases concerning dismissals for operational requirements, strike dismissals, dismissals due 
to discrimination, contractual or BCEA or EEA disputes without going through conciliation first 
(Benjamin, 2013).  
The Labour Appeal Court is the court of final appeal in respect of labour disputes. The LRA 
created the Labour Courts to deal with complex labour issues. The Labour Courts have been 
faced with a problem of over reliance on acting judges with little experience in labour law due to 
their inability to attract sufficient judges of high calibre. The Labour Courts have the responsibility 
to exercise a supervisory authority over the CCMA but due to the huge case loads and human 
resource constraints, it has been unable to (Bhorat et al., 2009).  Benjamin (2013) however states 
that in the last few years, many highly regarded labour law specialists have taken permanent 
appointments to the Labour Court bench. 
4.4 Workplace forums 
Workplace forums are a product of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. They are established upon 
the request of a majority union or unions in any workplace employing more than 100 persons 
(Bendix, 2009). Their primary objective is to facilitate a shift at the workplace, from adversarial 
collective bargaining to joint problem-solving and participation on certain matters.  
According to Finnemore (2009) and Bendix (2009), workplace forums are designed to promote 
the interests of all employees by; 
a) Providing a forum for the representation of all employees at the workplace 
b) Facilitate a shift from adversarial bargaining at the workplace to joint problem solving by 
employees and employers.  
c) Promote employee participation at the workplace. 
d) Provide employees with institutionalised voice in managerial decision-making. 
e) Benefit employers by raising productivity and profitability. 
f) Supplement collective bargaining and not undermine it, by relieving collective bargaining 
of functions to which the process is not well suited. 
4.5 Private dispute resolution 
South African labour law has a provision for parties to resolve their dispute through private 
processes and this is referred to as private dispute resolution. Private arbitration that is part of the 
private dispute resolution system is conducted by agreement between the disputing parties in 
which they choose their arbitrator and by agreement also determine their own terms of reference 
and powers. The powers of the arbitrator and the process to be followed are governed by the 
agreement between parties (Basson et al., 2005). 
The Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA), formed in 1984, was the first private 
dispute resolution agency that set out to provide mediation arbitration services that were more 
expeditious, informal and less adversarial in nature than the courts. In 2000, IMSSA closed down 
and Tokiso Dispute Settlement was formed and it has grown to be the largest and most active 
private dispute resolution service in South Africa. The CCMA has however, not accredited private 
agencies, despite the demand for private dispute resolution services by agencies such as Tokiso 
(Bhorat et al., 2009). 
 
5. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
5.1 Conciliation 
According to Smith (2008), conciliation is the first step in the dispute resolution process. Most 
endeavours for resolving labour disputes in South Africa start with conciliation, irrespective of 
whether the issue concerns a matter of right or interest. The only deviation from this approach is 
in private dispute resolution where parties are allowed to agree to refer disputes straight to the 
arbitration process. The CCMA is bound by the LRA to attempt to resolve disputes referred to it 
through conciliation and any private agency or bargaining council may be granted accreditation 
to conduct conciliations by the CCMA (Smith, 2008). However, the CCMA has not to date 
accredited any private dispute resolution agencies (Benjamin, 2013). 
If a dispute is referred to the CCMA according to section 133 of the LRA, a commissioner should 
be appointed to try and resolve the dispute within 30 days. According to Nel et al., (2012), the 30 
day period can be extended with the consent of both parties. The commissioner is entitled to see 
how to proceed with the dispute and this can be through mediating the dispute, conducting a fact 
finding exercise and making recommendations to the parties.  
Afterwards a certificate is issued indicating whether the dispute was resolved or not. In terms of 
section 135(5) of the Act, even if 30 days lapse without the matter being conciliated, the referring 
party has a right to a certificate of non-resolution in order to take the next step, whether being 
arbitration, adjudication or industrial action, depending on the issues involved. However, if the 
dispute is settled, the Commissioner will draw up a settlement agreement which both parties sign 
and a certificate issued recording that the dispute is settled. A conciliation agreement is final and 
binding on both parties, and if either party fails to uphold the agreement, it can be made an award 
and thereafter certified as an order of court (Basson et al., 2005). 
If a dispute is not settled at conciliation, there are options available. If it is a probation dispute, it 
must go to Conciliation-Arbitration (Con-arb) according to section 191(5A) of the LRA. If it is a 
dismissal (conduct or incapacity) or unfair labour practice and the parties do not object to the 
process, the matter may also continue to Con-arb or a commissioner may issue a certificate 
showing that the matter was not resolved and the applicant then apply for arbitration. If it is an 
automatically unfair dismissal according to section 187(1) of the LRA Act and unfair discrimination 
in terms of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act, then the matter must be referred to the Labour 
Court for adjudication. However, parties may opt for arbitration at the CCMA for unfair 
discrimination disputes. If it is an interest dispute, then employees may serve a strike notice and 
employers respond by issuing out lock-out notices (Basson et al., 2005; Smith, 2008). 
5.2 Conciliation-Arbitration (con-arb) 
This process is the combination of conciliation and arbitration. According to the LRA, an arbitration 
hearing must immediately follow the conciliation proceedings once a certificate on non-resolution 
has been issued in disputes concerning dismissals or unfair labour practices relating to probation. 
If no objection is received from either party, con-arb may be used for any other dispute for example 
conduct, capacity, continued employment intolerable, less favourable terms of section 197 or 
section 197A transfers, reason for dismissal unknown, or an unfair labour practice. The core of 
the process is that conciliation is immediately followed by arbitration (Smith, 2008). The con-arb 
process is similar in many ways to the conciliation process.  
If the dispute is alleged unfair dismissal, the disputant must refer the matter to the CCMA of 
Bargaining Council for con-arb within 30 days of the date of dismissal. If it is alleged unfair labour 
practices, the dispute must be referred to con-arb within 90 days. If any of the referrals are late, 
an application for a pardon for the lateness must be submitted by the referring party (Smith, 2008). 
Con-ab starts with conciliation and if the dispute is certified as unresolved, then the dispute is 
taken for arbitration where an arbitration award is issued to both parties. Such award is final and 
binding cannot be subjected to an appeal process but can be referred for review (Smith, 2008). 
However, before going for arbitration, a commissioner is allowed to postpone the matter for 
arbitration. If parties settle by themselves at the conciliation stage, an agreement is signed by 
both parties and a certificate of resolution is issues (Smith, 2008).  
5.3 Arbitration 
Section 115(1)(b) of the LRA grants the CCMA permission to conduct arbitrations if a dispute 
remains unresolved after conciliation and according to section 127(1)(b) of the Act, any private 
agency or bargaining council may be granted accreditation to conduct arbitrations by the CCMA. 
However, Smith (2008) asserts that certain disputes can only be dealt by the CCMA and not the 
accredited agencies. 
According to Nel et al., (2013), there are two types of arbitration: compulsory arbitration and 
voluntary arbitration. Compulsory arbitration can take place in terms of a collective agreement 
which stipulates arbitration as part of the collective bargaining process or in terms of the LRA 
which says arbitration is compulsory where conciliation has failed. Voluntary arbitration, on the 
other hand, is when parties choose to refer a dispute to arbitration. However, arbitration is 
compulsory regardless of the council’s right to select its own panel of arbitrators. 
A party must refer a dispute for arbitration with CCMA or Bargaining Council within 90 days after 
certificate of non-resolution from the conciliation process is issued. If such referral is late, then 
the party should apply for a pardon for the lateness because the arbitration process and award 
thereof becomes null and void if the late referral of the dispute for conciliation has not been 
condoned. A dispute may be arbitrated by the CCMA only if it has been conciliated, or if 30 days 
lapse without a date being set for conciliation. A certificate of non-resolution is a legal prerequisite 
for arbitration by the CCMA or Bargaining Councils. In terms of section 138(7), a Commissioner 
must issue an award within 14 days of the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings and the award 
cannot be subject to an appeal process but to review. In terms of section 134 of the Act, an 
arbitration award can be enforced as if it was an order of the court if there is non-compliance to it 
(Smith, 2008). 
5.4 Adjudication 
According to Smith (2008), adjudication is “a process where a judge reviews evidence and 
argumentation including legal reasoning set forth by opposing parties to come to a judgement 
which determines the rights between parties involved.” 
Adjudication is a compulsory process once appropriately referred by one of the parties to the 
dispute. The judge hears the parties’ cases and determines the dispute. However, there are 
certain disputes that must be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication according to section 
191(5) (b) of the LRA.  
 
6. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
According to section 213 of the LRA, Essential Services refers to “a service an interruption of 
which endangers life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part of the population, 
parliamentary service and the South African Police Service”. 
The Essential Services Committee has declared 18 services to be essential; Air Traffic Control, 
Blood Transfusion Services, Court Services, Department of Correctional Services, Department 
Defence Civilian Services, Fire Fighting, Key-point Computer Services, Local Authority Services 
(municipal traffic services and policing, health and security), Power, Private Health Services 
funded by the public (emergency health services and health facilities for the community, nursing 
and paramedical services), Private health Services funded by the public (boiler and water 
purification), Public Health Services, Public Health Support Services, Sanitation Services, Social 
Pensions Payments, water etc. (Van der Walt et al., 2012). 
Section 65(1)(d) of the LRA puts limitations on the right to strike if the person is engaged in 
essential or maintenance services. Section 74(1) states that a party engaged in an essential 
service may refer the dispute in writing to the CCMA or Bargaining Council for conciliation and 
arbitration who must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. If the dispute remains 
unresolved, then any party to the dispute may refer it for arbitration by the council or commission. 
If a dispute of mutual interest in essential service is referred to the CCMA in terms of section 
135(6) of the Act, parties must agree on the terms of reference. But if they don’t, then the 
commissioner can determine the terms of reference (Smith, 2008). 
 
 
 
7. REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
7.1 Elements of the system 
The institutions for dispute resolution in the South African labour relations system are the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Labour Court, the Labour 
Appeal Court, Bargaining councils and private dispute resolution agencies. The CCMA is one of 
the major and most successful innovations of the Labour Relations Act. The LRA established the 
CCMA as a statutory but independent body, although it is funded by the state. It is governed by 
tripartite committee chaired by an independent person. It has jurisdiction all over South Africa and 
has offices in all nine provinces. The primary function of the CCMA is to conciliate and arbitrate 
disputes. These are disputes referred to the CCMA in terms of the LRA and other labour statutes 
such as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA), Employment Equity Act of 1998 
(EEA), the Skills Development Act of 1998 and the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2001 (UIF) 
(Nel et al., 2012). 
According to Smith (2008), the South African Labour law distinguishes between disputes of right 
and of interest (matters of mutual interest) which isn’t always an easy distinction to make. 
According to the Labour Relations Act No.66 of 1995, disputes of interest may be resolved through 
power by way of either lockout or strikes, which are protected only if the process prescribed by 
the Act, including conciliation, has been exhausted while disputes of rights are normally settled 
through direct negotiations or during conciliation, through either arbitration or Labour Court 
adjudication. According to Venter & Levy (2013), dismissals make up the largest percentage of 
referrals amounting for 81% of the case load at the CCMA and Bargaining Councils with the 
exception of the Public Sector Bargaining Council. 
The CCMA has the power to licence Private Agencies and Bargaining Councils to perform any or 
all of its functions. This allows parties in dispute the choice of which institutions to assist them, 
although the Bargaining Council where it exists for parties, is always the first institution of 
engagement and if there is no Bargaining council then the CCMA has jurisdiction. However as 
mentioned above, the CCMA has not accredited any private agencies (Benjamin, 2013).  
Bargaining councils on the other hand do not need to be accredited with the CCMA to perform 
dispute resolution services regarding parties to that council. However if a bargaining council 
applies to the CCMA for accreditation, the CCMA may, as a term of accreditation, give council 
conciliators similar powers to CCMA conciliators. Their jurisdiction may be sectoral, regional or 
industry wide and hence they vary in size and quality of dispute resolution (Bhorat et al., 2009). 
In terms of usage of the South African system, Bendeman (2006) argues that the LRA has created 
a sophisticated system of dispute resolution in which most of the role players are not capacitated 
to operate. The guidelines in Schedule 8 of the LRA have become the norm for dealing with 
conflict within an enterprise, creating complex and technical processes for dealing with disputes. 
However, most of the employers and individual employees do not have the knowledge and skills 
to operate effectively in the system. The very technical nature of the internal conflict resolution 
mechanisms, the incapacity of the parties and the adversarial nature of the labour relationship 
have resulted in the high referral rate and consequent problems for the CCMA. 
7.2 Possible indicators 
7.2.1 Legitimacy  
When the ANC came to power in 1994, it started change by undoing the apartheid labour laws so 
as to transform the legislative framework and bring it in line with the international standards set 
by the ILO. There was extensive consultation with all social partners and the public so as to 
implement laws that were fair for all (Nel et al., 2012). The ANC focused on all the apartheid laws 
and realigned the labour legislation by primarily drawing on Australian, New Zealand and 
Canadian and related labour laws. This is because all these countries are Common wealth nations 
who inherited the British industrial relations system and South Africa’s history and labour relations 
structure is closely linked to the constitutional and socioeconomic developments of these 
countries. 
The LRA establishes the CCMA as a statutory but independent body, although it is funded by the 
state. The CCMA is also independent of political parties, trade unions, employer organizations, 
employers, federations of trade unions, and federations of employer organizations. It is governed 
by tripartite committee chaired by an independent person. It has jurisdiction all over South Africa 
and has offices in all nine provinces. This means that though the system is under government 
funding, it is an autonomous body that is free from government influence/ interference (Benjamin, 
2013).  
When it comes to awareness of the system, a large percentage of employees have no, or little 
schooling and the largest proportion of employers are in small to medium sized businesses with 
practically no skills or training in labour relations and labour law. It could thus be assumed that 
the parties the South African labour relations system aims at protecting lack knowledge or are not 
equipped to deal with and make proper use of this system (Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2008). 
However, Venter & Levy (2013) argue that the increased figures in terms of referrals are proof of 
the degree of public knowledge, understanding and reach of the system. The number of referrals 
was 161,588 in the 2011/2012 financial year which was a 4.7% increase from the previous year. 
This figure involves the number of cases referred to bargaining councils and private agencies.  
7.2.2 Efficiency 
According to Koorapetse (2011), efficiency of the South African system relates to how much time 
is spent during conciliation, con-arb or arbitration. According to the LRA, conciliations should be 
conducted within 30 days of referral of disputes and arbitrations within 90 days. The CCMA has 
set an internal efficiency target of 60 days for arbitrations rather than the statutory 90 days. The 
CCMA has even instituted mechanisms to notify parties of processes more effectively for example 
by using SMS notices. 
However, the CCMA has been accused of putting too much emphasis on the speedy resolution 
of cases which means that the CCMA commissioners don’t even have time or inclination to deal 
with the underlying issues of a dispute (Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2008). When efficiency 
becomes an end in itself, then the system is in danger of losing sight of its function which is to 
resolve the dispute (Brand et al., 1997). 
Bendeman (2006) however argues that the CCMA are not as expeditious as they hoped for with 
many disputes being referred to arbitration and not settled at conciliation as was intended. 
7.2.3 Informality 
The CCMA has been lauded for having un-complicated referral procedures when  complainants 
want to report their disputes. According to Koorapetse (2011), the only procedural requirements 
that an applicant has to fulfil are two referral forms for conciliation and arbitration and one does 
not even need legal representation during the whole dispute settlement process. Brand et al., 
(1997) further add that legal representation inevitably brings about formalised and technical 
arguments and procedures. However, Venter & Levy (2013) argue that having 
representation(trade union, consultant or a practicing attorney) really makes no significant 
difference to the outcome of the case and therefore parties should have the flexibility to choose 
representation as long as that representation does not obstruct the process. 
According to Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen (2008), the the dispute resolution system is being let 
down by the strict interpretation of the labour laws by the CCMA and the Labour courts. For 
example the CCMA has been accused of continuously applying and demanding procedural rights 
beyond those required by the Code of Good Practice. This is worsened by the lack of proper 
supervision and clear guidance from the Labour Courts which has also placed huge burdens on 
CCMA commissioners to determine the correct process to follow in resolving disputes. 
Applicants also do not have knowledge of the system or their rights and obligations. Bendeman 
(2006) further argues that applicants are poorly advised by trade unions, labour consultants and 
the Department of Labour, who lead them to believe that they have a good case and that they 
should pursue the matter further at the CCMA. 
7.2.4 Affordability 
The CCMA does not charge anyone for referring disputes to it. This is attributed to the fact that it 
is funded by the national government (Benjamin, 2013). This is an advantage as the poor are also 
availed the opportunity of fair labour justice. 
7.2.5 Accessibility 
A dispute resolution system should ensure that it is accessible to all parties. The absence of a 
requirement for formal pleadings and complicated referral procedures are one of the successful 
features that make the CCMA more accessible. This simplicity of the processes is often cited as 
an important factor in making the CCMA accessible to a large number of workers. For example, 
it has ensured that literacy, lack of skills and resources are not hindrances preventing entry to the 
system. 
According to Bendeman (2006), the CCMA’s accessibility is further evidenced by the high number 
of cases it gets, even frivolous ones. 
 
7.2.6 Full range of services 
According to Benjamin (2013), some of the services offered by the CCMA include dispute 
resolution, dispute management, and institution-building within the labour arena and the provision 
of education, training and information to employers and employees and their organizations. 
Bargaining councils on the other hand have traditionally negotiated collective agreements that 
regulate terms and conditions of employment in the sectors in which they operate.  They are also 
authorized to appoint designated agents who have powers similar to those of labour inspectors 
to enforce compliance with collective agreements. 
The South African system caters for all types of disputes. However, there have been calls for a 
reduction on individual disputes as they are time consuming and others tend to be frivolous. 
According to Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen (2008), the CCMA is faced by a very high number of 
referrals compared to its capacity. A delay in the settlement of cases has proved to be an even 
bigger challenge for the CCMA. 
7.2.7 Accountability 
Every effective system should be held accountable to the public and to their institutional 
stakeholders and the South African system has a high degree of transparency. All the dispute 
resolution institutions release monthly reports to account for the resources that they have used 
and this information is available to the public. Good examples are the CCMA and Tokiso who 
release annual reports on the number of cases they have solved, their financial statements et 
cetera.  
The governing body which exercises significant executive and oversight function over the 
management and operations of the CCMA plays an important role in accounting for the CCMA. It 
represents the CCMA in hearings before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and in dealings 
with the Department of Labour and the Auditor-General who has oversight of the CCMA’s financial 
management where it promotes the purpose of the CCMA and jointly argues for its continued 
relevance and funding. It also galvanises support for the CCMA from their constituencies and 
responding publicly to the criticism (Benjamin, 2013). 
7.2.8 Resources 
When it comes to resources, the South African dispute resolution system is faced by a number of 
challenges. It is faced with financial and human resource constraints. This is further aggravated 
by the immense case-load pressure and the need to meet case efficiencies for CCMA 
commissioners. According to Benjamin (2013), the daily efficiencies for commissioners are: 2 
con-arbs per day, 3 conciliations per day, 2 arbitrations per day, 4 rescissions per day. Because 
of this load, this may, in some cases, lead to hasty settling of disputes and possibly also in 
superficial settlements which fail to address the underlying causes of conflict or the real needs of 
the parties. 
There have been issues of limited funding for the system and implementation of the various acts. 
That is, the different acts like the Skills Development Act and the Employment Equity Act among 
several others in the labour system require funding for them to be implemented correctly. This 
funding is usually obtained from the employer in the organisation who pays a percentage to the 
Department of Labour to implement the acts. This is however still not considered to be enough 
for the correct implementation of the system therefore presenting a further challenge to the system 
(Webster & Sikwebu, 2006). 
The Labour Court’s reliance on acting judges has also proved to be a challenge to the effective 
performance of the system. Initially, three fulltime judges were appointed to the court, 
supplemented by acting judges. No new full time judges have been appointed since 2002, and 
since 2006 only two full time judges have been serving on the bench of the labour court. As a 
result, the most severe problem facing the Labour Court is its reliance on acting judges, some of 
whom have little experience in labour law (Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2008). 
The CCMA has introduced mentoring for entry-level commissioners which makes their transition 
into the organisation much easier. The CCMA has also started to invest more in the Training 
Development Unit (TDU), which has been in existence for two years and forms part of the CCMA 
Capacity Building and Outreach Cluster, as it believes this unit will provide design and 
developmental support for the CCMA’s capacity building and qualifications development 
activities. The impact of the training goes beyond the immediate function of ensuring skilled 
mediators and arbitrators, serving also to enhance the body of dispute resolution skills available 
in the labour market as a whole (Benjamin, 2013). 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has covered the historic evolution of the South African dispute resolution system and 
the influence of the South African trade union movement, secondly the current dispute resolution 
system and lastly a review of the performance of the current dispute resolution system. The 
evolution of the South African labour dispute resolution system was divided into four eras. The 
first era is from 1870 to 1948, the second era from 1948 to 1979, the third from 1979-1994 and 
the last era from 1994 to the present date. The first comprehensive piece of legislation that 
changed the face of Labour Relations in South Africa was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
which introduced a system that catered to white workers in the private sector only as male black 
workers were excluded from the definition of “employee”. Public workers were not included in the 
act as well. After periods of labour unrest, the Wiehahn commission introduced a new era and 
recommended changes to the system which were introduced in the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
which later came to be known as the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1979 and because not 
all recommendations were added, more amendments were made in the years to come leading to 
the passing of the Labour Relations Amendment Act in 1988. 
It was in the final piece of legislation, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 that the dual system of 
labour relations was removed. All employees whether public or private, black or white are 
currently covered under the same piece of Labour Relations Act. The LRA has also established 
institutions to make the system more efficient and accessible to the South African public and they 
are the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Labour Court, the 
Labour Appeal Court, Bargaining councils and private dispute resolution agencies. 
Lastly a review of the performance of the South African dispute resolution system was carried out 
and it was clear that though the system has made a number of achievements compared to other 
national systems, it is currently under strain. 
The next chapter deals with the comparison of the Ugandan and South African dispute resolution 
systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE UGANDAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
SYSTEMS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will establish the differences and similarities between the Ugandan and South African 
dispute resolution systems. This will be undertaken through using the framework developed in 
chapter one and used in chapters two and three, that is, by looking at the elements of the systems 
which include nature of disputes, coverage, processes, avenues of dispute resolution, human 
resources, and secondly, the two systems will be compared using the goals of the systems which 
are legitimacy, efficiency, informality, affordability, accessibility, a full range of services, 
accountability and resources. 
 
2. COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS 
2.1 Elements of the systems 
2.1.1 Nature of the disputes 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 of Uganda, both 
disputes of rights and disputes of interest, whether existing or apprehended, maybe reported in 
writing to a labour officer. However, a labour dispute may only be reported to the Commissioner 
for Labour, or the commissioner may on his/her own initiative take responsibility for any labour 
dispute if it is, or is likely to become a national disaster. The labour officer should react to report 
of labour dispute within two weeks and deal with the report in more than one way. He could 
endeavour to conciliate and resolve the dispute between the parties, appoint a conciliator, refer 
the dispute back with the parties with proposals on how to settle the dispute, reject the report with 
reasons and inform the parties accordingly or inform the parties that the report has matters which 
cannot be dealt with under the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
The Labour officer may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court if four weeks after receipt of a 
labour dispute, the dispute wasn’t resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the commissioner 
doesn’t see any likelihood of reaching any agreement. Therefore, the labour officer shall refer the 
dispute at the request of any party to the Industrial Court. If there are any arrangements for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration between a trade union and employers’ regardless of 
number, the labour officer shouldn’t refer the matter to the industrial court but should ensure that 
parties follow the procedures for settling the dispute laid out in the conciliation or arbitration 
agreement. 
In the South African system, disputes of interest are referred to either a bargaining council or 
CCMA for conciliation and when the dispute remains unresolved, it can either go to arbitration at 
the CCMA or adjudication in the Labour court. Disputes which go to the Labour Court include 
unfair labour practices entailing discrimination, automatically unfair dismissals, dismissals relating 
to retrenchment. Dismissals relating to incapacity, incompetence or misconduct are the ones 
which go to arbitration.  
When it comes to disputes of interest, they are referred to conciliation in either a bargaining 
council or CCMA. Only disputes of interest in essential services are referred to arbitration if they 
remain unresolved after conciliation. For disputes of interest if they are not resolved at conciliation 
the next step is strike action or lock out (Bendix, 2009). 
The difference here is the fact that the Ugandan system does not differentiate between the 
different types of dispute unlike the South African system which differentiates between rights and 
interest them and has different avenues for their settlement. 
2.1.2 Coverage 
In the Uganda, both private and public employees are covered by the dispute resolution system. 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, an employee 
means anyone who enters into a contract of service or an apprenticeship contract, including 
without limitation, a person who is employed by or for the government of Uganda, a local 
government or a parastatal organisation, but doesn’t include a member of the Uganda people’s 
defence force. However the Trades Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act 1964 did not apply 
to members of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces, members of any police force established 
by the Constitution or Act of Parliament, public officers or persons otherwise employed by the 
Government.  
In South Africa, the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 united the South Africa 
workforce which was divided by the apartheid regime as only private sector workers were covered 
by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. The 1924 Act and its follow up Acts excluded male 
African workers but that was to change when the Wiehahn commission in 1979 recommended 
that African workers were included in the dispute resolution system. Public sector employees took 
longer to have their own dispute resolution mechanism and it was only in 1993 that the Public 
Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) was promulgated together with the Education Labour 
Relations Act (ELRA) who established bargaining councils. The new Labour Relations Act of 1995 
covered all workers in South Africa under a single piece of legislation. Those who are not covered 
are the members of the South African Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency and the South 
African Secret Service (Smith, 2008). 
Both systems are quite similar as they both exclude their national armies from being covered by 
the Act. However, the South African system also excludes its National Intelligence Agency and 
the South African Secret Service from being covered by the Act. 
2.1.3 Avenues of dispute resolution 
According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 of Uganda, both 
disputes of rights and disputes of interest, whether existing or apprehended, maybe reported in 
writing to a labour officer. However, a labour dispute may only be reported to the Commissioner 
for Labour, or the commissioner may on his/her own motion take responsibility for any labour 
dispute if it is, or is likely to become a national disaster. The labour officer should react to report 
of labour dispute within two weeks and deal with the report in more than one way. He could 
endeavour to conciliate and resolve the dispute between the parties, appoint a conciliator, refer 
the dispute back with the parties with proposals on how to settle the dispute, reject the report with 
reasons and inform the parties accordingly or inform the parties that the report has matters which 
cannot be dealt with under the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006. 
The Labour officer may refer the dispute to the Industrial Court if four weeks after receipt of a 
labour dispute, the dispute wasn’t resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the commissioner 
doesn’t see any likelihood of reaching any agreement. Therefore, the labour officer shall refer the 
dispute at the request of any party to the Industrial Court. If there are any arrangements for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration between a trade union and an employer, regardless of 
number, the labour officer shouldn’t refer the matter to the industrial court but should ensure that 
parties follow the procedures for settling the dispute laid out in the conciliation or arbitration 
agreement. However, the Industrial Court has been un-operational for quite some time. 
According to Koorapetse (2011, p.62), “all types of disputes go for conciliation at the CCMA or 
Bargaining councils in south Africa. If after conciliation they remain unresolved, the legislation 
prescribes the route. For example, freedom of association goes to the Labour Court; disputes of 
interest in essential services goes for arbitration; dismissals due to incapacity, incompetence or 
misconduct goes to arbitration; automatically unfair dismissals go to Labour Court, dismissals 
relating to participating in strike for reasons linked to closed shop go to Labour Court, dismissals 
relating to reasons for retrenchment go to the Labour Court, unfair labour practices (excluding 
discrimination) go to arbitration; unfair labour practices entailing discrimination go to Labour Court 
and interest disputes go to strike action unless if it is a dispute about refusal to bargain”. 
The major difference here is the fact that the South African system has a number of avenues to 
cater to the different types of disputes unlike the Ugandan system which only has the Labour 
officers and the Industrial court. Because the Industrial Court is un-operational in Uganda, most 
disputes are sent to the Ministry responsible for labour or the High Courts. 
2.1.4 Human resources 
In Uganda, the ministry responsible for labour in the country is the Ministry of Gender, Labour and 
Social Development (MGLSD). The MGLSD is divided into a number of Directorates, including 
the Directorate of Labour. The Directorate of Labour, in turn, has three departments; Employment 
Services; Occupational Safety and Health; and Labour, Industrial Relations and Productivity. The 
Directorate of Labour appoints and facilitates Labour Officers though they are supposed to be 
appointed and administered by their individual districts as part of the country’s shift towards 
decentralisation but that hasn’t happened yet. Labour officers are responsible for conducting 
workplace inspections and ensuring compliance with the employment standards set out in the 
Employment Act. They are also called upon to facilitate the settlement of employment disputes 
and are empowered to institute criminal or civil proceedings in the Industrial Court in respect of 
any violation of the Employment Act (Ainslie & Bunya, 2011). According to the Labour Disputes 
(Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006, a Labour officer means the Commissioner for Labour, 
the district labour officer and the assistant labour officer. 
In South Africa, the governing body of CCMA appoints the commissioners according to the LRA 
of 1995 and they are appointed on the strength of their expertise and experience in labour matters 
particularly in labour dispute resolution to conduct conciliation, arbitrations, and con-arbs. 
Complete impartiality is expected from commissioners. Commissioners are employed on either 
full time or part time basis. There are several categories of commissioners for example senior 
commissioners who manage other commissioners and monitor the conciliation and arbitration 
hearings and they are all expected to have a certain level of education to carry out their tasks. 
 The LRA established a specialist system of labour courts with an exclusive labour law jurisdiction, 
that is the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court is the court of final appeal in respect of 
labour disputes to deal with complex labour issues. Because of the inability to attract sufficient 
judges of high calibre in the field of labour law, these courts rely on acting judges who have little 
experience in labour law. 
 
3. PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM 
3.1 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy of a dispute resolution system involves key factors like need for consensus, 
independence of institutions, the protection of human rights, need for the use to be voluntary and 
aligned not only societal norms but workplace agreements and regulations, delivery of just and 
fair decisions as well as clear and consistent decisions. 
Uganda’s legislative system has been marred by controversy from the very beginning. With every 
political regime, all the changes to the dispute resolution system have been made with very limited 
consultation with the concerned stakeholders. The Ugandan government has let market forces 
determine the employer-employee relationship in Uganda and has failed to enforce recognition of 
unions in the private sector, failed to recognise and bargain effectively in the public sector. 
Government has also failed to enforce laws on minimum wage which has left vulnerable groups 
unprotected from the forces of liberalisation.  Further still, most labour institutions have been non-
functional for many years for example the Industrial Court. The decentralisation of labour officers 
also subjects them to government control as districts are run by government representatives, 
Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs). This is evidence of government control of the labour 
institutions in Uganda. 
The South African system on the other hand carried out extensive consultation with all social 
partners and the public so as to implement laws that were fair for all. The LRA establishes the 
CCMA as a statutory but independent body, although it is funded by the state. The CCMA is also 
independent of political parties, trade unions, employer organizations, employers, federations of 
trade unions, and federations of employer organizations. Furthermore, the South African system 
has very well qualified and professional staff by the world standards. 
 
 
3.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency is a very vital goal for every dispute resolution system. Efficiency as desired by the 
parties to labour disputes, is the requirement that disputes be speedily resolved. That is, disputes 
should be addressed quickly with the least procedural technicalities as there is a need for the 
disputing parties to have the dispute resolved quickly and not drag on indefinitely. 
The Ugandan system has been designed to respond to disputes within the shortest time possible. 
Labour officer are expected to respond to labour dispute within two weeks and he/she may refer 
the dispute to the Industrial Court if, four weeks after receipt of a labour dispute, the dispute was 
not resolved and if the conciliator appointed by the Commissioner does not see a likelihood of 
reaching any agreement. However the system is not efficient because of the “chronic” shortage 
of labour officers and the un-operation of the Industrial Court, which is the only avenue for 
appealing the decision of a labour officer. According to Ainslie & Bunya (2011), a majority of labour 
cases are often referred to the un-operational Industrial Court or the Ministry responsible for 
labour, and consequently remain unheard which is quite distressing. This is further worsened by 
the alternative ordinary courts that choose not to handle labour disputes as they lack knowledge 
on labour laws. 
The South African system is much more efficient. The CCMA has set an internal efficiency target 
of 60 days for arbitrations rather than the statutory 90 days set by the LRA. The CCMA has even 
instituted mechanisms to notify parties of processes more effectively for example using SMS 
notices. According to Koorapetse (2011), there has been an increase of the settlement rate of 
disputes over the years. 
Therefore the South African system is more efficient than the Ugandan system as it has 
institutions which respond to labour disputes in a short period of time unlike the ugandan system 
that lacks institutions which would be handling these didputes. 
 
3.3 Informality 
Informality means that parties involved should be able to approach the system virtually unaided. 
Procedures and operations should be clear, uncomplicated, and informal. 
The Ugandan system is designed in an easy way that could be understood by all. However, 
majority of the labour officers are not qualified and are not sure on what their position entails as 
they havent been well trained in key labour administration activities such as labour inspection, 
employment services, dispute resolution and labour law. This therefore means that if the system 
is not understood by the labour officers, chances are high that there is limited assistance available 
for those who need to use the system which in the long run complicates the process for the users, 
mainly the vulnerable groups.  
The South African system on the other hand is committed to informality. This is shown by the 
absence of complicated referral procedures during the whole dispute resolution process as the 
only requirements that an applicant has to fulfil are two referral forms for conciliation and 
arbitration and one does not even need legal representation during the whole dispute settlement 
process. However, the CCMA and the Labour Courts have been accused of strict interpretation 
of the labour laws. 
Both systems do not require the parties to have legal representation which simplifies the process. 
However, the South African system is more informal than the Ugandan system as its staff is more 
acquainted with the system unlike the Ugandan labour officers who have not been well trained to 
use it. The CCMA commissioners are up to date with the current legislative and policy changes 
and offer assistance to parties where necessary. 
3.4 Affordability 
An ideal labour dispute resolution system should be free or at the very least inexpensive. That is, 
the least privileged or the poor should be able to access the system. 
The Ugandan system offers free services through labour officers and the Industrial Court. 
However because cases which are unresolved by the labour officers are being sent to the High 
court which is quite costly, because of the inactive industrial court, this means that the system is 
not affordable for majority of workers. In addition, due to budgetary limitations and differing 
political priorities at the district level many districts do not have labour officers in place. This 
therefore means that anyone with a dispute will be forced to report it to the normal court which is 
highly unlikely for low income earners. 
The South African system on the other hand is free of charge. The CCMA does not charge for 
referring disputes to it as it is a government funded institute. Comparing both systems indicates 
that the South African system is affordable for every type of employee, more importantly the 
vulnerable ones. However, when the cases end up at the South African Labour Courts, the 
disputants will need to hire a lawyer. 
3.5 Accessibility 
Brand et al., (1997) assert that a dispute resolution system should ensure that all parties, including 
the most vulnerable, have easy access in terms of where to go, who to approach and how to 
involve the dispute resolution institutions in their dispute. Furthermore, a system needs to have 
minimum formalities in obtaining assistance for the parties. 
According to the Ugandan Employment Act of 2006, labour officers should be appointed in each 
of the country’s 111 districts so that everyone has access to the system. However due to 
budgetary limitations and differing political priorities at the district level many districts do not have 
labour officers in place. This therefore means that not all parties, especially the most vulnerable 
and inhabitants of rural areas, have easy means to make contact and using the court system is 
quite complicated for a country with a high rate of illiteracy. According to the Labour Administration 
and Inspection Programme (2012), there were only 26 districts with labour officers. The 
Researcher discovered that many of Ugandans were not aware of the existence of labour officers 
and the Industrial Court which proves there’s not enough information out there about the system. 
The South African system however, ensures accessibility for every employee. The CCMA has a 
very simple system for referral procedures which is often cited as an important factor in making 
the CCMA accessible to a large number of workers as it has ensured that literacy, lack of skills 
and resources are not hindrances preventing entry to the system. Its accessibility is further 
evidenced by the high number of cases it gets, even frivolous ones. 
Therefore the South African system is much more accessible than the Ugandan system as it has 
less complicated procedures and has staff available to assist the users of the system unlike the 
Ugandan system which is facing a problem of staff shortage per district. 
 
3.6 Range of services 
According to the ILO (2013), an effective dispute resolution system should provide a range of 
services related to the prevention and resolution of disputes for both private and public sector 
clients. Some of these services include the provision of information, advice, training, facilitation, 
investigations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication as well as conciliation-arbitration, 
and arbitration-conciliation sequences where appropriate. Services such as advisory information 
and training to assist employers and employees to prevent disputes from arising in the first place 
should also be made available. 
The Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) Act No. 8 of 2006 of Uganda caters for all the 
different types of disputes, that is, private sector and public sector disputes, collective and 
individual disputes, Unionised and nonunionised disputes, disputes of rights and interests and 
disputes from the essential services. The Industrial Court is tasked with promoting equity, effective 
and expeditious settlement of labour disputes, industrial harmony and improved working 
conditions while Labour officers on the other hand are responsible for labour inspection, dispute 
resolution and because the Industrial Court is not operational, they have been conducting 
hearings and delivering rulings on matters which would ordinarily be done by the specialized 
court. Because of limited funding from the government, high staff turnover of labour officers, 
untrained labour officers, the system is unable to provide all the required services expected of a 
dispute resolution system by the ILO such as provision of information, advice, training, facilitation, 
investigations, conciliation, arbitration et cetera. 
In South Africa the CCMA offers services like dispute resolution, dispute management, and 
institution-building within the labour arena and the provision of education, training and information 
to employers and employees and their organizations. Bargaining councils on the other hand have 
traditionally negotiated collective agreements that regulate terms and conditions of employment 
in the sectors in which they operate.  They are also authorized to appoint designated agents who 
have powers similar to those of labour inspectors to enforce compliance with collective 
agreements. South African labour law also has a provision for parties to resolve their dispute 
through private processes and this is referred to as private dispute resolution. 
Therefore, the South African system offers more services compared to the Ugandan system as 
the Ugandan system is held back by limited funding from the government, high staff turnover of 
labour officers, untrained labour officers. 
3.7 Accountability 
According to the ILO (2013), any institution needs to be held accountable to the public and those 
institutional stakeholders who will be affected by their decisions or actions regardless of whether 
it’s a government, private or civil society organization.  
As mentioned in chapter two, the Ugandan governance system has a history of lacking 
transparency and accountability to the public and this has affected the dispute resolution system. 
For example the reluctance to re-establish the industrial court, set minimum wage. In fact, it has 
only been accountable after pressure from international bodies such as the ILO and western 
countries. Additionally, there are no labour reports from the institutions to account for the 
resources used or updates on what they are doing. 
By international standards, the South African system has a high degree of transparency and 
accountability through releasing monthly reports to account for the resources that they have used 
and this information is available to the public. Good examples are the CCMA and Tokiso who 
release annual reports on the number of cases they have solved, their financial statements et 
cetera. The CCMA also has a governing body which accounts for it, represents the CCMA in 
hearings before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and in dealings with the Department of 
Labour and the Auditor-General and to the public. 
Therefore, the South African system is generally more accountable to all the stakeholders than 
the Ugandan system. 
3.8 Resources 
For any dispute resolution to achieve any of the goals discussed in chapter one, it needs to have 
sufficient financial resources to meet the capital and operating expenditure associated with 
providing services to its clients. Furthermore, it needs sufficient professional and support staff 
who have sound knowledge of the system, adequate space and equipment, including computer 
and telecommunication systems.  
The Ugandan system has been faced with a serious issue of budget and staffing constraints and 
is thus unable to carry out the range of services it is expected to provide. According to the Labour 
Administration and Inspection Programme (2012), the Chief Administrative Officers’ (CAOs) have 
been known not to allocate sufficient funding for the functions of labour officers in the districts. 
Furthermore, the limited knowledge among employers and workers in the district about the 
contents of the labour laws and the untrained labour officers who are not up to date with the 
current legislative system have proved to be an obstacle to the success of the system. 
The South African system is faced with financial and human resource constraints which are further 
aggravated by the immense case load pressure and the need to meet case efficiencies for CCMA 
commissioners which leads, in some cases, to hasty settling of disputes and possibly also in 
superficial settlements which fail to address the underlying causes of conflict or the real needs of 
the parties. The Labour Court’s reliance on acting judges has also proved to be a challenge to 
the effective performance of the system.  However, the CCMA is investing more into training of 
its staff through mentoring for entry-level commissioners which makes their transition into the 
organisation much easier, investing in the Training Development Unit (TDU) which provides 
design and developmental support for the CCMA’s capacity building and qualifications 
development activities (Benjamin, 2013). 
The South African system has better resources as its major issues are more to do with lack of 
support staff and caseloads unlike the Ugandan system where the issue is with untrained staff. 
Further still, the South African government seems more responsive to the plight of the system 
unlike Uganda where the government has attempted and succeeded at supressing the system. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The comparison has revealed a lot of differences in the Ugandan and South African system which 
has indicated how much the Ugandan system needs to change in order to have an effective 
system. The South African system is more legitimate, efficient, informal, affordable, and 
accessible than the Ugandan system. Further still the South African system provides a full range 
of services is more accountable and has enough resources than the Ugandan system. 
The next chapter deals with recommendations and conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four has established that there are more differences than similarities between the 
Ugandan and South African labour dispute system. It is evident that the South African system is 
more advanced than the Ugandan system which explains why it is very successful. Both systems 
have roots in the British legal system and it would appear more obvious that the Ugandan system 
would adopt the same system as South Africa but this isn’t the case. The ILO developed a report 
in 2004 (Strengthening Labour Relations in East Africa (SLAREA)) and recommended that a 
system like South Africa’s was too complicated for implementation in Uganda with one of the 
reasons being the weak trade union movement. However, Uganda can still learn from South 
African system and the following are some recommendations to improve the system. 
 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1 Liberalising the Directorate of Labour, Employment, Occupational Safety and Health 
The Ugandan dispute resolution system is still under government control and has been unable to 
make fair and just decisions with or without government intervention. The ministry responsible for 
labour administration in the country is the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development 
(MGLSD) and has a department, the Employment Services Department, which appoints and 
administers Labour Officers. As part of the Country’s shift towards decentralization, these Labour 
Officers are supposed to be administered by individual districts but responsibility has not yet been 
delegated.  
However, to make the system more effective, the Ministry can liberalise the Directorate of Labour, 
Employment, Occupational Safety and Health. The directorate is currently responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of labour laws and policies. Liberalisation of the Directorate would 
enable it to give a more accurate and unbiased account of the labour situation in Uganda. 
Additionally, the Directorate will be able to have supervised control of its resources so as to 
strengthen labour administration and inspection services in Uganda as one of the systems major 
challenges was limited funding and issues such as health and education consistently ranked 
higher on the list of policy priorities for the government, often leaving labour and employment 
matters on the side-line. The role that the MGLSD can play is to guide, advice and fund the 
directorate as it carries out its duties. In South Africa, the labour law implementation has greatly 
improved largely because an independent mechanism has been relied on and more pressure to 
operationalize the law is placed on its government. 
2.2 Mass sensitisation on labour rights 
One of the obstacles to Ugandans enjoying their rights as workers is the fact that they are not 
aware of them. Therefore carrying out labour campaigns would be one way the trade union 
movement would enable Ugandans to know the laws and how the system operates. Government 
should play a pivotal role in ensuring these campaigns are a success by for example sponsoring 
them. 
Additionally, including labour education to the education system of Uganda is one way to create 
awareness. From the interviews carried out and from the researcher’s own personal experience, 
including labour education to the education system in Uganda would create a great awareness of 
the system as the Ugandan education system doesn’t seem regard the role the trade union 
movement played in the political and economic transitions in the country and the impact the labour 
laws and policies have on workers. This explains why many Ugandans, even the educated ones 
are not aware of the existence of labour laws and trade unions. 
2.3 Accreditation of private agencies 
There’s currently not much that is written on private agencies and the Ugandan law doesn’t say 
anything on their establishment or accreditation. However, to solve the problem of unresolved 
labour cases that are piling up at the un-operational Industrial Court, Ordinary Court and the 
MGLSD, the government should encourage the establishment of these agencies to take up the 
role of dispute resolution as the country waits for the re-opening of the Industrial Courts. In South 
Africa, private agencies like Tokiso have reduced the work load placed on the CCMA and 
bargaining councils. 
2.4 Create a separate dispute resolution system for the informal sector 
According to the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (2012), the population in 
Uganda is predominantly rural and agricultural based. In 2010, 25.5 per cent of the working poor 
were employed in agriculture, earning an average of Shs.50, 000 per month, about 33.5 per cent 
of the employees in the private sector earned less than Shs. 50,000 per month in nominal terms, 
while the median monthly income for paid employees was Shs. 90,000. Only 20.8 per cent of the 
employees in the private sector have written contracts and only 9.5 per cent are covered under 
pension schemes that guarantee them social security. 
A separate dispute resolution system needs to be created to cater for the vulnerable atypical 
workers in Uganda. This system should be accessible, informal and efficient. Currently, vulnerable 
workers are being subjected to harsh working conditions and they lack job security therefore a 
new system would establish policies and laws that would ensure that these workers are rights are 
not mistreated in the work environment and their rights are met. This system should be formed 
with the guidance and involvement of all the stakeholders, that is, the employer organisation, 
trade unions and the state. 
2.5 Proper routing of disputes 
According to Koorapetse (2011), the dispute resolution path is clearly prescribed by the LRA in 
South Africa. Several types of disputes are taken for conciliation at the CCMA or bargaining 
council, but if after conciliation they remain unresolved, they take slightly different routes. 
Therefore, it would be better if the Ugandan system would first and foremost differentiate between 
the different types of disputes like the South African system and also clarify where different types 
of disputes would go when conciliation fails. This is because disputes in Uganda are generalised 
and they all take the same path, that is, the dispute is reported to a labour officer who then 
forwards it to the Industrial Court if he/she cannot resolve it. This process is too general as 
different types of disputes should be dealt with differently. 
2.6 Creation of an independent body to monitor the national system 
Government, trade unions and employers need to create an independent body to monitor the 
usage of the system in uganda. This system should act more as a “watch dog” and should monitor 
whether the system is being utilised by every Ugandan, the number of cases being reported, the 
number of settlements et cetera. I belive this system should be comprised of worker 
representatives, employer organisations, the state and foreign representatives (from the ILO 
preferably). A foreign representative would be an important addition  as the government seems 
to respond more to foreign pressure so he/she would be handy when government is not being fair 
in its labour policies. 
In addition to the an independent body, all the social partners need to create “pressure groups” 
to forge relationships with the western world and international bodies with a purpose of exerting 
force on government to enforce the labour laws. Pressure groups also help in creating nation wide 
awareness of the system. 
2.7 Encouraging the creation of more democratic workplaces 
Both international and national companies need to create more democratic workplaces. From the 
interviews carried out and other social interactions, it was evident to see that so many Ugandan 
employees are not confident at expressing their opinions and don’t feel entitled to labour rights 
as they risk their job security. Many were safe with having a job rather than demanding their rights 
as they believe there was no protection for them if they requested for less work hours, leave days 
et cetera. The policy of hire and fire in uganda has not been protested. A democratic workplace 
ensures that employees have a voice and are in the long run motivated in their jobs in addition to 
other intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. 
2.8 Re-establish the Industrial Court 
The Industrial Court needs to be a re-established so as to deal with all the labour matters that are 
not resolved by the labour officers. According to the Labour Disputes (Arbitration & Settlement) 
Act No. 8 of 2006, the Industrial Court is supposed to be established by law under Section 7 with 
the mandate to arbitrate on labour disputes referred to it and to adjudicate all trade disputes 
referred to it. However, it has not been operating for quite some time in the country therefore 
labour matters have been brought before the High Court which most times fails to handle them or 
refers them to the Industrial Court meaning they remain unheard. Therefore, I recommend that 
the MGLSD should re-establish the Industrial Court as it is the only judicial body that has the 
expertise to ensure that there is effective application of labour legislation. More importantly, it 
serves as an important recognition of workers’ need for access to justice. In addition, the 
government should also provide financial support and independence for the court to fulfil its 
obligation as government control and limited funding were reasons for its closure in the first place. 
2.9 Employing and training more labour officers 
One of the obstacles to a success of the Ugandan dispute resolution system has been its human 
resources. Labour officers have been accused of having limited knowledge of the content and 
application of the labour laws and how the dispute resolution system should operate. Therefore 
the MGLSD needs to create and implement a training policy for both the old and new recruits on 
the legislation and how to enforce it. Labour officers should also be trained in conciliation and 
mediation so as to avoid conflicts being sent to court. 
The government should also employ more labour officers as there is also a shortage of labour 
officers in the country. According to the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme of 
2012, there were only 34 labour officers for the 111 districts meaning many districts do not have 
access to the legislative system. Additionally, the MGLSD needs to employ them in better working 
conditions so as to reduce the turnover as the ILO reports that there is a high turnover attributed 
to poor working conditions and unfavourable human resource policies such as low salaries, limited 
career advancement. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
From this chapter, it is evident that though Uganda cannot certainly adopt the South African 
system entirely, it can still learn some aspects so as to become more effective. It is clear from 
Chapter two that Uganda needs to start from the grassroots to create a system that is efficient 
and well known by the public. The ILO has carried out various studies and made 
recommendations on how to make the system better but these have been largely ignored by the 
government. As the Labour Administration and Inspection Programme (2012) suggest, there 
needs to be intensive training of all labour employees, the government needs to embrace and 
implement the 2006 Acts, the system needs to establish a standing court to deal with labour 
issues only et cetera. However, it is up to the Ugandan government to accept that workers have 
rights to and therefore work with all the stakeholders to implement the proposed changes. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF STATUTES 
 
UGANDA 
1913 The Masters and Servants Ordinance, No.19. 
1937 The Trade Unions Ordinance, No.18. 
1941 The Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Ordinance, No.46. 
1943 The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance, No.9. 
1946 The Employment Ordinance, No.13. 
1949 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance, No.19. 
1950 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) (Amendment) Ordinance, No.23. 
1952 The Trade Unions Ordinance, No.10. 
1963 The Public Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act, No.78. 
1964 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No.20, Cap 200, Laws of Uganda 
1964. 
1965 The Trade Unions Act, No.11. 
1970 The Trade Unions Act, No.40. 
1971 The Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.10. 
1973 The Trade Unions Act (Amendment) Decree, No.29. 
1974 The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act (Amendment) Decree, No.18. 
1976 The Trade Unions Decree, No.20. 
1995 Constitution of Uganda 
2006 The Employment Act, No. 6 
2006 The Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act, No. 8 
2006 The Labour Unions Act, No. 7 
SOUTH AFRICA 
1904 Ordinance No.17  
1911 Black Labour Regulations Act No.15 
1914 Workmen’s Compensation Act No. 25  
1914 Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 27  
1924 Industrial conciliation Act No.11  
1937 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act No.36 
1952 Native Laws Amendment Act 54 
1953 Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act No.48  
1956 Industrial Conciliation Act No.28  
1973 Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) No.70 
1977 Black Labour Relations Regulations Amendment Act No.84 
1979 Labour Relations Amendment Act 
1988 Labour Relations Amendment Act 
1993 Public Service Labour Relations Act No.102 
1993 Education Labour Relations Act No.146 
Labour Relations Act No.66 of 1995 
1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 
1998 Employment Equity Act No.55  
1998 Skills Development Act No.97  
 
 
APPENDIX B: LIST OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS PERTAINING 
TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ILO, 2013) 
Conventions 
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) 
The Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) 
The Workers’ Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135) 
The Labour Administration Convention, 1958 (No. 150) 
The Labour Relations (Public Service Convention), 1978 (No. 151) 
The Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154) 
The Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) 
Recommendations 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92) 
Co-operation at the Level of the Undertaking Recommendation, 1952 (No. 94) 
Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 1960 (No. 113) 
Communications within the Undertaking Recommendation, 1967 (No. 129) 
Examination of Grievances Recommendation, 1967 (No. 130) 
Labour Administration Recommendation, 1978 (No. 158) 
Labour Relations (Public Service) Recommendation, 1978 (No. 159) 
Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163) 
 
 
 
